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THE BROSS LECTURES . . 1915

THE WILL TO FREEDOM

OR

THE GOSPEL OF NIETZSCHE AND
THE GOSPEL OF CHRIST

BEING THE BROSS LECTURES DELIVERED IN
LAKE FOREST COLLEGE, ILLINOIS

BY

JOHN NEVILLE FIGGIS, D.D., LITT.D.

OF THE COMMUNITY OF THE RESURRECTION
HONORARY FELLOW OF S. CATHARINE'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

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1917

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TO
JOHN ERIC SIDNEY GREEN

THE BROSS FOUNDATION

THE BROSS LIBRARY is an outgrowth of a fund established in 1879 by the late William Bross, lieutenant-governor of Illinois from 1866 to 1870. Desiring some memorial of his son, Nathaniel Bross, who died in 1856, Mr. Bross entered into an agreement with the "trustees of Lake Forest University," whereby there was finally transferred to them the sum of forty thousand dollars, the income of which was to accumulate in perpetuity for successive periods of ten years, the accumulation of one decade to be spent in the following decade, for the purpose of stimulating the best books or treatises "on the connection, relation, and mutual bearing of any practical science, the history of our race, or the facts in any department of knowledge, with and upon the Christian Religion." The object of the donor was

to "call out the best efforts of the highest talent and the ripest scholarship of the world to illustrate from science, or from any department of knowledge, and to demonstrate the divine origin and the authority of the Christian scriptures; and, further, to show how both science and revelation coincide and prove the existence, the providence, or any or all of the attributes of the only living and true God, 'infinite, eternal, and unchangeable in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth.'"

The gift contemplated in the original agreement of 1879 was finally consummated in 1890. The first decade of the accumulation of interest having closed in 1900, the trustees of the Bross Fund began at this time to carry out the provisions of the deed of gift. It was determined to give the general title of "The Bross Library" to the series of books purchased and published with the proceeds of the Bross Fund. In accordance with the

express wish of the donor, that the "Evidences of Christianity" of his "very dear friend and teacher, Mark Hopkins, D.D.," be purchased and "ever numbered and known as No. 1 of the series," the trustees secured the copyright of this work, which has been republished in a presentation edition as Volume I of the Bross Library.

The trust agreement prescribed two methods by which the production of books and treatises of the nature contemplated by the donor was to be stimulated:

1. The trustees were empowered to offer one or more prizes during each decade, the competition for which was to be thrown open to "the scientific men, the Christian philosophers, and historians of all nations." In accordance with this provision, a prize of six thousand dollars was offered in 1902 for the best book fulfilling the conditions of the deed of gift, the competing manuscripts to be presented on or before June 1, 1905. The prize was awarded to the late Reverend James Orr, D.D., professor

of apologetics and systematic theology in the United Free Church College, Glasgow, for his treatise on "The Problem of the Old Testament," which was published in 1906 as Volume III of the Bross Library.

The second decennial prize of six thousand dollars was offered in 1913, the competing manuscripts to be submitted by January 1, 1915. The judges were President William Douglas Mackenzie, of Hartford Theological Seminary; Professor Rufus M. Jones, of Haverford College; and Professor Benjamin L. Hobson, of McCormick Theological Seminary. The prize was awarded by the judges to a manuscript entitled "The Mythical Interpretation of the Gospels," whose author proved to be the Reverend Thomas James Thorburn, D.D., LL.D., St. Helen's Down, Hastings, England. This essay has been issued as Volume VII of the Bross Library.

The next Bross Prize will be offered about 1925, and will be announced in due

time by the trustees of Lake Forest University.

2. The trustees were also empowered to "select and designate any particular scientific man or Christian philosopher and the subject on which he shall write," and to "agree with him as to the sum he shall receive for the book or treatise to be written." Under this provision the trustees have, from time to time, invited eminent scholars to deliver courses of lectures before Lake Forest College, such courses to be subsequently published as volumes in the Bross Library. The first course of lectures, on "Obligatory Morality," was delivered in May, 1903, by the Reverend Francis Landey Patton, D.D., LL.D., president of Princeton Theological Seminary. The copyright of the lectures is now the property of the trustees of the Bross Fund. The second course of lectures, on "The Bible: Its Origin and Nature," was delivered in May, 1904, by the late Reverend Marcus Dods, D.D., professor of exeget-

ical theology in New College, Edinburgh. These lectures were published in 1905 as Volume II of the Bross Library. The third course of lectures, on "The Bible of Nature," was delivered in September and October, 1907, by J. Arthur Thomson, M.A., regius professor of natural history in the University of Aberdeen. These lectures were published in 1908 as Volume IV of the Bross Library. The fourth course of lectures, on "The Religions of Modern Syria and Palestine," was delivered in November and December, 1908, by Frederick Jones Bliss, Ph.D., of Beirut, Syria. These lectures were published in 1912 as Volume V of the Bross Library. The fifth course of lectures, on "The Sources of Religious Insight," was delivered in November, 1911, by Professor Josiah Royce, Ph.D., of Harvard University. These lectures were published in 1912 as Volume VI of the Bross Library. The sixth course of lectures, on "The Will to Freedom, or the Gospel of Nietzsche and

the Gospel of Christ," was delivered in May, 1915, by the Reverend John Neville Figgis, D.D., Litt.D., of the House of the Resurrection, Mirfield, England. These lectures are presented in this volume.

JOHN SCHOLTE NOLLEN,
President of Lake Forest College.

LAKE FOREST, ILLINOIS,
June, 1916.

PREFACE

THESE lectures were delivered at Lake Forest College in May, 1915. Since then I have rewritten the text and added many notes. Even so, this book is not a complete treatment of Nietzsche. So much has been written about him that that may not seem needful.

I would beg the reader to bear in mind this fact: The author's interest in Nietzsche is not due to the war, nor does it date from 1914. To what extent Nietzsche is a creator as well as a prophet of the modern German mind I have not discussed. Speaking in a neutral country, I could not do that. Nor do I propose to discuss it now. The reader will find much help from Mr. Santayana's brilliant and witty work on *Egotism in German Philosophy*. This I had not read until these lectures

were in print. I am glad to find that Mr. Santayana in no way identifies the views of Nietzsche and Max Stirner. On the grounds given in the fourth lecture and elsewhere, I cannot agree with Doctor Rashdall in *Conscience and Christ*, who treats the doctrine of Nietzsche as an ethic of pure selfishness. For the same reason I think the refutation of Nietzsche which he quotes from Mr. Moore inadequate. Both statements would be correct as applied to Max Stirner. Nietzsche did not teach egotism, but the sacrifice of immediate desire to an ideal of nobility. This may not prevent the fact that many of his self-styled disciples preach the baser doctrine. That was true also of Epicurus.

On one other point misconception has been caused. Nietzsche disliked Germans, and was opposed to the doctrine of "*Deutschland über Alles*." This fact has been employed in an incorrect argument by certain followers of Nietzsche in this country. Their zeal for their master is

greater than their discernment. They write as though the anti-Prussian sympathies of Nietzsche's later years are conclusive evidence that modern Germany was not influenced by him. This is to throw dust in the eyes of the public. Nietzsche disliked Treitschke, yet each may have contributed to the same result. Bernhardi heads his book with a tag from the master. Last year a German pamphlet was published proving that Hindenburg expressed all that was vital in the idea of the *Superman*. I do not say that the author is right. Yet he would not have written as he did, were not Nietzsche a power in his nation. Long before the war I heard it said that what was driving the Germans to war was Nietzscheanism. The irrelevance of Nietzsche's personal liking to the topic of his influence on German ideals is best stated in the preface to Doctor Stewart's book on the subject. The dependence of Nietzsche on German thought and his place in the succession are developed by Mr. Santayana.

Without subscribing to all that either writer says, I can refer the inquirer to these two books, both of them interesting, though very different.

The text, so far as possible, is untainted. I owe thanks to the publishers for permission to use the excellent English translations. Nietzsche's letters and posthumous works are too little known in this country. I have, therefore, made considerable citations from them in the notes. They elucidate the argument of the lectures better than his full-dress works.

The preparation and delivery of this course was a joy to me. To the authorities of Lake Forest College and to many friends there I here render my thanks for their great kindness, and for the high honour they have done me.

To the Reverend Hubert Northcote thanks are also due. He has been through all the proofs, and saved me from many errors.

MIRFIELD, November 27, 1916.

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I

FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE: THE MAN

It is related of Archbishop Benson that when he first made acquaintance with London society he asked in his bewilderment: "What do these people believe?" If he were alive to-day he would suffer a like astonishment, but his question would rather take the form: "What don't these people believe?" So strange is the welter of creeds and sects, of religions and irreligions, moralists and immoralists, mystics, rationalists, and realists, and even Christians, that it is hard to guess what nostrum may be dominant with your next-door neighbour. It may be a dietetic evangel, it may be an atheistic apocalypse. One phenomenon, not the least notable of our day, is the rejection by large numbers of all the values, which even in the broadest

sense could be called Christian. It is not of Christianity as a creed, but Christianity as a way that I speak. Christianity involves many other elements, but it is, as we observe it, a way of life. It selects and sets its value on certain kinds of character. It is the most developed, though by no means the only form of the philosophy of Love. We now know that it gathered up into itself many tendencies at work in systems previously existing. The words *Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto* were written by a Pagan playwright a century and a half before the foundation of Christianity. Yet they found their full significance therein, and were, like many presuppositions of the great Roman jurists, ultimately destructive of the slave-basis of the ancient world. Many of these Christian values, at least the stress laid on common fellowship and unselfishness, are preserved, with what degree of legitimacy we need not inquire, by many who reject the Christian faith. The Religion of Humanity as set forth by Auguste

Comte is agnostic in its attitude to the other world, but its conception of duty as between man and man is not very different from the Christian. Adam Smith wrote a book, less famous than the *Wealth of Nations*, designed to show the origin of all morality in sympathy. Modern altruism in its varied forms may be traced not obscurely to Christian influence, although even ethically it is not identical therewith.

A short while back it was assumed that, apart from all questions of the supernatural, the Christian ideal was the highest known to man. John Stuart Mill declared in his *Essays on Religion* that we have no better criterion of conduct than that of living so that Christ should approve our lives. So long as that represented anything like a general sentiment it was possible to maintain that the wide-spread attack on Christian dogma need have no effect on morals. If such a charge was made by Christians it was hotly resented. Men like Huxley or Matthew Arnold would have scorned as

narrow-minded any one who had said that by knocking the bottom out of faith in the supernatural they were undermining morality. When Tennyson did say it, in "The Promise of May," the late Lord Queensberry protested at the first night and made a scene at the Globe Theatre.

Nous avons changé tout cela. On all hands we hear preached a revival of Paganism. Christianity as an ethical ideal is condemned. Formerly Christians were charged with hypocrisy because they fell short of the ideal. The charge was false, although the fact was true. We do fail, fail miserably, to come up to our ideal, and always shall, so long as it remains an ideal. Nowadays the Christian is attacked not because he fails, but in so far as he succeeds. Our Lord himself is scorned, not because he is not the revealer of Love, but because he is. Hardly a single specifically Christian value is left as it was. These attacks come from many angles. In these lectures on the foundation of Governor Bross I am to invite

your attention to one such assailant. Recently the name of Friedrich Nietzsche has become widely known. For some years a cult of him, almost like a religion, has been proceeding. It is nearly twenty years ago since his danger and his charm became clear to me. For long, indeed, he was ignored by official representatives either of apology or philosophy. Now, however, his name is so commonly familiar, that your complaint is like to be of the other order. So I must crave your pardon if the topic seems trite. At least it is germane to the scheme of the *Governor Bross Lectures*, as propounded.

This poet-prophet, so strange and beautiful, has laid a spell on many in our time. It may not be aimless toil to try to give some notion of what he wanted; and in the light of that blazing criticism to see how it stands with Christianity, as a house of life for men. The task is not easy. Nietzsche made a virtue of inconsistency, and never continued in one stay. Any presentment of

him may be pronounced unfair by an admirer. Moreover, the critic may even find chapter and verse for his complaint; since Nietzsche expressed most opinions during the course of his life. Even of his later Zarathustra period it is not easy to make a harmony. Probably no two people to the end of time will be in precise agreement as to the significance of the *Übermensch*.¹

For Christians yet another difficulty arises. One is tempted to give up all effort to understand a writer, of whom a passage like the following is typical:

“The Christian Church is to me the greatest of all imaginable corruptions; it has had the will to the ultimate corruption that is possible. The Christian Church has left nothing untouched with its depravity, it has made a worthlessness out of every value, a lie out of every truth, a baseness of soul out of every straightforwardness.”²

¹ One writer, Bélart, traces eight varieties in Nietzsche's own work.

² *Antichrist*, § 62.

Nietzsche put Voltaire's name at the head of one book—*Human, All Too Human*—and concludes his *Ecce Homo* with the words *Ecrasez l'infâme*. Yet we cannot withstand Nietzsche unless we take the trouble to understand him. Besides he is worth it. True, madness overcame him before he was forty-five. On this account some would dismiss him without more ado and say that his books are all ravings. But this would not be wise. Even if we do not like him, we cannot deny him an influence—in some ways an increasing influence. I think, indeed, that they are wrong who deny all traces of insanity in his writings. Doubtless, too, had Nietzsche fought on the Christian side, this insanity would be deemed good ground for neglecting his apologetic—even by those same superior persons who are all for treating it as irrelevant now. Still, there must be something of importance in a writer who is having so profound an influence on the cultivated world. We must take account of him, whether we like it or not. Nietzsche

knew this. He said in one of his letters that the world might attack or despise, but could not ignore him.

Besides, he had a way with him. Bitter though he be, violent, one-sided, blasphemous, perverse, vain, he never commits the unpardonable sin—he is never dull. The thousand and one facets in which flashes the jewel of his mind throw light and colour on many dark paths. The passion of his flaming soul, his sincerity, his sense of beauty, his eloquence, the courage of his struggles with ill health, the pathos of that lonely soul craving for sympathy, his deep psychological insight and sense of prophetic mission—all these give him a spell which is hard to resist. His teaching in some respects, not all, we may deplore. His picture of our holy religion is a caricature with hardly an element of likeness. His system, so far as he has a system, may seem childish. Yet Nietzsche remains. We shall always return to him; and the Alpine clearness of the atmosphere he breathes

braces, like his own Engadin. His opinions may be what you will, but Friedrich Nietzsche, the man, we love and shall go on loving, even when he hits us hardest. He said himself that in controversy we should be severe towards opinions, but tender towards the individual. That may [well form our maxim in dealing with Friedrich Nietzsche.

Friedrich Nietzsche, indeed, we must get at. No thinker was ever more personal than Nietzsche—not even Saint Paul.¹ He said somewhere that he felt every experience more deeply than other men; and that all the theories set forth in Zarathustra were expressive of something in his life. Moreover, “Nietzsche is ‘la sincérité même,’” says a hostile French critic (M. Pallarès, p. 345). These words are the more noteworthy that M. Pallarès leans unduly

¹ “Auch Tolstoi, auch Björnson, auch Ibsen, Strindberg, Zola gingen nicht so völlig auf in ihrem Werk, waren nicht so ganz wie er, Entwicklung, Kampf, Flamme geworden.” (Meyer, *Nietzsche, sein Leben und seine Werke*, 688.)

In regard to reading his book, *Morgenröthe*, he writes to his sister: “Such alles heraus, was Dir verräth, was im Grunde Dein Bruder am meisten braucht, am meisten nöthig hat, was er will, und was er nicht will. Lies dazu namentlich das fünfte Buch, wo vieles zwischen den Zeilen steht. Wohin alles bei mir

to the severe in dealing with Nietzsche. Let us then to-day concern ourselves with some attempt to picture Nietzsche the man.

Friedrich Nietzsche was born at Röcken in 1844. He lost his reason early in 1889 and died in 1900. Thus, he was but a child at the great age of the revolutions. As a young man at college he saw the dawn of Prussian predominance in 1866. During the war that made the new German Empire he was a youthful professor at Basle and no longer a German subject. The present Kaiser had begun his reign just before the catastrophe which engulfed Nietzsche. He had Polish blood in him.¹ This was a source of pride. He deemed himself the descendant of the Polish Counts

noch strebt, ist nicht mit einem Worte zu sagen—und hätte ich das Wort; ich würde es nicht sagen." (July, 1881. *Briefe*, V, 2, 458.)

Cf., also: "Mitunter ist mir, ich hätte genug erlebt für sechzig Jahre." (July, 1874. *Briefe*, V, 298.)

And again: "Jedes Wort meines Zarathustra ist ja siegreicher Hohn und mehr als Hohn über die Ideale dieser Zeit; und fast hinter jedem Wort steht ein persönliches Erlebniss, eine Selbstüberwindung ersten Ranges. (*Briefe*, V, 540.)

¹ This affiliation has been doubted, but it seems now to be established.

Nietzki. Two strains of purely German blood, that of his mother and one grandmother, prevented him being as much of a Pole as he would have liked. Yet he was often pleased when on his frequent travels people took him for a Pole and no German. He described himself as coming of a long line of Lutheran pastors. That gave him his exhaustless interest in Christianity. He hated it too much ever to leave it alone. We find him apologising to his friend, Peter Gast, for the result of his Christian ancestry.¹

Nietzsche's father was a distinguished Lutheran pastor, who died when the children were very young. Friedrich lamented this all his life. Frau Pastorin Nietzsche took the boy and girl, Friedrich and Eliza-

¹ This was in 1881. The letter is worth citing: "Mir fiel ein, lieber Freund, dass Ihnen an meinem Buche die beständige innerliche Auseinandersetzung mit dem Christenthume fremd, ja peinlich sein muss; es ist aber doch das beste Stück idealen Lebens, welches ich wirklich kennen gelernt habe; von Kindesbeinen an bin ich ihm nachgegangen; in viele Winkel, und ich glaube, ich bin nie in meinem Herzen gegen dasselbe gemein gewesen. Zuletzt bin ich der Nachkommer ganzer Geschlechter von Christlichen Geistlichen—vergeben Sie mir diese Beschränktheit." (*Briefe*, IV, 69.)

beth, to Naumburg. Nietzsche was only five years old at this time. He was brought up by his pious and Puritan mother amid a circle of relatives. The training of his mother was Spartan and the mitigations were the work of their grandmother, Frau Oehler. The circle was pious, eminently respectable, and of local importance. Nietzsche had a reverence for his mother which he never lost. When his stroke came in 1889 the old lady hurried to Turin, and insisted that she would tend him. There was, however, little intimacy of thought, and in this Friedrich missed his father's friendship.¹ Brother and sister were all in all to each other. Pleasant is the picture of their child life given in the earlier pages of her book by Frau Förster-Nietzsche. That biography is one of our chief means of understanding Nietzsche. Yet it must be read with caution. It is a very clever piece of apologetic writing. It needs to be

¹ Frau Nietzsche was a violent adversary of the Wagner connection.

checked by Nietzsche's own letters and other writings like that of Doctor Paul Deussen, his schoolfellow.¹ Naumburg was a small provincial town, and the circle in which the Nietzsche family moved was eminently pious. What all this meant in the fifties and sixties we can imagine. The boy disliked all vulgarity. At the local gymnasium he made few friends. But he was passionate in his attachments. He was an ardent scholar, and by this means won a place at the great institution of Pforta. Pforta was a place of renown organised apparently somewhat like an English public school, with the elder boys in authority over the younger. It prided itself on moulding life as a whole, and not being a mere teaching place. Many of the most distinguished men in Germany had been educated there. Nietzsche's letters and the recollections of Doctor Deussen give the impression of a strenuous and in-

¹ Deussen, *Erinnerungen an Nietzsche*, and also Frau Lou-Andreas-Salomé, *Nietzsche in seinen Werken*.

teresting life—with the friendships and quarrels of boyhood. Nietzsche had always a certain distinction of manner. Yet here and throughout his early life he was intensely human. It is an error to think of him as a recluse misanthrope. He was praised for all things, except mathematics. Towards the close of his time he got into one serious scrape, drunkenness, and his letters to his mother on the subject are touching and natural. Like other youths of literary tastes, he started a small essay club—the membership began with three—not all at the same school. The rules were elaborate and heroic. All were to send in essays or some other composition—music was included. One member elected each year was to act as critic. The ideal, as in most such cases, was too high for mortal schoolboys. It soon broke down. One story tells his courage. Round the fire the boys were talking of the story of Scævola. One of them said he could not understand how any one could do such a thing,

knowing what he was about. Immediately Nietzsche put his hand in the fire, and kept it there until he was pulled off by the monitor. Pforta left its mark on him. He had much *esprit de corps*. We can hardly be wrong in tracing to a memory of this school that passage about the need of a severe school at the close of *The Will to Power*. Even in his last illness he frequently spoke of the school.¹

From Pforta he proceeded to the University of Bonn. There he was not very happy. True, he found one professor whom ever after he honoured, Ritschl; and made at least one intimate friend. He joined the students' union, the *Franconia*, and fought the inevitable duel. But he did not enjoy undergraduate *camaraderie* and complained that many of his fellow-students were common. Partly because he had spent too much, he transferred himself to Leipzig,

¹ There seems to be no ground for supposing that Nietzsche was unhappy at Pforta or that he did not get on. Deussen's memoirs belie this view. There is a lifelike account of the "restoration of the *status quo*" after a quarrel.

whither had gone his revered Professor Friedrich Wilhelm Ritschl. This great classical philologist was one chief intellectual influence. But the star of Schopenhauer had now risen for Nietzsche. We hear much of his enthusiasm for the master, and of the value of redemptive pessimism.¹ In Leipzig a greater intimacy began. A sister of Wagner was living there. Nietzsche, a passionate lover of music and already of Wagner, was invited to meet the great man, who was at Leipzig *incognito* for a brief visit. Wagner took to Nietzsche at once. Thus began that friendship which was the most important personal influence in his life.

After Leipzig, Nietzsche went for a year's service in the cavalry. Much as he loved reading, Nietzsche was never a mere bookworm. The early Nietzsche and his friend

¹ "Wer mir Schopenhauer durch Gründe widerlegen will, dem raune ich in's Ohr: 'Aber, lieber Mann, Weltanschauungen werden weder durch Logik geschaffen noch vernichtet. Ich fühle mich heimisch in diesem Dunstkreis, Du in jenem. Lass mir doch meine eigne Nase, wie ich Dir die Deinige nicht nehmen werde.'" Nietzsche to Deussen. (Deussen, *Erinnerungen*, 40.)

His anti-intellectualist standpoint makes itself clear thus early.

Erwin Rohde had seemed to the others like young Greek gods when they came in flushed from a ride. Nietzsche entered with zest into his military life, and gives in his letters vivid pictures of it. Soon he became noted as the best rider in the regiment. Here he had a serious accident. The muscles of his heart were injured. After a time of severe illness he was discharged. His year of service came to an abrupt ending.¹ His health never entirely recovered. This event may be taken as the beginning of that long agony which ended with his madness. Eyesight, ill-cared for at school, would appear to have had much to do with his continual headaches and his subsequent insanity. So much is clear from what his sister says, but it is probably not correct to follow Doctor Gould in his book, *Biographic Clinics*. The whole trouble is there

¹ "Sie glauben, lieber Freund, es nicht was für ein Überschuss von Leiden mir das Leben abgeworfen hat in allen Zeiten von früher Kindheit an. Aber ich bin ein Soldat; und dieser Soldat ist zu guter Letzt noch der Vater Zarathustras geworden!" The impressions of that year were lasting, as this passage shews. (Nietzsche to Peter Gast, IV, 150.)

put down to the eyes. Every other cause is either denied or minimised.

In the year 1866 we find Nietzsche warmly patriotic and German in his sympathies, high in the praise of Bismarck and the government. This time at least he was pro-Prussian.¹

Not long after, when Nietzsche was back at Leipzig studying for his doctorate, his old preceptor, who had early discerned his merit, secured him a post at Basle as Professor Extraordinary of Philology. Nietzsche was only twenty-five, and although he said he would have preferred to wait, signs of this are not obvious in the hilarious, mystifying letters he wrote to his sister, just before the announcement.

¹ See his letter to Freiherr von Gersdorff (*Briefe*, I, 17). "Aber stolz müssen wir sein eine solche Armee zu haben, ja sogar—horribile dictu—eine solche Regierung zu besitzen, die das nationale Programm nicht bloss auf dem Papier hat, sondern mit der grössten Energie, mit ungeheurem Aufwand an Geld und Blut, sogar gegenüber dem französischen grossen Versucher Louis le diable aufrecht erhält. . . .

"Ein Krieg gegen Frankreich muss ja eine Gesinnungseinheit in Deutschland hervorrufen; und wenn die Bevölkerungen eins sind dann mag sich Herr von Beust sammt allen mittelstaatlichen Fürsten einbalsamiren lassen. Denn ihre Zeit ist vorbei."

Nietzsche was well aware of what he owed to Ritschl, and the correspondence between the two is a model for an intimacy between the pupil and the tutor, when the former grows up and breaks away, as he must. It is an error to think of Nietzsche as a disagreeable rebel without reverence. His life was spent in enthusiasms, which he afterwards outgrew. No man ever lived who felt more the need of worship. That is part of the tragedy of his career. Having given up God, he spent the rest of his existence in making idols and then breaking them—Schopenhauer, Wagner, and the rest—till he settled down at last to the *Übermensch* and the Eternal return. Always naïf—he was the antithesis of Henri Beyle (Stendhal), his great admiration—he was earnest and almost boyish in his enthusiasms. Later he found the feet of clay in his idol, and turned in fury to smash it, crying out against himself and his former god, and the universe, because he had allowed himself to be deceived. But he was

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not irreverent by nature. That is a superficial interpretation, due to Nietzsche's command of picturesque blasphemy.

The Basle appointment forced him to give up his nationality and become Swiss. Hence when the Franco-Prussian War came in 1870 Nietzsche could offer no more than the care of the wounded.¹ Full of sympathy, he did all that he could, until he fell ill. This period is noteworthy, for Nietzsche received then the first impressions of the principle which governs his later teaching, the Will to Power. Busied with the sick, driven nearly wild with sympathy, he caught sight of a troop of Prus-

¹ The following passage shews how far removed Nietzsche was at this time from his later dislike of all things German:

“Nun winken neue Pflichten; und wenn Eins uns auch im Frieden bleiben mag aus jenem wilden Kriegsspiel, so ist es der heldenmüthige und zugleich besonnene Geist den ich zu meiner Überraschung gleichsam als eine schöne unerwartete Entdeckung, in unserm Heere frisch und kräftig, in alter germanischer Gesundheit gefunden habe. Darauf lässt sich bauen; wir dürfen wieder hoffen; unsre deutsche Mission ist noch nicht vorbei. Ich bin muthiger als je: denn noch ist nicht Alles unter französisch-jüdischer Verflachung und ‘Eleganz,’ und unter dem gierigen Treiben der ‘Jetztzeit’ zu Grunde gegangen. Es giebt noch Tapferkeit, und zwar deutsche Tapferkeit, die etwas innerlich anderes ist als der ‘Elan’ unserer Nachbarn.” (*Letters*, I, 110.)

sian horse coming thundering down a hill into the village. Their splendour of aspect, strong, courageous, and efficient, at once impressed him. He saw that suffering and sympathy with it were not, as he had thought *à la* Schopenhauer, the profoundest things in life. It was this power greater than pain which made pain irrelevant—that was the reality. Life began to present itself as a struggle for power. This is his first move away from Schopenhauer and pessimism.

Nietzsche recovered, though not fully. He went back to Basle and tried to go through his duties before he was well. From this extra strain he never really recovered. Yet he had much to help him. Basle had welcomed him with open arms. Quickly was he made an ordinary professor, with a heightened salary. As a teacher he had and must have had enthusiastic pupils—they never had a better teacher, it was said. Friends were not lacking. True, Nietzsche was greatly bored by general

society, and found himself, as an eligible bachelor, more pushed against than pushing. Gradually he withdrew, and frequented only his chosen circle—Fischer and Overbeck, the historical theologian, who was later on to hurry to Basle on surmise of his illness; and Burckhardt, the great historian of the Renaissance. No man could complain who lived with such men and was loved by them. Wagner was a yet more potent star. Nietzsche occupied much of his spare time with visits to Trieb-schen, where Wagner and Frau Cosima lived. The latter is probably the only woman who greatly influenced Nietzsche. Even in later years he acknowledged his debt to her. To them is owing his *début* as a writer. Nietzsche came before the world with the *Birth of Tragedy*. The book is really a Wagnerite tract: it starts with that distinction of which he afterwards made so much, the distinction between Apollinian and Dionysian art, the former serene, contemplative, intellectual; the latter

ecstatic, emotional, compelling. The distinction is not unlike that between classical and romantic art, if we use the terms for two modes of art, not for definitely historical movements. The conclusion of the book points to Wagner, though it does not name him, as the man who is to recover the true tragic altitude. This was to Nietzsche the valuable thing in Hellenism, not the philosophic or Socratic development which already he treats as decadence. The real Nietzsche begins to shew himself in other efforts. David Strauss, the author of the famous *Leben Jesu*, had just then "taken the town" with his book on *The Old Faith and the New*. In this work Strauss gives up every vestige of supernatural faith, accepts evolution in a materialist form, and tries to shew that somehow or other all things are for the best in the best of all possible worlds, if the ideals of the present cultivated classes remain intact, and the movement to secure the rights of labour be checked. Strauss's attitude in some re-

spects is not unlike that of Nietzsche, who never could endure any attempt at improving the status of the labourer. Nietzsche was in this case (as also in that of Hartmann, who comes in for a share of the trouncing) at least as greatly irritated by the signs of likeness as he was by those of difference. In the first of the *Essays Out of Season* he fell with fury on this book, written, he says, solely for that contemptible product of the modern world, the culture-Philistine, of which Strauss and von Hartmann were the two capital examples. Nietzsche's strictures are largely justified by the smug and banal optimism with which the book closes. Probably what excited Nietzsche's ire most would be a passage such as the following:

“Ever remember that thou art human, not merely a natural production; ever remember that all others are human also, and with all individual differences the same as thou, having the same needs and

claims as thyself; this is the sum and substance of morality.

“Ever remember that thou and everything thou beholdest within and around thee, all that befalls thee and others is no disjointed fragment, no wild chaos of atoms or casualties, but that it all springs according to eternal laws, from the one primal source of all life, all reason, and all good; this is the essence of religion.”¹

Doctor Richard Meyer is hardly wrong in speaking of the danger of a cheap ideal of culture—comfort raised to a dogma.² This danger was not and is not confined to Germany. The importance of this book and *The Birth of Tragedy* is high. Nietzsche had now declared war on the academic scholarship of the day; he had asserted the superiority of art and philosophy to science, the essentially secondary position of science,

¹ *The Old Faith and the New*, David Frederic Strauss, II, 55.

² “Diese Bibel der liberalen Bourgeoisie drohte das billige Ideal eines gesättigten Bildungsoptimismus zum Dogma zu erheben.” (Meyer, *Nietzsche*, 260.)

needful or we could not bake our bread or heat our houses—but a slave in the house of life, as compared with its Divine Mistresses, art and philosophy and religion, so far as that is possible. Thus he had already begun his anti-intellectualist propaganda. Secondly, Nietzsche had shewn the hollowness of the Prussian triumph in 1870–1. Already he has flung his cap for French culture, as opposed to German. Even during the war he had expressed himself as fearful of its results to Culture. Culture in the highest sense is the one thing Nietzsche cared for and strove all his life to forward.¹ Now more than ever he begins to feel that Prussia is the supreme danger to Culture. He mocks at the Germans for their enslavement to French culture, and for their inability to produce anything of their own. His great hope in Wagner, afterwards dashed, was just this—that he would be the

¹ See his letter home in December, 1870:

“Für den jetzigen deutschen Eroberungskrieg nehmen meine Sympathien allmählich ab. Die Zukunft unsrer deutschen Cultur scheint mir mehr als je gefährdet.” (*Briefe*, V, 196.)

herald of a new German and European culture-epoch.

This essay created a sensation. It is significant of Nietzsche's tenderness of heart that a year later, when Strauss died, he expressed a fear lest he had caused him any pain.¹ Thirdly, the attitude indicated by the title *Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen* (*Essays Out of Season*) is significant. Nietzsche now took up that pose which he never relinquished, of being the prophet, denouncing the evils of his day, antagonistic to all its dominating currents. This was true only in part. Much of Nietzsche is, as has been pointed out, merely a translation into his own idiom of the ideals of Bismarckian success. A great deal else is merely the last movement of the Romantic symphony, for greatly as Nietzsche despised

¹ Apparently the Basle folk thought Nietzsche had done Strauss some damage. "Gestern hat man in Ludwigsburg David Strauss begraben. Ich hoffe sehr dass ich ihm die letzte Lebenszeit nicht erschwert habe, und dass er ohne etwas von mir zu wissen gestorben ist. Es greift mich etwas an." Nietzsche to Freiherr von Gersdorff, *Briefe*, I, 175. (Cf. Spitteler, *Meine Beziehungen zu Nietzsche*, 14.)

the Romantics of the nineteenth century, he was himself of that company.

High-water mark of early achievement is reached in his next essay—on the use and abuse of history. Rarely has he written better. Every student of history ought to be made to read it, lest he suffer from a “proud stomach.” The same is true of all whose notion of culture is largely mingled with “the passion of the past.” Nietzsche himself did not heed his own warnings sufficiently, or he would have been a less ardent neo-Pagan. Anyhow, his words are wise. He points out the danger of a culture mainly historical. It produces a race of *epigoni*, “pensioners on the past,” always looking back. As he says elsewhere, the historian begins by looking backward, he ends by thinking backward. Nietzsche in this essay is prophetic. More and more must culture look to the future, if it is to have any appeal. Less and less can it be made up of mere historical sentiment. This is true of every branch of culture, including

religion. True, the wise man will not discard history, nor suppose with the vulgar that anything beautiful and noble in life can be reproduced afresh for every age. We get to be more not less able to enjoy the atmosphere of a great epoch, whether Elizabethan England or the France of Louis Quatorze. But we must beware—and especially so if we are sensible of their attractions—of becoming enslaved to the past, or choked in inherited tradition, so that we cannot move forward. Mere memory, even when lit by imagination and taste, is no safe guide for life—or rather it is too safe, and leads only down ancient lanes, when we ought to be seeking new stars. Christians, and more especially ourselves, need to take these warnings deeply to heart. Some of the worst failures are due to this excess of sentiment for one particular age.

Nietzsche projected a dozen essays in this series. Two more were all that he wrote. One is entitled “Schopenhauer as Educator,” although it is mainly occupied with

Nietzsche. The other is on Richard Wagner at Bayreuth. He had already outgrown the theories of these two men of genius. These essays were his last tribute to them and were personal.

Wagner had become stronger in his reactions upon Nietzsche. The latter described vividly the scene at Tribschen before the final departure for Bayreuth. Nietzsche felt this removal deeply; he had been a sort of "tame cat" about the house, always gave presents to the children, went when he would for Christmas, and was treated almost as a son of the house both by Wagner and his cultivated consort, the daughter of Liszt. This sort of intercourse perforce came to an end when the Wagners went to live so far off. Really this change coincides with a change on Nietzsche's part. He looked to Wagner to lead all good Europeans into the promised land of a new culture. This hope grew faint. Bayreuth, the more Nietzsche saw of it, pleased him the less. Wagner became fashionable and

things grew worse. What he wanted, Nietzsche said, was mere idolaters—he was a critic. Nietzsche wrote a pamphlet to further the cause of the music of the future, but the Wagner committee would not print it. Rumour said, also, that Wagner had said hard things of a musical piece of Nietzsche's, and that was a cause of severance.¹ Wagner was surrounded more and more by a sort of court, and even had both willed it, the old easy intimacy was not possible. Triebschen was a private home in the country; Bayreuth was the metropolis of the kingdom of culture. Bayreuth at the beginning had seen a small band of disci-

¹ Nietzsche, though a passionate musician, does not seem to have been at the pains to learn the rules. In prose he worked at style and knew its difficulty; not so in music. He sent one piece to Hans von Bülow. The reply is worth quoting, for it shews even so early an insight into those elements which brought the great mind to ruin later on:

“Abgesehen vom psychologischen Interesse—denn in Ihrem musikalischen Fieberprodukte ist ein ungewöhnlicher, bei aller Verirrung distinguirter Geist zu spüren—hat Ihre Meditation vom musikalischen Standpunkte aus nur den Werth eines Verbrechens in der moralischen Welt. Vom apollinischen Elemente habe ich keine Spur¹ entdecken können, und das dionysische anlangend, habe ich, offen gestanden, mehr an den *lendemain* eines Bacchanals als an dieses selbst denken müssen.” Hans von Bülow to Nietzsche, 1872. (*Briefe*, III, 2, 350.)

ples. When it became a swell mob, and buzzed with the compliments of Kings and even the Emperor, officials, generals, the aristocrats and the plutocrats, all of them nearly as distasteful to Nietzsche as the democrat, it was more than an artist-prophet could stand. All of a sudden he bolted. This was the end. Nietzsche always recognised the importance of Wagner. His mastery in his own line he never denied—only that line had ceased to approve itself to Nietzsche. Even at the end of his working life, when he heard *Parsifal*, Nietzsche wrote to Peter Gast, saying he thought Wagner had never done anything better. Probably his statement is true, that the gradual adoption of at least sentimental reverence for Christianity was what repelled Nietzsche. Doctor Paneth relates that Nietzsche told him he realised their entire estrangement one day, when Wagner told him of his increasing admiration for the Eucharist.¹ Nietzsche said that his early

¹ "Dann erzählte er mir von Richard Wagner, dem er ungemein nahe stand, und von dem er sich dann trennte, als jener fromm

discipleship was due to this belief, that Wagner was a great anti-Christian force; and that "we Germans" are no use without a good stock of infidel scorn.¹ But Nietzsche himself had changed. In the early days of their intimacy he was an enthusiastic follower of Schopenhauer, and he regarded Wagner as the musical exponent of redemptive pessimism. Nietzsche broke more and more away from this and finally rejected it. It is not quite easy to determine how far the Wagner quarrel was a cause, and how far a consequence, of this change. Probably it was both. Nietzsche told his sister it had taken him six years of agony to over-

wurde, und einmal von den Entzückungen sprach in die ihn der Genuss des Abendmahls versetzte." (Doctor Paneth in *Leben*, II, 482, Dec., 1883.)

¹ Also Nietzsche wrote to his sister:

"Im Gegenteil sie wird immer fanatischer, verworrener Christlieberer und verdüsterter—wie das gesammte Europa. Die Wagnererei ist nur ein Einzelfall. Wie hat sich, alles gegen die Jahre 1869-72 verändert. Damals war ich Wagnerianer wegen des guten Stücks Antichrist das Wagner mit seiner Kunst und Art vertrat. Ich bin der Enttäuschte aller Wagnerianer, denn in dem Augenblick wo es anständiger als je war Heide zu sein, wurde Wagner Christ. *Wir Deutschen* (gesetzt dass wir es je mit ernstesten Dingen ernst genommen haben) *sind allesammt Spötter und Atheisten. Wagner war es auch.*" (*Briefe*, V, 777.)

come the falsity induced by the spell of Wagner. He also said that Frau Wagner was the most cultivated woman he had ever met. From about 1878 the friendship became an enmity. Wagner and his friends wrote attacks on Nietzsche. Nietzsche treated Wagner as the last and worst of the Romanticists—a drop back into Christianity—a corrupter and seducer—declaring him essentially an actor. Wagner is the Wizard in *Zarathustra*. Finally, he wrote the two pamphlets, *The Case of Wagner* and *Nietzsche versus Wagner*. One of these begins by exalting Bizet's *Carmen* as the true ideal for music. Considering the former relations, the tone and taste of these productions are hardly to be excused, even by the approach of insanity.¹ Both were men of genius, both were irritable, both wanted disciples—and a breach some time was inevitable. Nietzsche said Wagner was not of the same rank as he. The truth is they

¹ “La seule chose impardonable sont les pamphlets de la fin.” (Pallarès, *Le Crépuscule d'une idole*, V.)

were too big for each other.¹ Meanwhile the health of Nietzsche had become a serious question. At Basle he was a stimulating teacher and did good work. But the place did not suit him. Digestive troubles of great severity attacked him and he was prostrated by frequent headaches. All this time the sense of his mission was growing upon him. The difficulties with Wagner and the general perplexity about his ethical and philosophical standpoint reacted on his health.² His eyes could not stand the strain of incessant reading. Palliatives proved vain. He tried cures. His sister took up her abode and kept house for him. He took a long leave of absence and spent a

¹ "Ich bin damals, als ich Wagner fand, unbeschreiblich glücklich gewesen. Ich hatte so lange nach dem Menschen gesucht der höher war als ich und der mich wirklich übersah. In Wagner glaubte ich ihn gefunden zu haben. Es war ein Irrthum. Jetzt darf ich mich nicht einmal mit ihm vergleichen—ich gehöre einem andern Rang an. Im Übrigen habe ich meine Wagner-Schwärmerei theurer bezahlen müssen. . . . Habe ich nicht fast sechs Jahre gebraucht um mich von diesem Schmerz zu erholen?" (V, 479, 1882.)

² "So lange ich wirklich Gelehrter war, war ich auch gesund; aber da kam die nervenzerrüttende Musik und die metaphysische Philosophie und die Sorge um tausend Dinge, die mich nichts angehen." (To Malwida von Meysenbug, 550, 1872.)

winter with his friend, Malwida von Meysenbug, and two fated others, Paul Rée and Lou-Salomé, in Sorrento. All was in vain. In 1879 he was forced to resign his chair. The University treated him very generously in the matter of pension. During the next ten years he lived during the winter in the Riviera, and in the summer at Sils-Maria in the Engadin. The first few years after his resignation saw Nietzsche at his lowest ebb. Even to himself it seemed doubtful whether he would live. But he was resolved not to be beaten, and carried on a heroic contest against all weakness. *The Joyful Wisdom* was the symbol of returning health. From 1883 onward until the final collapse he was a good deal better. Gradually he grew more and more lonely, and broke with all his friends except Peter Gast.

At one time he was intimate with a Jew, Doctor Paul Rée, who is said to have influenced him in the positivist direction. The work *Human, All Too Human*, written under that influence and marking his estrange-

ment from Wagner, is the least attractive, either in style or outlook, of Nietzsche's works. Rée is said to have influenced this work, and despite the denials of Madame Förster-Nietzsche, he probably did.¹ During this period there occurred an incident, which would have been ludicrous if it were not tragic. Malwida von Meysenbug, the author of the *Memoirs of an Idealist*, a woman of engaging charm and very bad judgment, thought to provide for this most fastidious of men a youthful amanuensis disciple. A young Russian girl of brilliant gifts, Fräulein Lou-Salomé, was to be the mouthpiece and populariser of Nietzsche. After a few months of enthusiasm, Nietzsche came to see that the scheme was hopeless. The matter was complicated by Paul Rée, with whom Nietzsche very nearly fought a duel. It led to an estrangement of some length between brother and sister (for Elizabeth had concealed certain facts so as to

¹ Madame Förster had no occasion to be so contemptuous. The book is really Nietzsche at low-water mark.

avoid a duel). Much paper has been wasted on this topic, and we need not discuss it at length. This much should be said. Frau Salomé-Andreas in her book on Nietzsche is by no means so untrustworthy a portrait-painter as Frau Förster would have us believe. On one point, the importance attached by Nietzsche to the doctrine of the Eternal Return, Frau Lou-Salomé is demonstrably right, as against the sister.¹

This breach was short. More difficult was the situation created by Elizabeth Nietzsche's engagement and marriage. Nietzsche, who felt any marriage on her part even more deeply than Macaulay had done in a like case, had looked for Elizabeth to be always his nurse and companion. It was a blow to his pride when he found that she was betrothed, and that to an anti-

¹ Doctor Karl Bernoulli's two large volumes on *Franz Overbeck und Friedrich Nietzsche* are avowedly written to counteract in many respects Madame Förster-Nietzsche's *Life*. Into all the points he discusses it is not possible to enter, especially since owing to an action at law some of the passages have been blacked out. But on this Lou-Salomé incident there is an important account from the pen of Frau Overbeck. (I, 336-351.) This should be read, especially for its criticism of Elizabeth Nietzsche.

Semite. The amazing bitterness of politics in Germany is illustrated by the fury with which Nietzsche, no lover of the Jews, treated this alliance with opinions which he disliked. Nietzsche allowed himself to be persuaded into a sort of peace, but he did not attend the wedding. What still more bewildered him was his sister's going off with her husband to help found a new communist colony in Paraguay. Still, he took a share in it later.

Deeper and deeper grew his loneliness.¹ At Sils-Maria he now and then met some one whom he liked—especially an invalid

¹ "Ach, wir Einsamen und Freien im Geist—wir sehen dass wir fortwährend irgend worin anders scheinen als wir denken; während wir nichts als Wahrheit und Ehrlichkeit wollen, ist rings um uns ein Netz von Missverständnissen; und unser heftiges Begehren kann es nicht verhindern, dass doch auf unserem Thun ein Dunst von falschen Meinungen, von Anpassung von halben Zugeständnissen, von schonendem Verschweigen, von irrthümlicher Ausdeutung liegen bleibt. Das sammelt eine Wolke von Melancholie auf unserer Stirne; denn dass das Scheinen Nothwendigkeit ist, hassen wir mehr als den Tod; und eine solche andauernde Erbitterung darüber macht uns vulkanisch und bedrohlich. Von Zeit zu Zeit rächen wir uns für unser gewaltsames Verbergen, für unsere erzwungene Zurückhaltung. Wir kommen aus unserer Höhle heraus mit schrecklichen Mienen, unsere Worte und Thaten sind dann Explosionen, und es ist möglich, dass wir an uns selbst zu Grunde gehen. So gefährlich lebe ich." (*Briefe*, V, 309.)

Englishwoman. Doctor Paneth has left a valuable account in his letters of visits and talks with Nietzsche in the Riviera. Very early he discerned that Nietzsche worked always from his feelings outward. Nietzsche welcomed his loneliness. Glimpses of this are seen again and again in *Zarathustra*. It was to him the sign and seal of his greatness. He declares that he cannot expect friends any more, for friendship is only for equals.¹ Yet all along he resented the neglect of his books in Germany and the lack of disciples. Injured partly by sleeping drugs, Nietzsche became more and more difficult of approach. When he met his old friend, Erwin Rohde, in Leipzig, neither was gratified. Later on they quarrelled finally, owing to a

¹ This was written in 1884. "Lassen sie mich nur in meiner Einsamkeit.

"Es war zuletzt eine Eselei von mir mich 'unter die Menschen' zu begeben: ich musste es ja voraus wissen, was mir da begegnen würde.

"Die Hauptsache aber ist die: ich habe Dinge auf meiner Seele, die hundertmal schwerer zu tragen sind, als *La bêtise humaine*. Es ist möglich, dass ich für alle kommenden Menschen ein Verhängnis, das Verhängnis bin,—und es ist folglich sehr möglich, dass ich eines Tages stumm werde, aus Menschenliebe." (To Malwida von Meysenbug, *Briefe*, III, 611.)

difference over the merits of Hippolyte Taine. Paul Deussen and his wife went to see him two years before the catastrophe. They were shocked at the change in his appearance; Nietzsche spoke of his fears of what would befall him, and as they parted they saw the tears in his eyes.¹ All the while there grew in him the sense of mission. "I am at the summit of all moralist thinking in Europe,"² he wrote to his sister. His sense of Apocalyptic vision appears in such titles as *The Dawn of Day*, and dominates *Zarathustra*. He believes himself inspired as no one has been for thousands of years.

The aphoristic form which he had begun to adopt in *Human, All Too Human*, was doubtless an imitation of La Rochefoucauld.

¹ "Hier sprach er nochmals die düstern Ahnungen aus, welche sich leider so bald erfüllen sollten. Als wir Abschied nahmen, standen ihm die Thränen in den Augen, was ich früher nie an ihm gesehen hatte." (Deussen, 93, 1887.)

² "Glaube mir; bei mir ist jetzt die Spitze alles moralischen Nachdenkens und Arbeitens in Europa und noch von manchem Anderen. Es wird vielleicht einmal noch die Zeit kommen, wo auch die Adler scheu zu mir aufblicken müssen, wie auf jenem Bilde des heiligen Johannes, das wir als Kinder so sehr liebten." (*Briefe*, V, 469.)

But it did not sell his books. Finally, he was forced to publish at his own expense, or even to print privately. His life was possible only by the severest economy. From 1883 onward come his last and most important works. They express his conquest over all impeding forces, over earlier masters, and above all over his own weakness. He thinks that his illness even has helped him, and his whole philosophy rests on the acceptance of what comes to man—*amor fati*. *Zarathustra* puts all in a poetic dramatic form. The other books, *The Genealogy of Morals*, *Beyond Good and Evil*, *The Case of Wagner*, are to be read as commentaries on *Zarathustra*. The same is true of those works which appeared after Nietzsche had ceased all writing. *The Antichrist*, *Ecce Homo*, and the *Will to Power*.

Nietzsche seemed almost well. When better he worked with feverish haste. Signs of insanity are not hard to discern in his later works, and increasing *megalomania*. In sending Taine one of his works, he de-

scribes it as the most marvellous book ever written, and declares in *Ecce Homo*, "I am not a man, I am dynamite."¹ He discovers Turin, and wonders why he ever spent a winter elsewhere. His power of boyish enthusiasm grows greater, if possible. He went on working with appalling energy. What he produced in the final year and a half is prodigious. The last publication, *The Case of Wagner*, was his ruin. Wagner was dead, and his friends resented, not unnaturally, this ruthless attack on an old friend. The anti-Semites attacked him also. Finally, he was given to understand that his brother-in-law, Doctor Förster, had turned Elizabeth against him. This was

¹ "Diese Wochen in Turin, wo ich noch bis zum 5 Juni bleibe, sind mir besser gerathen als irgend welche Wochen seit Jahren, vor allem philosophischer. Ich habe fast jeden Tag eine, zwei Stunden jene Energie erreicht um meine Gesamt-Conception von Oben nach Unten sehen zu können: wo die ungeheure Vielheit von Problemen, wie in Relief und klar in den Linien unter mir ausgebreitet lag. Dazu gehört ein Maximum von Kraft, auf welches ich kaum mehr bei mir gehofft hatte." (N. to Brandes, May, 1888, III, 305.)

"Das Buch das in Ihre Hände zu legen ich mir den Muth nehme, ist vielleicht das wunderlichste Buch das bisher geschrieben wurde—und in Hinsicht auf das was es vorbereitet, beinahe ein Stück Schicksal." (N. to Taine, III, 204.)

not true, but Nietzsche could not know that. He wrote a letter attacking his brother-in-law. It was not sent, but was found among his papers. He said that he was taking more and more chloral without being able to sleep; and would ere long take so much that he would lose his reason. He did. Shortly after this he had a stroke. Living in poor rooms among strangers, means were not taken to guard him. He began writing letters of which the insanity was patent. Fortunately Professor Overbeck saw what was the matter and hurried to Turin, just in time to save him. He had been found bereft of reason in the streets. His mother, strong-minded and tender, was resolved to keep him with her, but it was needful for him first to go to an asylum at Jena. He became well enough to be moved home, and Frau Nietzsche tended him till her death in 1897. It is a pathetic picture, the pious Christian lady, old-fashioned and tender, spending her last years as nurse of the son, who had attacked with a violence

before unknown everything she held dear. It is the irony of fate that such care as he enjoyed had been condemned by Nietzsche as a cockering up of the weak and useless. Madame Förster-Nietzsche had returned to Europe on her husband's death, and was able to have her brother with her at Weimar in 1897. He was occasionally conscious, and not unhappy. He died in 1900, nearly seventy years after the death, under conditions so different but in the same place, of Goethe. Now the *Nietzsche-Archiv* is one of the treasures of that city, which means more to culture than the millionaire-haunted hovels of modernity.

Nietzsche's story is full of pathos. No one had deeper feelings than Nietzsche.¹ Much of his barbarity in philosophy is due to his fear of falling a prey to them. All who met him knew him as amiable and very gentle, and he had a distinction in all his ways. He is afraid of his own tenderness.

¹"Il fut au fond du cœur un tendre et un pitoyable en dépit de ses affectations de rondeur militaire et de ses préférences martiales affichées." (Seillières, 360.)

“Never give way.” is his motto. All his teaching is a self-conquest. He could never be quiet. No single view could ever hold him. When he has embraced a doctrine or a teacher, he begins at once to pass beyond. His loneliness is a cross, and he profits by it like a cross. This innate sense of martyrdom must be the true ground of his signing one of his last letters—*The Crucified One*. It is not mere satire. Paul Deussen, who knew him from a boy, says he would never continue in one stay—his preference for *becoming* over *being* as a philosophic category he fulfilled all his life.¹ Nietzsche creates because he is ever destroying. He is one of those natures which always react against their surroundings. He was indeed less hostile to his own age than he supposed,

¹ “Nietzsche war und blieb eine im tiefsten Innern unruhige, bestandlose Natur, welche es nicht ertrug lange bei einer Sache zu bleiben. Sein ‘Menschliches, Allzumenschliches’ nebst den verschiedenen Fortsetzungen bis zum ‘Zarathustra’ hin geben ein deutliches Bild dieses rastlosen, quälenden Fortgetriebenwerdens, und ich weiss nicht ob nicht, wenn ihm Leben und Kraft vergönnt gewesen wäre, die Umwertung aller Werthe eine nochmalige Umwertung würde erfahren haben.” (Deussen, I, 80.) Cf. also Salomé, 54.

for in some ways he is but an element in the Romantic movement, in others a part of the reaction against the Revolution; and his *Will to Power* expresses in some sort the Bismarckian triumph;¹ and that in spite of himself, for Nietzsche thought the Prussians the supreme danger to culture.² But in the main Nietzsche's ambition was to be *unzeitgemässe*. So far as the prevailing currents of society were concerned, he fulfilled it.

He had been a pious little boy. At his confirmation at school he was greatly impressed. But he gave up Christianity apparently without any sense of trouble.³ He

¹ "In both these authors [Nietzsche and Hartmann], comparatively independent as they are, the one a mystical natural philosopher, the other a mystical immoralist, is reflected the all-dominating militarism of the new German Empire. Hartmann approaches on many points the German snobbish national feeling. Nietzsche is opposed to it on principle, as he is to the statesman who has piled up for the Germans a new tower of Babel, a monster in extent of territory and power and for that reason called great, but something of Bismarck's spirit broods, nevertheless, over the works of both." (Brandes, 53.)

² 1870. "Ich halte das jetzige Preussen für eine der Cultur höchst gefährliche Macht." (*Briefe*, I, 105.)

"Möge vor und ganz allen die staatliche Machtentfaltung Deutschlands nicht mit zu erheblichen Opfern der Cultur erkaufte werden." (N. to Ritschl, *ibid.*, III, 122.)

³ The suggestion of such trouble may be seen here:

"Hier scheiden sich nun die Wege der Menschen; willst Du

read as a student Strauss's *Leben Jesu*¹ and asked, if one gave up Christ, how should a belief in God be retained? Religion dropped away from him very early. That cry, "God is dead! God is dead!" which rings through the pages of *Zarathustra* is the assumption of all Nietzsche's writing. Yet all his life was occupied with attempts to found a new religion. One critic declares his whole doctrine to rest on a kind of metaphysical Divinity—Power.² Another who

Seelenruhe und Glück erstehen, nun so glaube; willst Du ein Jünger der Wahrheit sein, so forsche." (To his sister, *Briefe*, V, 114.)

"Ist es wirklich so schwer, dass alles worin man erzogen ist, was allmählich sich tief eingewurzelt hat, was in den Kreisen der Verwandten und vieler guten Menschen als Wahrheit gilt, was ausserdem auch wirklich den Menschen tröstet und erhebt, das alles einfach anzunehmen, ist das schwerer, als in Kampf mit Gewöhnung, in der Unsicherheit des selbstständigen Gehens, unter häufigen Schwankungen des Gemüths, ja des Gewissens, oft trostlos, aber immer mit dem einigen Ziel des Wahren, des Schönen, des Guten neue Bahnen zu gehen?" (1865, *Briefe*, V, 113.)

¹ "Um diese Zeit war das neue *Leben Jesu* von Strauss erschienen. Nietzsche schaffte es sich an und ich folgte seinem Beispiele. In unseren Gesprächen konnte ich nicht umhin, meine Zustimmung auszudrücken. Nietzsche erwiderte: 'Die Sache hat eine ernste Konsequenz; wenn Du Christus aufgibst, wirst Du auch Gott aufgeben müssen.'" (Deussen, *Erinnerungen an Friedrich Nietzsche*, 20.)

² "Seine ganze Lehre beruht auf einer Art metaphysischer Gottheit: der Macht." (Caffi, *Nietzsches Stellung zu Machiavellis Lehre*, 28.)

knew him says that the history alike of his mind, his works, and his illness is the result of an effort to find in the different forms of apotheosis of self a substitute for the loss of God.¹ Nietzsche himself makes Zarathustra ask: "If there be a God, how could I bear not to be one? Therefore there is no God." Probably his early religion was mere sentiment and fell away almost without his knowing it. Not that his attitude was determined by personal bad habits. Nietzsche's life shewed not only great heroism in its struggle with ill health, but was, in its noble simplicity and poverty and unwearied interest in high things, an example to an age sunk in vulgar money-making.

Many causes combined in his passion of recoil from Christianity. These can be left till the topic is definitely before us. One, however, and not the least important, may be noted here: the atmosphere of Naum-

¹ "Die Möglichkeit einen Ersatz für den verlorenen Gott in den verschiedensten Formen der Selbstvergöttung zu finden, das ist die Geschichte seines Geistes, seiner Werke, seiner Erkrankung." (Salomé, 39.)

burg. He writes to his sister, that it is his pet aversion, the little town and its petty interests, adding that they two did not really belong there.¹ Still more illuminating is a letter written to his mother. It was despatched in a fit of irritation. Many like letters he would appear to have posted in the waste-paper basket. Presumably, it is a reply to something that had been said about religion. Nietzsche tells his mother he cannot stand the atmosphere; these good Christians, these uncles and aunts, whether in Naumburg or not. (*Briefe*, V, 534-6.) We can imagine the situation. The circle of respectable old ladies; the horror, when the young man from college takes a walk instead of going to church. The whisperings, the inquiries as to whether he reads Voltaire, the offer of "good books," the attempts to interest him in missions or relig-

¹"Naumburg ist leider meine Abneigung *par excellence*. Die kleine Stadt, und gedrückte Seelen. Du und ich sind nicht Naumburgisch gerathen, viel zu unabhängig und vielleicht auch zu leicht zufrieden, und in uns zufrieden, was diesen Raths- und Staatsmenschen nicht so leicht begegnet." (To his sister, *Briefe*, V, 725.)

ious gossip—all this probably among people who lived as though comfort were their main object and had little interest in things beyond the local horizon. Nietzsche's whole life was in reaction. His conception of Christianity was compounded of certain errors of Schopenhauer and the domestic pettiness of a small provincial town. He was in reaction against his aunts.¹

Secondly, we find him in strong reaction against the conventions of the academic world. The narrow second-hand culture, priding itself on heterodoxy, the complacent belief that by the multiplication of research and professorial activities the progress of mankind is assured, the easy-going middle-class ideals of a rationalist millennium, all this revolted him. We see its beginning in the essay on Strauss; but the attitude is unchanged throughout his life, except in so far

¹Perhaps this passage has a note of the same feeling: "Wer hat nicht seine Mutter getödtet, seine Frau verrathen, wenn es auf Gedanken ankommt? Man würde in einer artigen Einsamkeit leben, wenn Gedanken tödten könnten."

as he seemed partly to have receded in the period of Rée's influence. Because he had been a professor, he is thoroughly alive to the defects of the professorial view of the universe.¹

In the same way, after submitting to the influence of Schopenhauer, he turned round, and in regard to the fundamental thesis of the evil of life, and of salvation through denial of the will to live, he became the strongest opponent of what he once adored. It is needless to point out how the same is true of his relations to Wagner. It is not really so much these adversaries whom he attacks, as it is himself in his former state of mind. Half the bitterest things in controversy are those said in all sincerity by men who have changed their view, and are for ever lashing themselves in punishment of their peccadilloes in opinion. It would have been the same with the *Superman*. Had the *Superman* or the ruling caste of

¹ "Keine erbärmlichere Gesellschaft giebt es, als die von Gelehrten: jene wenigen abgerechnet die militärische Gelüste im Leibe und Kopfe haben." (Nietzsche, *Werke*, XI, 249.)

Nietzsche's prophetic dreams ever been made manifest to his sight, no critic would have been more contemptuous. Nietzsche would have broken his ancient idol into a thousand splinters.

Nietzsche had the temper of detachment. His words about loneliness, as a means not of withdrawal from reality but of deeper immersion therein, might have been used by any mystic and many monks. His affinities were by no means what he supposed them. Could the two have met, Henri Beyle, with his real cynicism, would have repelled the poet-soul of Nietzsche, who tried all his life to be a cynic and could achieve only the mood of "the great love and the great contempt."

Many of his inconsistencies we can understand. Very few writers but feel to some degree the need and the value of that loneliness which was to Nietzsche at once his cross and his crown. Yet few men, however much they feel the need to be by themselves, but feel, like Nietzsche, the need of a little love in regard to their creations.

Mere friendship without this seems something outside. Vanity may seem the name for some of Nietzsche's imaginings, such as his desire for a few disciples, who would keep the rest of the world in respect. But there was something deeper.

That loneliness helped Nietzsche as an artist.¹ Maybe without it we could not have his most splendid passages, or the mystic beauty and apocalyptic of *Zarathustra*. As a thinker he lost by it. Nietzsche always seems to discern some truth in whatever topic he discusses. His psychological insight is deep and real. But he sees it out of proportion, and having seen it, he magnifies all into a unity of feeling by shutting off all other sides and refusing to listen to any criticism. Dialectic would have saved him. Doubtless it would not have altered his fundamental view, but it

¹ "Zuletzt hat mir die Krankheit den allergrössten Nutzen gebracht: sie hat mich herausgelöst, sie hat mir den Muth zu mir selbst zurückgegeben. . . . Auch bin ich, meinen Instinkten nach, ein tapferes Thier, selbst ein militärisches. Der lange Widerstand hat meinen Stolz ein wenig exasperirt." (N. to Brandes, *Briefe*, III, 302.)

would have shewn him the limits of its application, and made him less attractive but more enduring. Nothing could be less like the moderation of the classics and their balance and harmony than the febrile energy, always a little hectic, of the hermit of Sils-Maria. Nietzsche jeers at Wagner for his incessant *expressivo*. Yet nothing is more characteristic of his own style.

This is but an instance of the same fact—all his ideals express disgust at his own character and limitations. An incurable Romanticist, he is all for the classics. Profoundly naturalistic in his fundamental view, he is for ever chafing against the thought, and denies materialism in favour of some doctrine of spirit, which he is careful not to define. His dislike of sympathy is due to his being naturally full of it and afraid of giving way. His adoration of force is partly the expression of physical weakness.¹ Lonely, he longed for friends,

¹“Malgrado le immagini e le allegorie, malgrado gli ampi orizzonti scenografici ed i crescendo delle sinfonie, il segreto di Nietzsche è stato scoperto. In una parola—in una sola e piccola

and cries out pathetically at the neglect of him in his native land. Even his dislike of the Germans is partly due to his consciousness of being one.¹ Despite all assertions to the contrary, some of his characteristics are eminently German—notably his violence of language. Urbanity in controversy is a quality of French culture.

Rays of light came to him at the last. He heard that Georg Brandes at Copenhagen was giving a course of lectures on his philosophy and that it drew crowded

parola—sta il segreto di Nietzsche, nella parola *debolezza*.” (*Il Crepuscolo dei Filosofi*. Papini. 225.)

¹“Toute sa vie cet Allemand pur sang s’enorgueillit de ne pas être Allemand. Fils d’un pasteur de campagne prussien, il s’imagine qu’il descend d’une vieille famille noble polonaise du nom de Nietzky, alors que (sa sœur elle même en fait la remarque) il n’a pas une goutte de sang polonais dans les veines; dès lors son slavisme imaginaire devient une idée fixe et une idée-force; il finit par penser et agir sous l’empire de cette idée. Le noble polonais, dit-il, avait le droit d’annuler avec son seul veto la délibération d’une assemblée tout entière; lui aussi héroïquement à tout ce qu’a décidé la grande assemblée humaine il dira: veto. ‘Copernic était Polonais et Copernic a changé le système du monde.’ Nietzsche renversera le système des idées et des valeurs; il fera tourner l’humanité autour de ce qu’elle avait méprisé et honnie. Chopin le Polonais . . . a ‘délivré la musique des influences tudesques’; Nietzsche délivrera la philosophie des influences allemandes; il s’en flatte, il le croit; et il développe en une direction nouvelle la philosophie de Schopenhauer.” (Fouillée, *Nietzsche et l’Immoralisme*, VI.)

audiences. One or two signs latterly at Turin and Sils-Maria made him feel he was getting known. But it was too late. During the last years one day he heard talk of books, and his face lit up. "Ah," said Nietzsche, "I also have written some good books."

One quality he had—a terrific pride. He said that he was too proud to make friends, for none alive were of the same rank.¹ All loneliness of spirit easily becomes arrogance. This Nietzsche does not react against.² It is his constant quality. Of that pride he proceeded to make an ideal. In the next lecture I shall try to shew what it was.

¹ 1885. "Ich bin viel zu stolz um je zu glauben dass ein Menschen mich lieben könne. Dies würde nämlich voraussetzen dass er wisse wer ich bin. Ebensowenig glaube ich daran dass ich je Jemanden lieben werde; dies würde voraussetzen dass ich einmal—Wunder über Wunder—einem Menschen meines Ranges finde." (*Briefe*, V, 596.)

"Ich selbst den Stifter des Christenthums in mancher Hinsicht als oberflächlich empfinde."

Cf. also: 685. His pathetic account of loneliness: "Ein tiefer Mensch braucht Freunde; es wäre denn dass er seinen Gott noch hätte. Und Gott ich habe weder Gott noch Freunde."

² "On chercherait en vain dans l'histoire des lettres, des philosophies, voire des religions depuis les temps les plus reculés, jusqu'à nos jours un autre exemple d'orgueil aussi prodigieusement ingénu, de narcissisme intellectuel à ce point exalté." (Pallarès, *Le Crépuscule d'une idole*, 125.)

II

THE GOSPEL OF NIETZSCHE

Courage, mon ami, le diable est vif, might be taken as the motto for the Gospel according to Nietzsche, heralded with the call, Repent ye of your virtues, for the kingdom of earth is at hand. For it is an Evangel that Nietzsche sets forth with, on it the title marked, "the rich have the Gospel preached to them"; save that by the rich Nietzsche would mean rich in faculty and not goods. Nietzsche is no less convinced than any Moses that he is to lead his people into a promised land. As he says in *Ecce Homo*:

"My life-task is to prepare for humanity one supreme moment in which it can come to its senses, a great noon in which it will turn its gaze backward and forward, in which it will step from under the yoke of accident and of priests, and

for the first set the question of the why and wherefore of humanity as a whole—this life-task naturally follows out of the conviction that mankind does *not* get on the right road of its own accord.¹

“For such a task there is requisite a different kind of spirits than our age is likely to produce; spirits strengthened by wars and victories; to whom conquest, adventure, danger, even pain have become a need; for it an accustoming to thin, Alpine air, to winterly wanderings, to ice and mountains in every sense; nay, even a kind of sublime maliciousness, an ultimate and most self-assured sprightliness of knowledge, indispensable for the great health: to say a bad thing in one word, even this great health is requisite! But is just this even so much as possible to-day? But at some time and in a stronger time than this tottering, self-doubting age of ours he *is* to arise, the *redeeming* man of the great love and con-

¹ *Ecce Homo*, 93, I.

tempt, the creative spirit who by his thronging power is ever again driven away from every corner and other world; whose loneliness is misunderstood by the people, as though it were a flight from reality, whereas it is but his sinking, burying, and deepening into reality, in order that when he rises again into light, he may bring home with him the redemption of reality, its redemption from the curse which the old ideal has laid upon it. This man of the future who will redeem us from the old ideal, as also from that which had to grow out of that ideal, from great surfeit from the will to nothing, from Nihilism, this bell-stroke of noon-day and the great decision which restores freedom to the will, which restores to the earth its goal and to man his hope; this Anti-Christ and Anti-Nihilist, this conqueror of God and of the Nothing—he must come some day. . . .

“But what say I here? Enough!
Enough! At this place but one thing

befits me—silence: lest I should infringe on that which only one younger than I am, only one more futurous than I am, one stronger than I am is free to do—on that which my Zarathustra is free to do—Zarathustra the ungodly. . . .”¹

Nietzsche is an apostle preaching a new religion of redemption.² For the doctrine of Nietzsche, no less than that of Christ or of Buddha, is a doctrine of redemption and deliverance. Nietzsche believes that man, especially European man, is in evil case. He preaches that he must be delivered from this. He holds that this needs a radical change of nature. It is a “new creature” that is needed.³ This will be reached not by

¹ *The Genealogy of Morals*, 121.

² “Tiefes, feindseliges Schweigen über das Christenthum im ganzen Buche, es ist weder apollinisch noch dionysisch; es negirt alle ästhetischen Werthe (die einzigen Werthe die ‘Die Geburth der Tragödie’ anerkennt); es ist im tiefsten Sinne nihilistisch, während im dionysischen Symbol die äusserste Grenze der Bejahung erreicht ist.” (*Leben*, II, 103.)

This is his summing up of his attitude to Christianity in the account he wrote later on of his first book.

³ “Tutto quello che gli resto di energia lo speso per gridare in belle forti parole il suo desiderio di salute e di forza trasformato in teoria redentrice e per suonare e risuonare alcuni arguti motivi con un sas porticcio flauto di antico saggio.” (Papini, 260.)

education or intellect, but by raising a portion of man, the ruling class, into a higher order of life, a new society. It is a religion, even more than a philosophy or even an ethic that Nietzsche preached. His attitude to the Universe is in one respect religious. True, he does not in the strict sense believe in a universe at all, but only a chaos of forces. Yet his doctrine of the eternal recurrence makes up for this, and justifies a certain reverence. It is life that he worships; and his adoration is so wholehearted, that he requires every second of the tale of life to be told again, like children who never tire. Not without justice does one who knew him say:

“In Nietzsche there dwelt in continual warfare, side by side of one another and in turn tyrannising over one another, a musician of high talent, a thinker with a free orientation, a religious genius, and a born poet.”¹

¹ *Nietzsche in seinen Werken*, 23.

“In Nietzsche lebten in stetem Unfrieden, neben einander und

But we must not forget that of this new religion the presupposition is the non-existence of other-worldly values. Not once do these occur to Nietzsche, except as a target for attacks. The possibility that they have any basis in reality he does not consider. Rather his whole philosophy starts from the attempt to make people think out the consequences of those denials which he says they have already made. It is no use to give up God, and yet remain in the prison-house of an ethical system, which resulted from faith in God. See what your denial involves, and be bold enough to carry it to its logical conclusion. "Thorough" is his motto. A passage in the *Joyful Wisdom* puts this very well:

"Have you ever heard of the madman who on a bright morning lighted a lantern and ran to the market-place, calling out unceasingly: 'I seek God! I seek God!'

sich gegenseitig tyrannisierend, ein Musiker von hoher Begabung, ein Denker von freigeisterischer Richtung, ein religiöses Genie, und ein geborener Dichter." (*Friedrich Nietzsche in seinen Werken*, Lou Andreas-Salomé, II, 23.)

As there were many people standing about who did not believe in God, he caused a great deal of amusement. 'Why is he lost?' said one. 'Has he strayed away like a child?' said another. 'Or does he keep himself hidden?' 'Is he afraid of us?' 'Has he taken a sea-voyage?' 'Has he emigrated?' the people cried out laughingly, all in a hubbub. The insane man jumped into their midst and transfixed them with his glances. 'Where is God gone?' he called out. 'I mean to tell you! *We have killed him*—you and I. We are all his murderers. But how have we done it? How were we able to drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the whole horizon? What did we do when we loosened this earth from its sun? Whither does it now move? Whither do we move? Away from all suns? Do we not dash on unceasingly? Backward, sideways, forward, in all directions? Is there still an above and below? Do we not stray, as through in-

finite nothingness? Does not empty space breathe upon us? Has it not become colder? Does not night come on continually, darker and darker? Shall we not have to light lanterns in the morning? Do we not hear the noise of the grave-diggers, who are burying God? Do we not smell the divine putrefaction? For even Gods putrefy. God is dead! God remains dead! And we have killed him! How shall we console ourselves, the most murderous of all murderers? The holiest and the mightiest that the world has hitherto possessed, has bled to death under our knife—who will wipe the blood from us? With what water could we cleanse ourselves? What lustrums? What sacred games shall we have to devise? Is not the magnitude of this deed too great for us? Shall we not ourselves have to become Gods, merely to seem worthy of it. There never was a greater event—and on account of it, all who are born after us belong to a higher

history than any history hitherto.' Here the madman was silent, and looked again at his hearers. They also were silent, and looked at him in surprise. At last he threw his lantern on the ground, so that it broke in pieces and was extinguished. 'I came too early,' he then said. 'I am not yet at the right time. This prodigious event is still on its way, and is travelling—it has not yet reached men's ears. Lightning and thunder need time, the light of the stars needs time, deeds need time, even after they are done, to be seen and heard. This deed is as yet farther from them than the farthest star—and yet they have done it!' It is further stated that the madman made his way into different churches on the same day and there intoned his *Requiem æternam deo*. When led out and called to account, he always gave the reply: 'What are these churches now, if they are not the tombs and monuments of God?'"¹

¹ *Joyful Wisdom*, 167.

What, then, is the nature of this religion? Has it no object of worship? It has—*Life*. The yea-saying to the whole of life is the sum and substance of it all. Nietzsche himself had suffered so much and profited by his suffering so deeply that he could not feel with Schopenhauer that existence is evil, because of the suffering which it involves. No less deeply than any Christian was Nietzsche persuaded that what makes life noble is richness of experience, and that suffering is irrelevant. No less than any Christian does he repudiate the stoic ideal of apathy. We are not to train ourselves to impassibility, but to endure and even to embrace the Cross, on account of the strength and beauty that can be won thereby.¹ Fulness of life is

¹ Nietzsche, *Werke*, XIII, 89, § 226: "Wer das Leiden als Argument gegen das Leben fühlt gilt mir als oberflächlich, mitten unsrer Pessimisten."

§ 227: "Mit der närrischen und unbescheidenen Frage, ob in der Welt Lust oder Unlust überwiegt, steht man inmitten der philosophischen Dilettanterei: dergleichen sollte man sehnüchtigen Dichtern und Weibern überlassen."

Ibid., XIV, 81, § 162: "Leiden verringern und sich selber dem Leiden (d. h. dem Leben) entziehen—das sei moralisch? Leiden schaffen—sich selber und Anderen—and sie zum höchsten Leben, dem des Siegers, zu befähigen—wäre mein Ziel."

Ibid., XIV, 102, § 222: "Es ist Nichts hart sein wie ein Stoiker;

the end, and topics of joy and suffering are as irrelevant; just as fatigue is irrelevant to an athlete or losses in battle to a commander, if victory be the one end.¹ He had learned to welcome all that befel him—just as Madame Guyon declared that whatever has happened to one is the Will of God after it has happened; or as St. Paul—“All things work together for good to them that love God.” As he says in *The Will to Power*:

“The kind of *experimental philosophy* which I am living, even anticipates the possibility of the most fundamental Nihilism, on principle; but by this I do not mean that it remains standing at a negation, at a *no*, or at a will to negation. It would rather attain to the very reverse—

mit der Unempfindlichkeit hat man sich losgelöst. Man muss den Gegensatz in sich haben—die zarte Empfindung und die Gegenmacht, nicht zu verbluten, sondern jedes Unglück wieder plastisch zum Besten zu wenden.”

¹ (*Leben*, II, 838.) “Und später schreibt er: ‘Ich habe längst bei mir beschlossen, meine eigenen Wünsche und Pläne nicht so wichtig zu nehmen. Gelingt mir das nicht, gelingt mir jenes: und im Ganzen weiss ich nicht, ob ich nicht allen Misslingen so gut zu Dank verpflichtet bin, wie irgend welchem Gelingen. Das was mir Werth und Ertrag des Lebens ausmacht, liegt wo anders.’ ”

to a *Dionysian* affirmation of the world, as it is, without subtraction, exception, or choice—it would have eternal circular motion: the same things, the same reasoning, and the same illogical concatenation. The highest state to which a philosopher can attain: to maintain a Dionysian attitude to Life—my formula for this is *amor fati*.”¹

Nietzsche will go farther. Affirmation of life carried to its logical extreme means not only the acceptance of the moment. It involves also the desire for its recurrence, precisely in all particularity as it took place. It is to recur again and again. To this end courage is needed. The doctrine is probably the expression of Nietzsche's own resolution in his darkest hours no less than in bright ones. “No, I will not give way. No weakness; none of your pity. It won't last for ever. As the schoolboy says: It will be all the same a hundred years hence.”

¹ *Will to Power*, II, 412.

Then a further access of courage. "No, I don't care if it does go on. I will still bear it, bear it if it lasts for ever; bear it if it repeats itself *ad infinitum*." Some such experience nightly when he had toothache is partly at the bottom of the Eternal Recurrence. On the other side there is the more obvious desire for the recurrence of joyful moments. This is expressed in his refrain: "Eternity is sought by all delight." We have Nietzsche's own word for it, that all his doctrines represent experience lived and aflame. Courage is the one virtue which Nietzsche leaves untouched. His disciples are to have the courage of their sufferings and of their sins. They are to risk the depths that they may win the heights. Far from seeking serenity and the pensioned dull existence of the safely insured, they must court danger and adventure, ever driven by one thought, the newness of the moment and the self-affirmation of life. No weak sympathy for themselves is to deter them. What they need not for themselves, they

are not to dishonour their fellows by offering to them.¹ "I reckon the overcoming of pity as noble." Life, life, and more abundant life is his cry. This is the need of every soul—life—not comfort nor happiness nor riches. Some of his words are not unlike those of another Master: "In the world ye shall have tribulation, but be of good cheer, I have overcome the world." Or again: "Blessed are ye when men shall hate you and persecute you and revile, and say all manner of things falsely against you, for my sake. Rejoice and be exceeding glad."²

¹See the letter to Peter Gast on the value of *Vornehmheit*, IV, 219. "In allen meinen Krankheits-Zuständen fühle ich mit Schrecken, eine Art Herabziehung zu pöbelhaften Schwächen, pöbelhaften Milden, sogar pöbelhaften Tugenden."

"Vornehm ist z. B. der festgehaltene frivole Anschein mit dem eine stoische Härte und Selbstbeziehung maskirt wird. Vornehm ist das Langsamgehen in allen Stücken, auch das langsame Auge. Wir bewundern schwer. Es giebt nicht zu viel werthvoller Dinge; und diese kommen von selbst und wollen zu uns."

²"Dass man diese Lehre für einen frivolen Egoismus, eine Heiligsprechung epikureischer Zügellosigkeit angesehen hat, gehört zu den wunderlichsten Augentäuschungen in der Geschichte der Moral. . . ."

"Nietzsche hat den Personalismus zu einem objektiven Ideal gemacht und ihn damit von dem eigentlichen Egoismus der immer auf das Subjekt zurücksieht, aufs Entschiedenste abgetrennt. Der Egoismus will etwas haben, der Personalismus will etwas sein." (Simmel, *Schopenhauer und Nietzsche*, 245.)

One of the most wholesome elements in Nietzsche is his contempt for the vulgar *eudæmonism* of the Manchester school, "the bagman's paradise" of Cobdenism, the tea-grocer's philosophy of Spencer, as he calls it. To all who know England it is strange to find Nietzsche identifying Benthamite utilitarianism with English civilisation, as though that were anything more than a particular phase. But it is true to say with Meyer: No philosophy was ever less eudæmonistic than that of Nietzsche, despite the fact that some have thought of him as teaching sheer hedonism.¹ Mere money-getting on the part of those who have enough is the ugliest of all the idols of human worship. Nietzsche deserves all honour in that he sets his face against this, no less than any daring Hebrew prophet. Not that he is justified in doing so on his own theory. A man struggling for financial triumph, say, to be a "Bun-Em-

¹ "Weniger eudämonistisch ist keine Philosophie als die Nietzsches, den man einen Genussphilosophen zu nennen gewagt hat." (Meyer, 689.)

peror" as in Mr. London's tale, may plausibly argue that he incarnates the will to power in a modern pacific and industrial society, and is preparing the way for the superman. None the less is it true that what revolted Nietzsche above all things was the millennium of the utilitarian comfort-idolater, whether individualist or socialist.

The religion of valour is no bad name for this side of Nietzsche's teaching. No one need be at pains to quarrel with his inculcation of heroism. As he says of his disciples:

"The type of my disciples—to such men as concern me in any way I wish suffering, desolation, sickness, ill-treatment, indignities of all kinds. I wish them to be acquainted with profound self-contempt, with the martyrdom of self-distrust, with the misery of the defeated: I have no pity for them; because I wish them to have the only thing which to-day proves whether a man has

any value or not, namely, the capacity of sticking to his guns.”¹

The ground of all this is, that the fulness of life is won only this way. Risk and pain are needful for the tempering of the steel of spirit. In this he preaches a doctrine precisely similar to that of our Lord: “Whoso loseth his life shall save it.” It is, in fact, the doctrine of the Cross, little as Nietzsche seems aware of this.

To Nietzsche Life, development, is the one fact. *Πάντα ῥεῖ οὐδὲν μένει.*² There is neither being nor spirit nor matter nor individual nor universe—all is becoming.³ Every conception involving substance is a mere illusion of language created by our

¹ *Will to Power*, II, p. 333, § 910.

² (Simmel, *op. cit.*, 262.) “So ruht seine ganze Lehre auf dem dogmatischen Imperativ: das Leben soll sein.”

³ “Es giebt weder Geist, noch Vernunft, noch Denken, noch Bewusstsein, noch Seele, noch Wille, noch Wahrheit. Alles Fiktionen die unbrauchbar sind. Es handelt sich nicht um ‘Subjekt und Objekt,’ sondern um eine bestimmte Thierart, welche nur unter einer gewissen relativen Richtigkeit, vor allem Regelmässigkeit ihrer Wahrnehmungen (so dass sie Erfahrung kapitalisieren kann) gedeiht.

“Die Erkenntniss arbeitet als Werkzeug der Macht. So liegt es auf der Hand, dass sie wächst mit jedem Mehr von Macht.” (II, 770.)

habit of chopping up the world, so as to control it. Strictly speaking, there is no world, only a perpetual flow of becoming. That becoming, that energy (you will at once recall the *élan vital* of M. Bergson, and the eternal flux of Heraclitus)—is wrongly conceived if it is thought of as the will to live. There cannot be a will to live. That would be supposing something anterior to life. Life is. What does it mean? A will for more and more and ever more; in other words, a will to power. This is the one reality. Every other picture of the world, every other living piece of the world, ourselves included, is merely a distorted image of this reality. As he puts it in an eloquent passage at the close of the *Will to Power*:

“Do ye know what ‘the universe’ is to my mind? Shall I show it to you in my mirror? This universe is a monster of energy, without beginning or end; a fixed and brazen quantity of energy which

grows neither bigger nor smaller, which does not consume itself, but only alters its face; as a whole its bulk is immutable, it is a household without either losses or gains, but likewise without increase and without sources of revenue, surrounded by nonentity as by a frontier. It is nothing vague or wasteful, it does not stretch into infinity, but is a definite quantum of energy located in a limited space, and not in space which would be anywhere empty. It is rather energy everywhere, the play of forces and force-waves, at the same time one and many, agglomerating here and diminishing there, a sea of forces storming and raging in itself, for ever changing, for ever rolling back over incalculable ages to recurrence, with an ebb and flow of its forms, producing the most complicated things out of the most simple structures; producing the most ardent, most savage, and most contradictory things out of the quietest, most rigid, and most frozen material, and then returning

from multifariousness to uniformity, from the play of contradictions back into the delight of consonance, saying yea unto itself, even in this homogeneity of its courses and ages, for ever blessing itself as something which recurs for all eternity—a becoming which knows not satiety, or disgust, or weariness: this, my Dionysian world of eternal self-creation, of eternal self-destruction, this mysterious world of twofold voluptuousness; this, my ‘Beyond Good and Evil,’ without aim, unless there is an aim in the bliss of the circle; without will, unless a ring must by nature keep good-will to itself—would you have a name for my world? A *solution* of all your riddles? Do ye also want a light, ye most concealed, strongest, and most undaunted men of the blackest midnight? This world is the *Will to Power*—and nothing else! And even ye yourselves are this will to power—and nothing besides!”¹

¹ *Will to Power*, II, 431, 2.

This will to power is everything; the goal and development of spirit no less than of matter. In truth, there is neither one nor the other, but only this chaos of warring forces, all with the one end. The will to power determines the "law" of gravitation, the process of the planets, the origin of species, the course of human history. It is the reality behind all science, all art, and all religion. Every act which seems to deny it is nothing but a mask to insure its deeper predominance. Since this will to power is the one reality, and since, also, it has no meaning, for there is no goal of evolution, no "far-off divine event." "The world is not an organism, it is a chaos," blind and without purpose or meaning, with neither end nor beginning, after passing through every possible combination it must ultimately repeat itself. The world is thus a clock running down, and then self-winding to an exactly similar course. Since all this is the one will to power, individuality can be no more than an appearance of it. Individuals

do not in any real sense exist—any more than they do on the system of Schopenhauer.¹ Nietzsche lays stress on personality. His object is to secure strong individuals. Yet I do not see how on his system they have any reality; they are the mere soap-bubbles blown for the nonce by the will to power; the superman is only the largest and most highly coloured soap-bubble.

Since the will to power is all, and since moral value is denied to it, to talk of wrongdoing is absurd. All actions, after they have taken place, are holy. Will, however, which can make all things new, finds one obstacle. It cannot reverse the past. In revenge for this impotence, it invents the torment of evil conscience. In theory Nietzsche rejects all moral valuations. In practice he reasserts them. Otherwise there is no meaning in his attacks on decadence, and all forms of decadent ethics, whether

¹ "Egoismus ist ebenso wie 'Selbstlosigkeit' eine populäre Fiktion; insgleichen das 'Individuum' die 'Seele.'" (*Werke*, XIII, 148.)

philosophic pessimism like that of Schopenhauer, or a religion like Christianity, or any formal adoption of the golden rule. All these in Nietzsche's view are equally a no-saying to life; they are a crushing of the will to power, a forcing down of the strong and adventurous in favour of the anæmic (in whose interest commonly the rules were framed). Every form of self-denial and humility is thus to be condemned, except on one condition. These qualities are the note of all those who are by nature slaves. Among such they are to be fostered, not for any good they do to the slaves, but because they make them more ready of service to their masters.

Everything is power; the world is always in flux; it never is. Supermen are life represented by its highest moments of power, its concentrations in a classical epoch, an imperial race, a triumphant personality. Species is but a name. Mankind is in no sense real or ideal, a unity. To talk of *homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto* is to talk

nonsense. That maxim is the low-water mark of development, a symbol of the mongrel world over which Rome ruled, the mishmash of the mob. The problem is to realise the highest type of man. This will be produced not by raising the people, but by producing a select caste of born commanders. The only sense of moral virtue is command, whether inside the individual or in relation to others.¹ A state, says Nietzsche, is simply "nature's roundabout way of making a few great individuals." At the moment under the influence of ideals, which are Christian in essence if not in name, the mob is too powerful for the strong personalities. That is why Napoleon failed—and Cesare Borgia. Our object should be to bring about conditions in which such men are the rule and no longer the exception. So

¹ "Das Nachdenken über Freiheit und Unfreiheit des Willens, hat mich zu einer Lösung dieses Problems geführt, die man sich gründlicher und abschliessender gar nicht denken kann—nämlich zur Beseitigung des Problems vermöge der erlangten Einsicht: es giebt gar keinen Willen, weder einen freien noch einen unfreien." (Nietzsche, *Werke*, XIII, 263.)

"Der freie Mensch ist ein Staat und eine Gesellschaft von Individuen." (Nietzsche, *Werke*, XII, 116.)

far from the weak needing protection against the strong, it is the strong who need protection against the unified jealousy of the weak, powerful only by numbers. The end can be reached only by securing a ruling race or class, and by such subordination and breeding as will keep individualities strong. To such an end the rest of mankind are only tools. In themselves they have no value. To take an instance, in art a genius gives value to his epoch, he is not the mere resultant of the other individuals in his milieu. The aristocrat exists for himself and for his order, not to serve the community. Yet even the aristocracy does not, like a body of voluptuaries, exist for itself alone. Its purpose (often unknown to its members) is to produce a higher type of man. Therefore it must have experience both of the heights and the depths. Its training must be Spartan, only more severe. It must shrink from nothing. All the old rules of morals vanish before it. The *Übermensch* is beyond good and evil. Morality exists for the

mediocre, the herd, the inhabitants of the world, in which you and I are alive. Europe is becoming more and more one; mediocrity is becoming more and more and more mediocre. As against this background of common people, united by a slave morality, there is at the same time gradually defining itself, at present dimly seen, a master caste of free, adventurous spirits. They prepare the way for the superman. He is not yet here. The succeeding ages, even at their highest, are but the forerunners of the supermen of the future. To that far goal they must sacrifice themselves. This new nobility exists for itself alone. No sympathy or fellow-feeling with the slaves who are its instruments is to stain its sense of distinction.

Distinction, indeed, the "pathos of distance," must increase, until it reaches a higher point than that between a Roman Senator and his slaves. No existing aristocracy has enough of it. Nietzsche admired the Prussian officer corps with its

exclusive claims and discipline.¹ Not, however, from the Germans does he hope for much; he treats them as more hostile to culture than even the English, and declares that the presence of a German retards his digestion.² It is the "good Europeans" who are the beginning of the master race of the future. This does not mean the intellectuals in the university sense. All his life

¹ (*Leben*, II, 617.) "Man hat behauptet, dass mein Bruder stets eine starke Vorliebe für den Adel und das deutsche Offiziercorps ausgesprochen habe. Mit vollem Recht—nur darf man den Begriff 'Adel' nicht zu eng fassen. In unserm demokratischen Zeitalter empfand er es als eine Wohlthat, dass es noch gesellschaftliche Klassen gab, die den Muth hatten, sich abzusondern, die männlichsten Tugenden allen andern voranzustellen, und welche Befehlen und Gehorchen in der Vollkommenheit kennen und lernen. Allerdings wünschte er, dass der Adel und das Offiziercorps strenger in der Forderung guter Herkunft bei der Ehe sei, schärfer in dem Sich-Abheben von dem Andern, tapferer und kräftiger in dem sich-selbst Ziel-setzen."

Cf. Nietzsche's own words:

"Die Zukunft der deutschen Kultur ruht auf den Söhnen der preussischen Offiziere." (*Nietzsche Nachlass*, Taschen-Ausgabe, VIII, 494.)

² "So ergibt sich die seltsame Verbindung, dass ein durchaus international-gesinnter Mensch, ein Verkennen und Verächter des Deutschtums, das Geheimniss und den 'Geist' der er ausspricht, die als specifisch-typische Deutsche sich am lautesten gebärden . . . werden." (Tönnies, *Der Nietzsche Kultus*, 10.)

"England's Klein-Geisterei ist die grosse Gefahr jetzt auf der Erde. Ich sehe mehr Hang zu Grösse in den Gefühlen der russischen Nihilisten: als in denen der englischen Utilitarier." (*Nachlass*, 8, 495.)

Nietzsche was tilting at the culture-Philistines. He declares that it is not intellect that ennobles blood, but blood that ennobles intellect, while a sedentary life is the sin against the Holy Ghost. What he wants is a more highly educated chivalry without the strong Christian element in the chivalrous ideal—a race of Alcibiades, and Borgia, freer, less bookish, less second-hand than the modern men of culture. Neither the *Almanach de Gotha* nor *Minerva* will give him what he wants. The peasantry has some of the qualities better developed than the modern culture of the newspaper and the café. This class, when it is established, will achieve a transvaluation of all values. It will retranslate the word good into its older and more pagan equivalents, noble, proud, self-centred, courageous, barbarous.

Some have debated as to how far Nietzsche was looking to a new development of man, as a species. Did he think that evolution would produce a new species, differing from man as much as man differs

from the ape? This is denied by his sister. But we must treat her statements with reserve. She writes apologetic. Nietzsche is ever saying that man is not a goal but a bridge—that man is something that must be surpassed.

Nietzsche, despite his dislike of Darwin and contempt for the Darwinians, was much under the influence of Darwin. Probably at times he dallied with the notion that the *Übermensch* expressed a physiological development.¹ But it cannot be said to be a ruling thought. The *Übermensch* is a vague term: it must be taken to express Nietzsche's dissatisfaction with man as he now is, and his belief that it is only by a radical heightening of what to him are the noble elements in his nature, that things can be bettered.² It means a higher type of man, something

¹ "Auch der höchste bleibt ein Mensch. . . . Der *Übermensch* kann nicht das Endziel der Menschen sein; denn was wäre dann das Endziel der *Übermenschen* selber?" (Riehl, *Friedrich Nietzsche, der Künstler und der Denker*, 132.)

² "Der *Übermensch* ist nichts als die Kristallform des Gedankens, dass der Mensch sich über sein Gegenwartsstadium hinausentwickeln kann und also soll." (Simmel, 253.)

better in the Nietzschean sense of better than we have now ; a new kind of superior persons or race of persons. The superman is a new creature, not merely the race as it now is better educated.¹

That raises a more important question :² Is the superman an individual or a class ? Here once more Nietzsche is not consistent. Much of his language favours the view that the superman is an individual, or a number of individuals ; the strong man with intellect and no restraint. Much points that way in his taking of individuals such as Napoleon. Cesare Borgia, the individual man of *virtù* in Machiavelli's sense, the need of freedom from all morals, the nullity of communal claims, the statement that all fellowship is degrading, the value set upon solitude.

¹ *Werke*, XIV, § 281 : " Das Christenthum hat darin Recht : man kann einen neuen Menschen anziehen. "

² On the question whether the superman is an order or an individual, cf. especially Simmel, *Schopenhauer und Nietzsche*, and Dorner, *Pessimismus, Nietzsche und Naturalismus* ; Simmel believes it to be a race ; Dorner takes the new Herren-Order as preparatory to the superman. Bélart in his book on *Wagners und Nietzsche Freundschafts-Tragödie* quotes eight varieties of the superman.

Yet, on the other hand, we have his definite statement that what he looks for is a new hierarchy of ranks, that his works are directed to the new master class and the often-repeated injunction that the higher man is to endure discipline and suffer. The truth is, that in view of Nietzsche's repudiation of sheer egoism, the problem is immaterial. We may say, perhaps, that his supermen will be separate individuals, arising out of but not identical with the master class, formed by discipline to severity; or we may say that they are a set of individuals. But in any case he allows them no absolute freedom. They are to be governed by the ideal of distinction, "*Vornehmheit*," gentlemanliness, as we might say. They are to be free of morals in the sympathetic sense, but more than others are they to be bound by the morality of courage. The superman is to incarnate personality at its highest, involving self-control, adventure, fine manners, and powers of command. If it is a superclass of which Nietzsche is thinking,

he would not allow mere heredity apart from discipline and fitness to be a claim to membership. If it is an individual or individuals, clearly again they will not be supermen merely by pleasing themselves, but must incarnate certain qualities of ascending life.¹ The social element is never entirely absent from Nietzsche's thought, however much some of his followers may repudiate it. Nothing is farther from his intention than to pander to mere unbridled egoism in the individual, although, despite his intention, that is very often the result of his teaching. At any rate, there can be no doubt that Nietzsche looked forward to a new aristocracy. It is to be a society recruited upon blood and training, resting upon a slave system, kept pure by eugenic methods.² It will develop in common the

¹ "Zarathustra glücklich darüber, dass der Kampf der Stände vorüber ist, und jetzt endlich Zeit ist für eine Rangordnung der Individuen. Hass auf das demokratische Nivellirungs-System ist nur im Vordergrund: eigentlich ist er sehr froh, dass dies so weit ist. Nun kann er seine Aufgabe lösen." (Nietzsche, *Werke*, XI, 417.)

² On Nietzsche's relation to eugenics and biology see Richter, *Nietzsche et les théories biologiques contemporaines*.

virtues characteristic of an aristocracy, and it is to produce forms of culture higher than anything hitherto known—to carry forward the work of the Romans, as they might have developed, had not they been attacked by the corrupting virus of Christianity. This aristocracy is not the servant of society, but, on the other hand, it is not its own master; it exists for the raising of the type man. Rome, Nietzsche says often, offered the nearest approach to his ideal. The new rulers will no more regard themselves as servants of the mob than a Roman would think of duties towards his slaves. Rather they will incarnate the ideal of Dionysos; this in one place he seems to identify with barbarism and sensuality. On Nietzsche's principles we might look forward a millenium or two and see in a vision a race of masters, seated in a grander Colosseum, once more urging on torturers to whip their slave-gladiators into courage by white-hot electric rods, in order that their æsthetic sensibilities may be stimulated. We need

not suppose that Nietzsche desired this. But it would be a natural result of the acceptance of his principles. Clearly, he says that he wants more barbarism, that uncounted sufferings are needed to produce his new lords; to this end all other men are mere tools. Nietzsche is not to be blamed for asserting that higher powers in life are worth having at the cost of suffering; or that if culture is to reach a higher stage much must be gone through for it. Where he is wrong is in his attempt to purchase these goods, not only apart from the world at large, but deliberately at its cost. His system, if it is to be called a system, is a new return to Nature; less idyllic than that of the eighteenth century with its cry:

“I am as free as Nature first made man
Ere the base laws of servitude began
When wild in woods the noble savage ran.”¹

Sick of the stuffy atmosphere of academic lecture-halls, Nietzsche cries for the free and

¹ Dryden, *Conquest of Granada*.

open air. Wearied with domestic virtues and morality in petto, he hails barbaric grandeur. From the mean streets of modern civilisation he calls men to Alpine heights of danger and triumph, despising above all things utilitarian democracy and the optimism of inevitable progress, with its gospel of the sofa-millennium. Nietzsche boldly proclaims life to be immoral and preaches a gospel for the few. "*Pulchrum est paucorum hominum*" is one of his favourite tags. His desire is to herald a new Renaissance when man "free from moralic acid" shall display the splendours of individuality, and a brighter Borgia shall win a more enduring triumph. Nietzsche was angry at being compared with Carlyle. Yet in some respects the superman is curiously like Carlyle's strong man. Nor need we forget that while Carlyle bade men fall down and worship Frederick the Great, Nietzsche declared that the present Kaiser would be able to understand the Will to Power. Maybe he was right.

This *Will to Power* is the expression of life. The yea-saying to life, *i. e.*, to all reality and not merely to a part of it is the fundamental maxim of Nietzsche. But, he argues, if we are to say yes to any moment, we ought logically to desire that moment to recur. Besides, the energy in the world is limited in amount. Had there been any goal of all this striving it would long ago have been manifest. Since no such goal has been seen, and since the number of combinations is limited, Nietzsche deems it certain that the whole universe is turning for ever on its axis. Every event even in its minute detail is repeated infinitely. This doctrine of the eternal recurrence is not much dwelt upon by Nietzsche's disciples. Yet it is integral to his thought. He himself declares it to be the central doctrine of Zarathustra. Early in his life in the second of the *Essays Out of Season* Nietzsche had adumbrated the idea. Not until later did it become one of his chief articles of faith. The notion is the

ancient one of the *Annus Platonicus*. First of all, the thought that he would have to go through everything over again filled Nietzsche with unutterable repulsion. Afterwards he contemplated it with a certain mystic awe. Vainly does his sister, Frau Förster-Nietzsche, endeavour to minimise its importance to him. The despised Frau Lou Andreas-Salomé is more trustworthy on this point. One or two passages will serve to set it forth:

“ ‘Behold,’ I continued, ‘this moment ! From this gateway called moment a long, eternal lane runneth *backward* : behind us lieth an eternity.

“ ‘Must not all that *can* run of things have run already through this lane ? Must not what *can* happen of things have happened, have been done and have run past here ?

“ ‘And if all things have happened already : what dost thou dwarf think of this moment ? Must not this gateway have existed previously also ?

““And are not thus all things knotted fast together that this moment draweth behind it all future things? *Consequently*—draweth itself as well?

““For what *can* run of things—in that long lane *out there*, it *must* run once more!

““And this slow spider creeping in the moonshine, and this moonshine itself, and I and thou in the gateway whispering together, whispering of eternal things, must not we all have existed once in the past?

““And must not we recur and run in that other lane, out there, before us, in that long, haunted lane—must we not recur eternally?’

“Thus, I spake and ever more gently. For I was afraid of mine own thoughts and back-thoughts.”¹

Here is a more prosaic expression of the same idea:

“If the universe may be conceived as a definite quantity of energy, as a def-

¹ *Zarathustra*, 230.

inite number of centres of energy—and every other concept remains indefinite and therefore useless—it follows therefrom that the universe must go through a calculable number of combinations in the great game of chance which constitutes its existence. In infinity at some moment or other, every possible combination must once have been realised; not only this, but it must have been realised an infinite number of times. And inasmuch as between every one of these combinations and its next recurrence every other possible combination would necessarily have been undergone, and since every one of these combinations would determine the whole series in the same order, a circular movement of absolutely identical series is thus demonstrated: the universe is thus shown to be a circular movement which has already repeated itself an infinite number of times, and which plays its game for all eternity. This conception is not

simply materialistic; for if it were this, it would not involve an infinite recurrence of identical cases, but a finite state. Owing to the fact that the universe has not reached this finite state, materialism shows itself to be but an imperfect and provisional hypothesis.”¹

The doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence served three purposes:

1. It justified a certain mystical attitude of reverence by giving an element of eternity to every act. This would otherwise have been lacking in a system according to which all things are for ever in rapid movement. Nietzsche said that it marks the nearest possible approach of the ideas of Being and Becoming. His frequent phrase, “Eternity is sought by all delight,” is a necessity of the artist-nature.

2. It supplied the place of a faith in immortality. Nietzsche was a forward-looking spirit. He could not face the

¹ *The Will to Power*, II, 430.

thought of extinction. Disbelieving in any transcendent world, he had no hope of any individual life beyond, no resurrection, not even its pale philosophic counterpart, the immortality of the soul. Nor is absorption in the All of any attraction, if there be no unity in things. The eternal recurrence does assure a sort of immortality, although purely unconscious. It provides the only form in which Nietzsche could preserve something of the values of immortality, while keeping clear of all faith in an unseen world.

3. This doctrine, as Professor Simmel points out, gave Nietzsche the right to formulate a new canon of ethics, akin to that of Kant. Kant had said: "Act so that the principle of thy action may be a universal law." Nietzsche would say, or might say: "Act as though your action were to be eternally repeated."¹ Such a canon gives dignity to the moment and

¹ "Meine Lehre sagt: so leben dass du wünschen musst, wieder zu leben, ist die Aufgabe—du wirst es jedenfalls." (Nietzsche, *Werke*, XII, 64, § 116.)

preserves the doer from what is base. Such words as base and noble may seem strange in a writer who professedly repudiates all moral responsibility. Nietzsche is radically inconsistent. His yea-saying to life might mean only that we accept whatever happens after the event. But since Nietzsche regards all remorse as due to illusion, and repudiates freedom of choice, he can have no right to rank acts. Yet he does so. His whole system is based on selection, on the notion that some kind of actions are of worth and some are not, although these differ for different classes.¹ On no other hypothesis can his violence of abuse of Christian ethics be justified, even on Nietzsche's own showing. Briefly, the morals of Nietzsche consist in an exalta-

¹ The following passage gives Nietzsche's own account of his first perception of the Will to Power, and shows how it arose to counteract the plethora of sympathy aroused by the sufferings of the wounded:

"So vollständig der Ausdruck einer Rasse die siegen, herrschen oder untergehen will—'da fühlte ich wohl, meine Schwester,' fügte mein Bruder hinzu, 'dass der stärkste und höchste Wille zum Leben nicht in einem elenden Ringen um's Dasein zum Ausdruck kommt, sondern als Wille zum Kampf, als Wille zur Macht und Übermacht.'" (*Leben*, II, 683.)

tion of courage and a rejection of all other moral values, and a sense of the value of distinction and individuality. "Live dangerously," is his motto, and live differently from others.¹

The romantic expression of sheer naturalism is, perhaps, the best account that can be given of this gospel. Nietzsche had discarded all supernatural values. He was not unnaturally disgusted with the

¹ The barrenness of the mere empty notion of power is well stated here:

"Kurz: in Nietzsche verbindet sich der Naturalismus mit der Romantik. . . .

"Aber sein oberstes Prinzip ist widerspruchsvoll; der Wille zur Macht oder besser die Machttaktionen die *eo ipso* Anderes brauchen, um sich auszubreiten. Je mächtiger eine Aktionsgruppe, ein Selbst, um so ohnmächtiger macht sie die Anderen. Das Leben ist irrational an sich, Kampf mit sich selbst. Von einem Ganzen der Welt kann eigentlich Keiner reden, und doch redet er von dem Ganzen." (Dorner, *Pessimismus, Nietzsche und Naturalismus*, 189.)

"Die formale Macht wird wie ein Selbstzweck behandelt. Aber die Macht ist kein Selbstzweck. Es kommt darauf an, wozu die Macht verwendet wird. Weil Kultur da ist, ist Kampf um die Kultur. Aber die Kultur ist nicht bloss Mittel für die formale Macht. Wenn die Macht nur auf der Ausbeutung des Fremden beruht, was ist sie an sich selbst? Was hat diese Ausbeutung für einen Wert? Nietzsche redet von der Vergeistigung der Macht; aber woher der Geist bei seinem ausschliesslich physiologischen Standpunkte? Was versteht er unter Geist? Er hat ihn in die metaphysische Rumpelkammer verwiesen und will ihn nun doch wieder zitieren." (*Ibid.*, 191.)

prevailing Pantheistic idealism of the Universities. His romantic tendency combined with the relics of the system of Schopenhauer to produce the doctrine of the *Will to Power*. Essentially he accepts the standpoint of naturalism; and grafts on to it a religious attitude in the maxims of yeasaying to Life, and the Eternal Return. It is described by Papini as a dithyrambic transfiguration of evolutionary naturalism.¹

¹ "Io credo per conto mio che la più espressiva definizione che si possa dare della filosofia de Nietzsche sia questa—una transfigurazione ditirambica del naturalismo evoluzionista." (Papini, *op. cit.*, 238.)

III

NIETZSCHE AND CHRISTIANITY

NIETZSCHE regarded it as one of his greatest achievements in originality, that he was the first to perceive the true nature of Christianity.¹ As we saw, it is with Christianity as a way of life that he is concerned. So far as it is a doctrine of the other world, Nietzsche always assumes without argument that it is a system of lies. The only question for him is what person or group of persons developed his will to power through these lies. Chris-

¹ "Man hat bisher das Christenthum immer auf eine falsche, und nicht bloss schlichterne Weise angegriffen. So lange man nicht die Moral des Christenthums als Kapitalverbrechen am Leben empfindet, haben dessen Vertheidiger gutes Spiel. Die Frage der blossen 'Wahrheit' des Christenthums—sei es in Hinsicht auf die Existenz seines Gottes, oder die Geschichtlichkeit seiner Entstehungslegende, gar nicht zu reden von der christlichen Astronomie und Naturwissenschaft—ist eine ganz nebensächliche Angelegenheit so lange die Werthfrage der christlichen Moral nicht berührt ist. Taugt die Moral des Christenthums etwas, oder ist sie eine Schändung und Schmach trotz aller Heiligkeit der Verführungskünste?" (*Leben*, I, 30.)

tianity is a system of ethics, and it must be judged alongside of all other systems of ethics, which have the same or similar principles. In *Ecce Homo* he recounts his services to posterity:¹

“No one hitherto has felt Christian morality beneath him; to that end there were needed light and remoteness of vision, and an abysmal psychological depth, not believed to be possible hitherto. Up to the present, Christian morality has been the Circe of all thinkers—they stood at her service. What man before my time had descended into the underground caverns from out of which the poisonous

¹ “Ich habe jetzt mit einem Cynismus der welthistorisch werden wird, mich selbst erzählt. Das Buch heisst *Ecce Homo*, und ist ein Attentat ohne die geringste Rücksicht auf den Gekreuzigten; es endet in Donnern und Wetterschlägen gegen Alles was christlich oder christlich-infekt ist, bei denen Einem Sehen und Hören vergeht. Ich bin zuletzt der erste Psychologe des Christenthums und kann, als alter Artillerist der ich bin, schweres Geschütz vorfahren, von dem kein Gegner des Christenthums auch nur die Existenz vermuthet hat. . . . Ich schwöre Ihnen zu dass wir in zwei Jahren die ganze Erde in Convulsionen haben werden. Ich bin ein Verhängniss.” (Nietzsche to Brandes, *Briefe*, III, 321.) Nietzsche must have been thinking of *Antichrist*, not of *Ecce Homo*.

fumes of this ideal—of this slandering of the world—burst forth?”¹

“What separates us, is not that we do not rediscover any God, either in history or in nature or behind nature—but that we recognise what was worshipped as God not as ‘divine,’ but as pitiable, as absurd, as injurious—not only as an error, but as a *crime against life*. We deny God as God. If this God of the Christians were proved to us, we should still less know how to believe in him. In a formula: *Deus qualem Paulus creavit, Dei negatio*.”²

“I call Christianity the one great curse, the one great intrinsic depravity, the one great instinct of revenge, for which no expedient is sufficiently poisonous, secret, subterranean, mean—I call it the one immortal blemish of mankind.”³

“That which deifies me, that which

¹ *Ecce Homo*, 138.

² *Antichrist*, 316.

³ *Ibid.*, 354.

makes me stand apart from the whole of the rest of humanity is the fact that I have unmasked Christian morality. . . . Christian morality is the most malignant form of all falsehood, the actual Circe of humanity, that which has corrupted mankind."¹

One or two passages from the many which express Nietzsche's attitude may be taken as samples. They might be multiplied almost to any extent. No one familiar with Nietzsche's writings in his last period will deny their representative quality.

His point is that all merely theoretical and historical criticism is worthless, so long as the Christian values are retained. Moreover, supposing the Christian values are in themselves unobjectionable, such criticism would be needless, and even harmful. Nietzsche considered truth to be merely the illusion that was useful.

¹ *Ecce Homo*, 139.

“Wherever the will to power declines in any way, there is always also a physiological retrogression, a *décadence*. The Deity of *décadence*, pruned of his manliest virtues and impulses, henceforth, becomes necessarily the God of the physiologically retrograde, the weak. They do not call themselves the weak, they call themselves the ‘good.’ . . . It is obvious (without a further hint being necessary) in what moments of history only, the dualistic fiction of a good and a bad God became possible. Through the same instinct by which the subjugated lower their God to the ‘good in itself,’ they obliterate the good qualities out of the God of their conquerors; they take revenge on their masters by *bedevilling* their God. The good God, just like a devil; both are abortions of *décadence*. How can one defer so much to the simplicity of Christian theologians as to decree with them that the continuous development of God

from the 'God of Israel,' from the national God to the Christian God, to the essence of everything good, is a *progress*? But so does even Renan. . . . It is just the very opposite that strikes the eye. When the presuppositions of ascending life, when everything strong, brave, domineering and proud has been eliminated out of the concept of God, when he sinks step by step to the symbol of a staff for the fatigued, a sheet-anchor for all drowning ones, when he becomes the poor people's God, the sinners' God, the God of the sick *par excellence*, and when the predicate of Saviour, Redeemer, is left as the sole divine predicate, what does such a change speak of? such a *reduction of the divine*? To be sure, the kingdom of God has thereby become greater. Formerly, he had only his people, his 'chosen' people. Since then he has gone abroad in his travels, quite like his people itself; since then he has never again settled down

quietly in any place, until he has finally become at home everywhere, the great 'cosmopolitan'—till he has gained over the 'great number,' and the half of earth to his side. But the God of the 'great number,' the democrat among Gods, became, nevertheless, no proud pagan God; he remained a Jew, he remained the God of the woods, the God of all dark corners and places, of all unhealthy quarters throughout the world.

. . . His world empire is still, as formerly, an underworld empire, a hospital, a subterranean empire, a Ghetto-empire. . . . And he himself so pale, so weak, so *décadent*. Even the palest of the pale still became master over him—the Metaphysicians, the conceptual Albinos. They spun round about him so long, until hypnotised by their movements he became a cobweb-spinner, a metaphysician himself. Henceforth, he spun the world anew out of himself—sub specie Spinozæ—henceforth he trans-

figured himself always into the thinner and the paler, he became 'ideal,' he became 'pure spirit,' he became 'absolutum,' he became 'thing in itself,' Ruin of a God . . . God became thing in itself. . . .

"The Christian concept of God—God as God of the sick, God as cobweb-spinner, God as spirit—is one of the most corrupt concepts of God ever arrived at on earth; it represents perhaps the gauge of low water in the descending development of the God type. God degenerated to the contradiction of life, instead of being its transfiguration and its eternal *yea!* In God hostility announced to life, to nature, to the will to life. God as the formula for every calumny of 'this world,' for every lie of 'another world.'¹ In God nothingness deified, the will to nothingness declared holy! . . .

"This hybrid image of ruin derived

¹ We may compare with this Mark Pattison's dictum that the "idea of God had been defecated to a pure transparency."

from nullity, concept, and contradiction, in which all *décadence* instincts, all cowardices, and lassitudes of soul have their sanction.”¹

This is strong language. But it is not mere extravagance. Nietzsche does not set out only to *épater le bourgeois*. He is not amused with things, he is passionate in his sense of the value of life, and in hatred of all that he thought opposed to fulness of life. To appreciate his purpose, we must recur to the fundamental doctrine of the *Will to Power*, as the one reality. All other-worldly values are false coin. The problem is to determine what kind of man finds his account in uttering this coinage. Briefly, the answer is that Christianity is the boomerang-throw of the slave races by which they have taken captive their conquerors. The theory is simple.

What, first of all, is the origin of conscience? According to Nietzsche, con-

¹ *Antichrist*, 260-2.

science arises from the taming of man by civilisation. As society settles down, fighting ceases to be the main work of man; cruelty, moreover, in private life has less free scope. Consequently, man turns his need of inflicting pain upon his inner being, and suffering results. This unpleasantness inside is a fact. The priest and all who share his instincts proceed to exploit it. They invent the doctrine of moral freedom and responsibility. By this means, man is led to feel that the pain is his own fault. The conception of guilt is introduced. With the sense of burden self-created but irremovable by his own efforts, man develops the need of redemption. Ascetic morality of all kinds is due to the belief that, if man will but add a little self-inflicted pain, the ill conscience will be removed. Man is willing to suffer, and indeed to increase his suffering, if only he can be persuaded that the pain has an object. That object, the negation of the will, is the aim of morality. Chris-

tianity is little more than the most triumphant form of this tendency, which arises from the instinct of priests (men of no real personal force, but great ingenuity) to secure power for themselves. In this way they get power which the weakness of their personality would otherwise prevent. Among priests he includes moralists and most philosophers. He starts from the true notion that right and wrong are fundamental values. He will have nothing to do with the English utilitarian moralists and associationists, who teach that the idea of right is merely the communal sanction of what is useful to men in general. Good and evil are original value-judgments. Like all our ideas, they come from the will to power. Power, satisfied, triumphant, embodied in a conquering race, "the splendid blond beast" calls all its own characteristics good. Good meant in the first instance the qualities of a ruling class. It is the same as noble and implies courage and an enduring will,

pride, and self-sufficiency. Its opposite is the character of the enslaved people, base, mean, villainous. Thus, goodness has nothing to do with love, humility, justice, or self-denial. These qualities are displayed by the down-trodden, or at least admired by them. *Do unto others as ye would that they should do to you* is the maxim of the herd, the helot, the outcast, the chandala. For the slave world, since it goes on living, has its own will to power. It is ever seeking to turn the tables on its masters. To do this subtlety is needed. Victory in the field is not to be thought of. If, however, the slaves can instil into their masters a belief that the highest moral values are those qualities which slaves are forced to display, gentleness, meekness, self-sacrifice, industry, obedience, pity, they may gradually reverse the order and once more rule their masters. The superior culture of Greece took captive the Romans. Christian morality is a similar effort, only it is exercised not by a real

culture, like that of Greece, but by a spurious set of moral values, the so-called Christian virtues. The *terrain* of the conflict has been changed before the masters were aware of the fact. The herd will treat as good—and by their numbers and cunning will ultimately make even their rulers think good—those qualities which unite people in herds and keep them in subjection. In this way they have achieved a transvaluation of all values. The new values thus grow upward from below, until at last the masters begin to have a bad conscience for pride and self-sufficiency. They will even stoop so low as to pretend that their sole claim to rule is based on service of the community. The maxim: “I am among you, as a slave” has raised Jesus of Nazareth to be Lord in name of the world. “He that is greatest among you let him be your minister” is the expression of the same principle by one who believed it. Its real import is that by affecting to minister to others, a weak

man or race will win greatness. In this revolution, which began in early times, priests are the leaders. They are, as they claim, not rulers but shepherds. They symbolise and heighten the power of the herd as against the unique, the rare, the distinguished. Priesthood represents the success of the mob, the chandala, the herd morality. By this means a mental empire is established vested in them, and political dependence is avenged.

Morals, *i. e.*, all morals based on any doctrine of humanity, are due to the instinct of revenge. They are the will to power of impotent, decaying folk. "Morality is the idiosyncrasy of the decadent revenging themselves upon Life." The Jews are the most outstanding instance. That race, mean and ignoble like all cowards, was willing to sacrifice everything to its desire to live. It went on despite political annihilation. The will to power, was only dormant and began to reassert itself. Firstly, its priests turned

all its history topsyturvy, and changed every moral value. The Old Testament contains ample evidence that originally the Hebrews were as other nations, and their God a prince of power. This, however, has been changed by the priestly caste, and the conception of Jehovah as a loving Father, and of holiness and all the mean virtues of "fellowship" have been introduced and suffered to corrupt the ancient story. In Jesus of Nazareth the Jewish race produced a man who carried still further this philosophy of resentment. Our Lord was consumed with Love and led a revolt inside the Jewish nation of the poor and outcast against the aristocracy of Jerusalem. He died for his own guilt, and in modern days would have been sent to Siberia; for he asserted the superiority before God of the "poor, the maimed, the halt, and the blind," and denied the claims of the rulers. In bringing our Lord to the Cross, the Jewish spirit performed its master-stroke.

By crucifying him as a criminal (which he was), and then proclaiming the Kingdom of the Crucified and Risen Saviour, it secured for a couple of thousand years the triumph of Hebrew, *i. e.*, slave valuations. The Incarnation is the apotheosis of slave morality.

The world at large was in a state which enabled the movement to win success. Multitudes of slaves filled the Roman Empire. These were eager to fall in with any system which would restore their dignity. The mixture of races all through the Empire brought with it a physiological depression, which, disguised as the sense of sin, made men eager for a salvation cult.¹ Add to this that Socrates and Plato, the great Greek decadents, had long corrupted the pagan mind with notions of goodness, justice, and the Eternal world.²

¹ "Alle unsere Religionen und Philosophien sind Symptome unseres leiblichen Befindens: dass das Christenthum zum Sieg kam, war die Folge eines allgemeinen Unlust-Gefühls, und einer Rassen-Vermischung." (Nietzsche, *Werke*, XVI, 250.)

² It is easily seen how this notion of the genesis of the Catholic Christianity underlies the whole work of Houston Stewart Chamberlain—*The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*.

The persecution of Christians by the state was foolish, for it gave them precisely the leverage which they needed, as Apostles of the Cross, and enabled them in very deed to make their strength "perfect in weakness." Even the Roman Law and the stoic moralists prepared the way; for although in regard to slaves, the ruling order kept its hand on the whip, in theory it was admitted that men were by nature free, that man as man deserves to be considered, that justice, not force, is the end of social institutions. All these tendencies united to help on the march of the Christian Church from the catacombs to the chair of St. Peter; and transformed the fisherman of Galilee into the prince of the Apostles, the slave of the slaves of God into the Vicar-General of the Universe. The Church was able to clothe it all in a philosophic or semiphilosophic garb, and to provide a symbol which for a time enslaved alike the intellect and the heart of man. At last, through its leadership of

the slave races and lower orders, the Church of Christ was able to triumph over the Pagan Empire, the proudest and most valuable organisation of the Will to Power, which the world has hitherto seen.

All this is the victory of decadence. All morality is decadence. Ascending life is ever pitiless and proud. Christianity, it is true, is nowadays out of fashion as a creed. Yet men deceive themselves. Its poison lurks in all the idealisms of the day, in the generally accepted code of moral values, in democratic equality, in nearly every notion of the so-called free-thinkers.¹ Nietzsche with his band of free spirits will topple over the house of

¹ George Eliot. "They have got rid of the Christian God, and now think themselves obliged to cling firmer than ever to Christian morality, that is English consistency; we shall not lay the blame of it on ethical girls à la Eliot. In England for every little emancipation from divinity, people have to reacquire respectability by becoming moral fanatics in an awe-inspiring manner. That is the penalty they have to pay there. With us it is different. When we give up Christian belief, we thereby deprive ourselves of the right to maintain a stand on Christian morality. This is not at all obvious of itself, we have again and again to make this point clear, in defiance of English shallow-pates. Christianity is a system, a view of things, consistently thought out and complete. If we break out of it a fundamental idea, the belief in God, we thereby break the whole in pieces." (*Twilight of the Idols*, 167.)

cards. The old pagan valuation will be restored. The transvaluation will be effected. So important is this aim of Nietzsche, that his final period is sometimes spoken of as his *Umwerthungszeit*. Meanwhile, Christian, moralist, humanitarian ideals are not to be allowed to drop. They are to be retained, as the most useful for the mass of men, the herd. With the general tendency of the world to become more mediocre, with the ever-growing clamour of the triumphant middle-class, Nietzsche would not interfere. Against this and out of it as a background will the new ruling order define itself. Herein a few spirits, courageous, intellectual, and highly tempered as steel, the philosophers of the superman world, will rule. They are the first order. Of the second order are the warrior class, Kings and statesmen. Both these are privileged, beyond good and evil, free from the herd morality. Curious it is to notice how like is Nietzsche's conception to

the mediæval doctrine of the two swords, with the spiritual first and the ruler governing in his interest.

Let us now consider in detail Nietzsche's account of Christianity.

1. It is based upon an essential misunderstanding. Nietzsche has identified the pessimistic ethic of Schopenhauer with the ideals of Christianity. Both agree in this. They teach self-denial, and this in some sense is a principle of every system, which selects between actions. If any actions are selected, there must be self-denial, or in times of stress we shall choose the opposite course. This ascetic quality ought to have been no objection to Nietzsche, for Nietzsche's whole notion of the superman involves severe discipline, *i. e.*, self-denial. He even goes so far as to say that he wanted a natural asceticism. All that Nietzsche said in favour of an enduring will, his attitude to suffering as the condition of insight, is in fact very

similar to the Christian. Creighton said that suffering gives an insight denied to thought, and Hort declared that power of life means power of suffering. Both of these maxims are in full accordance with the teaching of Nietzsche. Nietzsche in no way taught a doctrine of voluptuous enjoyment. No man whose vision is of the far future would do that. He has indeed been blamed for this ascetic side, but unfairly.¹

All asceticism, from the training of the athlete to that of the scholar, from the discipline of the child to the experience of a St. John of the Cross, may direct similar acts, or abstinences—a fact which is too often forgotten, when people either attack or defend the morality of the Cross. The question is in regard to every act of apparent and immediate self-denial; whether it be to abstain from alcohol, or to face an almost certain death in the trenches—to what purpose is this waste? Is the

¹ E. g., by Seillières, *Apollon ou Dionysos*.

ointment of man's tears to be poured out, and the alabaster of his gifts to be broken for a noble or an ignoble purpose? Is the result to be the development or the annihilation of the personality? The latter is the teaching of Schopenhauer, of Buddhism, and of the various forms of Oriental pessimism. To them the individual being is the supreme evil, or else the curse of existence. Christianity and Nietzsche also might commend the same ascetic practices as the Buddhist; but the object is different. Always it is the development of the personality—not its extinction. It is a negative means to reach a positive end. "I am come that they might have life, and might have it more abundantly" is the principle of Christian asceticism; every whit as much as the expansion of Life is the maxim of Nietzsche. It may be that now and then the means are unwise, in which case they are analogous to over-training a crew for a race. Sometimes, also, Christian teachers with too little

hold on the sacramental principle, or with Pantheistic leanings, may have taught a doctrine of Christian self-denial which is truly negative and Oriental. That does not affect the main issue. Christianity is essentially sacramental in the doctrine of the Incarnate Lord and the Risen Body. It does not teach the neglect of the body, except in so far as any act of discipline involves the postponement of immediate ease for some greater good. Moreover, as Nietzsche knew, even for bodily health a too meticulous thoughtfulness will defeat its own ends. A little carelessness is essential. The risks it involves are less than those which it avoids. Now and then Nietzsche admits and even deplores the effect of Christianity exercised in heightening the sense of individual worth; for it did this for all, whereas it is only the few whose personality is worth developing. On the whole, however, Nietzsche never freed himself from the doctrine of Schopenhauer, that all morality is in the

literal sense self-abnegation, and is to culminate in the destruction of the will to live.

Thus he is ever repeating the charge, that Christianity is the supremely decadent religion, nihilism. He might have been undeceived, had he read a little more Church history, or even studied the New Testament which he so heartily despised. He could hardly then have ignored the words about abundant life and fulness of joy—while St. Paul's frequent references to joy in suffering would seem almost designed to meet Nietzsche's own experience. It is not the sense of weakness, but of power that is the most obvious thing in the psychology of the early Christians. Two great facts about the Church impress themselves upon the reader of the New Testament: (1) it was possessed by a spirit of power; (2) it was a separating, distinguishing force, adding to dignity: "Ye are a holy nation, a royal priesthood, a peculiar people." True, Nietzsche might counter this by saying it was power for

the wrong sort of people, and distinction for those by nature undistinguished.

The truth is that the Church of God so far from being a denial of life has been and now is the greatest yea-saying force in the world.¹ That does not mean that it refuses to select between actions or to forbid those which are less admirable. Neither does Nietzsche. Any yea-saying which involves courage, involves also no-saying. Nietzsche is right, when he says that education should be directed rather to make the will taut than to convey information. That, however, cannot be done without a no-saying, which is equally important, perhaps more so than yea-saying.

Nietzsche never discerns power except

¹ "Nietzsche ist aber in historischem Irrtum von grober Art befangen, wenn er dem Christentum die Wirkung zuschreibt dass es die männliche Tüchtigkeit untergrabe, dass es aus dem Menschen ein Zahmes Haustier und Herdentier gemacht habe. . . .

"Aber auch wenn man das Barbarische ausser Acht lässt, so hat sich das christliche Ideal mit dem einer edlen Männlichkeit, mit dem ritterlichen Ideal, nicht allein vertragen, sondern aufs Innigste vermählt." (Tönnies, *Der Nietzsche-Kultus*, 91.)

as explosion. Yet it is equally great as containing. The first lesson of courage is doubtless yea-saying to life; not to shrink; not to stop development because of dangers or fatigues; to face the unknown; to be adventurous, and so forth. Equally needful and harder to teach is the lesson of no-saying, *i. e.*, to concentrate, to limit oneself, to hold oneself in; to control the desire to be always on the move. Even Napoleon, Nietzsche's great idol, used to talk of the importance of *savoir se borner*. Nietzsche introduced an opposition where none really exists between yea-saying and no-saying to impulses. Every yielding to impulses presents itself to the mind as yea-saying. Yet no one would be quicker than Nietzsche to assert that mere yielding to impulse would produce not the superman but the decadent. The point is whether or no we are to select between acts, some which we commend, others which we condemn. Both Christianity and Nietzsche say that we are. It is true

that to the strong character the element of no-saying will be harder than to the weak. Most of us know men of strong character, the beauty of which consists not in the hardness which they have by an inherited gift, but in the refinement and self-denial by which it is tempered to noble ends. "Be hard," as Nietzsche preached, is by no means bad advice to people naturally soft. Tendencies in our age there are which such words might attack. But the opposite maxim, Be gentle, is even more needful, or civilisation will lose its most delicate blooms. Nietzsche himself would be the first to deplore this. The sentimentalism of "beautiful souls" against which Nietzsche protested may have been evil, but Nietzsche, who felt in himself the dangers of sentimentalism, is entirely one-sided in the way in which he preaches force and nothing but force. Nor can any process of interpretation rid him of this violence of overemphasis.¹

¹ "La sua filosofia è stata da capo a fondo la confessione e la proiezione della debolezza della sua vita." (Giovanni Papini, *Il Crepuscolo dei Filosofi*, 233.)

2. Nietzsche made a second error in regard to Christianity. He treated it as inculcating pure altruism. This the Christian ethic never was and never will be. It teaches us to love our neighbour as ourself. It does not teach that the individual is entirely to be merged in the group. From this it is saved by its doctrine of individuality,¹ which asserts that every man has a special value and meaning of his own: "One star differeth from another star in glory—so also is it in the resurrection of the dead." Nietzsche saw that it was vain to expect to maintain the Christian values, after Christian supernaturalism is surrendered. He failed to see that Comtism and other purely humanitarian schemes, although Christian in their *provenance*, are only partially Christian in their ethics and omit certain indispensable elements of the Christian canons of conduct. Nor

¹ "Nietzsche übersieht im Christenthum völlig diese Zustützung zu dem Eigenwerte der Seele, in dem er das Christliche Wertgefühl ausschliesslich in den Altruismus verlegt. Nicht auf den, dem gegeben wird, sondern auf den, der gibt, nicht auf den, für den gelebt wird, sondern auf den, der lebt, kommt es Jesus an." (Simmel, *Schopenhauer und Nietzsche*, 200.)

again does Christianity make all Love consist in sympathy. That is another mistake due to Schopenhauer, *alles Lieb ist Mitleid*. Nietzsche somewhere complains that religion nowadays means nothing more nor less than sympathy with suffering. Naturally enough he attacked the habit of making material comfort the one idol and the only test of development. But Christians do not do this. Often, indeed, they are blamed because they seem callous to much unmerited suffering (as even at this moment they are blamed because they refuse to assert that all war is always to be condemned). Christianity must be judged by its own ideals, not by the dreams of sentimental rationalists, who deck themselves out in Christian colours.

In matters like the marriage law and the limits of the Christian society, and the need of principle, Churchmen are frequently attacked because they refuse to allow sentimental sympathy to be the sole arbiter, and decline to identify the

Holiness of God with the weak good nature of a parent who spoils his sons. It is hard to understand how any one not wholly ignorant of Christian life could have made such a charge.

3. The same may be said of the attack on Christianity as hostile to culture. Like many other classical scholars, Nietzsche was ignorant of the Middle Ages. Yet he was familiar with Venice, and must have seen the great pictures of Italy, although it does not appear that he cared for painting.¹ How could a man who had once seen St. Mark's at Venice or St. Ambrogio at Milan declare with any sincerity that Christianity was always, and through its whole course of set purpose, hostile to culture? Doubtless he might say that the great painters of the Renaissance were not truly Christians. He does say so of Raphael. That may be true

¹ "Selten habe ich Vergnügen an einer bildnerischen Darstellung, aber dieses Bild, 'Ritter, Tod und Teufel,' steht mir nahe, ich kann kaum sagen wie." Nietzsche to Malwida von Meysenbug. (*Briefe*, III, 2, 491.)

partially of the later or high Renaissance. It is not true of Fra Angelico or Giotto or the primitives. Even Nietzsche could not have believed it to be true of Michelangelo. Probably the noblest material treasure of mankind is the great Gothic cathedrals. That will to power, that ascending energy of which he makes so much, has had nowhere larger expression than in Romanesque and Gothic architecture. Recently, Mr. March Phillips in the *Works of Man* has taught us to see in the Gothic essentially the expression of energy. He omits, indeed, a certain spiritual aspiration, yet it is none the less true that we have a spirit of power.¹

Once more. The Christian Church does not accord any especial honour to the tame anæmic virtues. No truer typical Christians can be found in history than Alfred the Great and St. Louis—or, though on a

¹ One of Nietzsche's more unbalanced admirers, Mr. A. M. Ludovici, is good enough to inform us that Gothic is no true art. Was this the notion of the Germans when they gave us the Kultur-lesson of the bonfire of Louvain?

lower grade of character, Charlemagne. Or taking Churchmen in the technical sense, Gregory the Great, St. Bernard, Bishop Grossetête were not weaklings. Were the English to make a formal canonisation for the nineteenth century, it is almost certain that their choice would fall on General Gordon.

It is true that cowardice and indolence may keep certain natures of low vitality from active sins, while the greater a man's powers, the more chances he has of going wrong. Yet outside a few specialised circles, the Church cannot be said to honour the one-horse-power type of character. Great characters, if they do more wrong, will do more right. The true type of active Christian is our King Edward I, with his motto *Pactum serva*, not ashamed to burst into tears before his people and own himself in the wrong. Our Lord himself was blamed because he liked the society of harlots and collectors. Do we suppose that these people were tame cats? I cannot

help thinking that Nietzsche was in this respect led astray by the social antipathies of his highly respectable relatives at Naumburg. The lay figure against which he tilts, in the character of the Christian ideal, is ludicrously untrue to reality.

Lastly, it must be said that Nietzsche misconceived the Christian doctrine of equality before God. That doctrine asserts that every soul has an eternal value, none is merely a thing, a tool. Nietzsche, it is true, would deny this, except for the few. But when he goes on to say that Christianity makes all souls equal, in the sense that it denies the aristocracy of character, he is asserting the direct contrary of the fact. This alleged over-democratic character of Christianity is not there. In its doctrine of the saints, it asserts clearly definite degrees and carries them beyond this life. Further, it goes on to say that what matters is the whole personality. That, indeed, sometimes undergoes a cataclysmic change in the process

we call conversion. But this is not universal. The point is that neither on earth nor beyond it does Christianity deny the "aristocracy of character"—although it has never, like Nietzsche, asserted its right to tyrannise in virtue of superiority.

Nietzsche charges against the Christian Church all the developments of the modern democratic ideal. I would that more of these developments were chargeable thereto. Yet even socialism he appears to have misunderstood.¹ Socialism is a means to an end: it demands no more than equality of opportunity; it does not assert identity of gifts for every man. Nietzsche, doubtless, is opposed alike to socialism and to individualism, because they each assert the worth of every individual and merely differ in the means whereby they promote it. But it is not true to assert, as Nietzsche does, that either asserts or even implies that all

¹ "Nietzsche probably misunderstood the inmost meaning of democracy." (Wolf, *The Philosophy of Nietzsche*.)

men are of equal power. A few extreme democrats may do this, just as a few extremists may deny any select moments or epochs in history. But such a charge is contrary to fact in regard to nearly all believers in democracy, whether Christian or not. Moreover, the Christian Church, in its sense of the sanctity of marriage and the unity of family life, has been and remains, sometimes almost in spite of itself, a chief barrier to that unregulated individualism, "the mishmash of the mob," which Nietzsche condemns.

Nietzsche says a great deal about "the pathos of distance," and is very anxious that the sense of difference, of distinction, between men shall increase. He would base all this upon a radical difference of nature, and, in so far as this is the case, Christianity would be opposed thereto. Once, however, admit the common human quality, *i. e.*, capacity for choice and for God of every "even-Christian," and the Church will really operate, is operating now, in

the direction which Nietzsche desired. This happens in more ways than one. First, the modern world is religiously heterogeneous. Christians are but a part of it. More and more will the Christian tend to be separated by the fact of his Christianity—the words “a royal nation, a peculiar people” are bound to have a more immediate application, as the pressure of religious competition increases. Secondly, in the Christian ideal there is latent a certain *Vornehmheit*. Nietzsche never realised that it is the sinner who is always commonplace, the real saint who is the distinguished person. Nietzsche’s beloved Borgia were vulgar enough; it was Michelangelo and Savonarola, Contarini and Pole who had true distinction. Most of us know some in whom the perfection of Christian saintliness has reached that miracle of refinement. A certain dignity and detachment, a certain grace of holiness seems to attach to such natures, and they attain a charm given by nothing

else; neither by high birth nor by high culture. Thirdly, Christianity asserts for every man a definite idea, a place in the Kingdom. None, it declares, there is, however lowly, who has not in him something that is a beauty all his own. Nietzsche denies this, and asserts it only of the few; although he gives no criterion to distinguish the classes.

True, Christianity is a fellowship, a common life. It teaches that no one can reach his end in isolation. So did Nietzsche, however high the value he set upon loneliness. The qualities he desiderates—power to command, a certain proud obedience, refinement, distinction of manner—can none of them be won except at the cost of a strong social discipline. His idea of *Vornehmheit* has no meaning whatever out of society. What he says of the need of severe schooling shews how well aware he is of the social element, even in the making of the superman. True, he appears to teach that, once his superman is made, he is

free from all social restraints. Even this is doubtful; he would be restrained in his dealings with his peers, though not with the herd.

Modern knowledge has shown that after all there is something in the idea of race, of good breeding, of family. This eugenic notion of a carefully prepared birth-issue, is what Nietzsche rested upon at the last. Nor is there anything in this (provided certain safeguards are taken) which Christianity need object to. The multiplication of the unfit—provided we know what are truly unfit—it is no concern of the Church to preserve; although it is concerned (unlike Nietzsche) for their proper treatment when once they are here.

Even in politics the aspirations of the most ardent social reformers have passed away from that vast state, the "all too many," as fairy godmother, and are all in favour of groups as the only effective method of securing good conditions on a large scale. Such groups (even in a sys-

tem of guild-socialism) will not be equal—a group of doctors or artists would be different in all its requirements from a group of engineers. Each will have its own place. The honour and austerity of its life and its dignity will be enhanced by the fact that hereditary influences are bound to have much influence in helping towards membership, as they do now.

Even Nietzsche once admits that there is something common running through all men. Christianity teaches that the lowest of us is not too low to be redeemed by the blood of Christ, and that the noblest is not so high that he needs no forgiveness. In this we are diametrically opposed to Nietzsche, who would divide the world at birth into those who are and those who are not capable of rising above the herd; although even for the former discipline is needed. We have seen, moreover, that Nietzsche was unconsciously Christian in his conception of the tragic nature of existence as against the facile opti-

mism of Strauss and the Hegelians, in his sense that redemption is needed, and that this can come only by a "new creature."

Further, there is something analogous to Christian thought even in Nietzsche's *Beyond Good and Evil*. What that book attacks is the ethics of Kant and all other codifiers of the Categorical Imperative. Christianity is not a code, but a spirit. Love to God and to our neighbour is the principle. The ordinary rules of morals are merely formulæ, which express the application of this principle under normal conditions. There are cases when they do not apply. That is the excuse for casuistry, which discusses all these cases on the edge. It is true, for instance, that *necessity knows no law*. *Salus populi suprema lex*—is the motto for certain rare conditions which justify the disregard of all normal rules. The error of Machiavelli and all who follow him is that they raise cases of necessity into the normal rule of action. They are an instance of the mis-

take of trying to legislate for hard cases.¹ Nietzsche discerns the truth of the matter when he says that acts "done for love are beyond good and evil." Nietzsche's system, as practically applied, is wrong, for it would make normal what is meant to be exceptional. But it must be pointed out, that his polemic against conventional morality is less anti-Christian than he supposes, and that his error springs from the fallacy frequent in Germany of identifying Christian morality with the systems of some philosophers who are either not Christian at all, or else very partially so.

It has appeared, then, that much of the attack of Nietzsche is due to misconception. Is it, then, the case that Nietzsche was, after all, only a Christian who had lost his way,² that his own system was,

¹ On the relation of Nietzsche to Machiavelli, cf. Caffi's *Nietzsches Stellung zu Machiavellis Lehre*.

I have said something on this topic in *From Gerson to Grotius*, chap. III.

² "Il Nietzsche, invece, era nel fondo un' anima assai cristiana e non ingiustamente è stato chiamato da qualcuno un 'prete decadente.' L'ideale del superuomo corrisponde un poco a quello

had he but understood it better, the same thing so far as rules of conduct went? No. True, some like Mr. Stephen Graham may say that Nietzsche was on his way to become a transcendent Christian. That may be, for he was always changing. But it is unlikely, unless his view of the non-existence of the supernatural had altered. We must take him as he wrote. Had he not gone mad, he might have become saner. It is true, also, that Nietzsche's ideas have very much more affinity with the truly Christian conception of life than had the moral ideas of Strauss or of any other of the Pantheistic philosophers whom he superseded. It is true, also, that his attitude to life is at bottom mystical. He sees that man as he is is not a beautiful sight. He sees the wickedness

del Cristo—l'accettazione del male corrisponde all cristiana accettazione del dolore—il sacrificio degli inferiori alla futura vita superiore, al sacrificio della vita attuale per la beatitudine della vita futura. I superuomini somigliano oltre che ai guardiani della repubblica platonica, anche ai monaci soldati, ai Templari o ai cavalieri di Malta, e il Nietzsche è arrivato a scrivere che 'chi vuol impiegare il suo denaro da spirito libero deve fondare istituti sul tipo dei conventi.'" (Papini, 254.)

of pessimism. Pessimism, the nay-saying to life, is ten thousand times more wicked than all the variegated blasphemies of Nietzsche. Man can be saved only by becoming changed in his nature. That is the Christian doctrine of grace. Nietzsche is nearer to this than are those who preach a dogma of inevitable progress or those who deny sin. Sin Nietzsche admits practically, though not theoretically; it is the instinct of decadence. Also, when Nietzsche talks of the rarity of the higher man, he is more like Christianity than those who teach the contrary. Christians are, and are likely to be, a minority. Only persecution or its results have obscured that fact. We are not yet rid of the confusion between Christianity and citizenship. Distinction, further, is the outward and visible sign of an invisible grace, the sacrament of personality—it depends on a consecrated will. It is a will consecrated to God that marks the Christian, not emotion or knowledge. In his insistence on the will and its train-

ing Nietzsche is in harmony with Christianity and with the characteristic English conception of education. Even the ideal of the superman enshrines the truth that individuality or group distinction has its own quality, and that man is of worth, through something inherent and inalienable in himself.¹ All forms of Christianity admit this, except the heresies which are toppling into Pantheism. Nietzsche's hatred of equality *in the sense in which he gives it* is not belied by Christian sentiment. His idealisation of heroism—his use of suffering, the religion of valour—is only the ancient doctrine of the Cross taught by Jesus Christ, palpitating in St. Paul and the whole New Testament. Even

¹ "Der christliche Altruismus, so fern er dem Kraft- und Entwicklungsideal Nietzsches steht, teilt mit ihm doch den Gegensatz gegen alle in engerem Sinne bloss moralische und soziale Idealbildung; nicht in der altruistischen Handlung als solcher, sondern in der Heiligung und Seligkeit der Seele, die deren Innenseite bildet, liegt der abschliessende Wert." (Simmel, 202.) Cf. also a little earlier.

"Wenn der reiche Jüngling sein Gut an die Armen verschenken soll, so ist das keine Anweisung zum Almosengeben, sondern ein Mittel und Zeichen der Vollendung und Befreiung der Seele." (Simmel, 201.)

what he says of the barbaric virtues, his new commandment, "Be hard," might perhaps be interpreted as little more than a warning against that pity which is born of cowardice, or that sympathy which is a form of luxury. All this may be said.

Also it is added that Nietzsche is careful to distinguish Christianity from its Founder. He is the author of the saying that there has been only one Christian, and he died upon the Cross. This qualification, however, is but a slight one. All that can be said is that the venom which we note in his attack on St. Paul and the New Testament is less apparent in his words about Jesus of Nazareth. One or two places show a certain reverence. In the main, however, he treats Him with contempt. Jesus is to him a decadent, a madman (curiously enough, Nietzsche attacks others for the idiosyncrasies of his own temperament). He had the melancholy of an ill-nourished person: was the most ill-natured of all men, suf-

fering from a lunatic pride, which took delight in humility.¹ He died for His own guilt. He led an indefensible revolt. The sermon on the mount is not spoken from an elevated standpoint. The distinctive note of Jesus is His hatred of all actuality. Nietzsche wishes Dostoieffsky could have described the world of morbid unreality in which Jesus lived, and written the life "of this most interesting decadent." He sums up at the close of *Ecce Homo*: "Have you understood me, Dionysos or Christ?"

Had Nietzsche corrected those misconceptions of which I spoke, his ideal of conduct would still remain fundamentally antagonistic to the Christian. Nor need one be so cruel as to tear from his melancholy

¹ "Jesus mit der Melancholie der schlechten Ernährung.

"Jesus: will dass man an ihn glaubt, und schickt Alles in die Hölle was widerstrebt. Arme, Dumme, Kranke, Weiber, Kinder, eingerechnet Huren und Gesindel von ihm bevorzugt: unter ihnen fühlt er sich wohl. Das Gefühl des Richtens gegen alles Schöne, Reiche, Mächtige, der Hass gegen die Lachenden. Die Güte mit ihrem grössten Contrast in einer Seele; es war der böseste aller Menschen. Ohne irgend welche psychologische Billigkeit. Der wahnsinnige Stolz, welcher die feinste Lust an der Demuth hat." (*Werke*, XIII, 305.)

"Man verkenne doch ja nicht den tiefen Mangel an Noblesse des Gefühls in Christus."

brows that laurel-wreath which he himself had placed thereon—the title of Antichrist.¹

The cardinal objection is this: Nietzsche sets before us the ideal of redemption by the superman. The whole point, then, is what content he pours into this vague and plastic conception. Nietzsche's ideal is essentially anti-Christian. It is based on the notion of pride. Not only is it anti-Christian; the superman, as Nietzsche preaches him, is inexpressibly vulgar. The notion of force without any direction—for he says repeatedly that life has no meaning or goal—would ultimately be no less destructive of the culture which Nietzsche desired. As Doctor Tönnies points out in his little book *Der Nietzsche-Kultus*, all the highest culture in the world comes from treating men as bound in fellowship, not from mere tyrannic pride.²

¹ "Wollen Sie einen neuen Namen für mich? Die Kirchensprache hat einen: ich bin . . . der Antichrist." Nietzsche to Malwida von Meysenbug. (*Briefe*, III, 603.)

² "Alle edlere, geistige Kultur, alles 'höhere' Menschensein hat bisher noch—auch im 'klassischen Altertum'—auf der breiten Basis gesunden Bauer- und Bürgertums sich erhoben. Die sys-

The Renaissance was noble, in so far as it worked upon the heritage of the Middle Ages. When it became purely pagan, it ceased to be interesting and lost refinement. It may be said that Nietzsche qualifies his cult of power with his cult of what is distinguished. True—but what does he mean by that? We can judge from the persons he cites with most frequent admiration. The Roman Empire, of which the very essence is “that river of cruelty” which according to Mommsen ran through it in its relations to slavery: and that in contradistinction to the Christian Church, which would assuredly suffer a worse persecution, if Nietzsche’s ideals were ever to be really triumphant. He takes names: Napoleon, and above all Cesare Borgia. Now, we know pretty well the kind of man Cesare was. The murder of the generals at Sinigaglia under a safe-conduct, of his

tematische und massenhafte Sklavenwirtschaft war für die antike Kultur ebenso ein Ende wie für die moderne die systematische und massenhafte Proletarisierung des Volkes.” (Tönnies, *Der Nietzsche-Kultus*, 105.)

brother the Duke of Gandía, his mixture of vulgarity and skill are familiar to all. It is vain to say that Nietzsche did not want these people now. They are the kind he admired. His private letters to Peter Gast and Georg Brandes make it even more patent. Did Cesare Borgia advance culture as much as a contemporary like Dean Colet?

Nietzsche's theory is at bottom a denial of rights to the mass of men. It is a protest carried to its utmost limits against the maxim: "*Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto.*" Cicero's constant appeal to *humanitas* would be anathema to Nietzsche. The will to power, if that be all reality, must perforce treat all else as tools. The will to freedom is in essence Christian, for it recognises in others what it claims for itself. To Nietzsche, with all outlook on the other world denied, men in the mass are no more than living beings, to be the instrument of the strong man's lust. The Putumayo atrocities, and others more recent which we need not cite, are

in accord with his teaching. An author must be judged, not by the actions which he directly enjoins, but by the kind of spirit which will naturally come of following on his lines. Nietzsche need not be held to have wished many of the things which have happened. Yet they may be the natural outcome of his prophecies.

The system of Nietzsche is shattered upon the rock of facts, just as ultimately were the great slave empires of the past. All are founded on a lie. Mr. Paterson in his *Nemesis of Nations* has shown how one after another empires have risen and decayed through this very cause, that they treated the vast mass as mere tools, "chattels," as the law said. This is a lie. Treat human beings as machines as much as you will, the fact remains that they are incurably personal. Ultimately this truth is destructive of the proudest tyranny, though it may last a thousand years.

The passion and the pride of man are for ever trying to loose all bonds, and to

enslave others to their will. It is a grave question whether that is not the real purpose of modern capitalism. Those who are forward to condemn Nietzsche should ask themselves how far they allow themselves to be ruled by a like idea, how far they are content to build their own development, their culture and high tastes, and even their religion upon the services of masses of men—of whom they think as so much machinery. We cannot in this or any other form of society be free of using the services of others. The point is, how do we regard those who help us? The culture, which is founded even in theory on the denial of all share in it to the common people, may for a time be brilliant; but it lacks that freedom which is of the essence of all living art. A society whose root-notion is pride, which looks on the rest as though in the slang phrase they “do not really exist,” will in the long run develop grosser corruptions. This is said to be the cause of the decadence of Greece. Its art

became hedonist, and thereupon sensuality ruled. Or else its aristocrats will become so highly refined that the sight of the ugliness of the life of the masses fills them with horror, and they seek to remedy it. This will be the case, even if "the pathos of distance" be mainly intellectual.

Some defenders of Nietzsche have argued that in no real sense does he desire a tyranny of masters, like that of the ancient world, that his words about war refer only to warfare of ideas, and that he had no sympathy with the present plutocratic oligarchy. This may be true. It is irrelevant to the consideration of the meaning of his substitute for the good tidings preached to the poor. Nietzsche's moral system is the apotheosis of pride. His own feeling that he was of a different rank to other men, that *Zarathustra* was more wonderful than *Faust* or the *Divina Commedia*;¹ his words about Wagner and

¹ "If all the spirit and goodness of every great soul were collected together, the whole could not create a single one of Zarathustra's discourses." (*Ecce Homo*, 106.)

many other expressions are evidence for this megalomania. This was the oncoming of disease. Yet it translates itself into his ethical doctrine. As he claimed himself, his philosophy is eminently personal. However much Nietzsche's wildness be trimmed, his effect would be to endow the "superior person," out of whose loins the superman shall come, with a sense of cold aloofness from the rest of mankind, and to destroy all sense of duty towards them. Nietzsche admits this.

Nietzsche's gentle and delicate nature is often pleaded in extenuation. The truth remains that his doctrine is, what it professes to be, a philosophy of force and nothing but force, that it is certain to stimulate that pride from which tyranny comes in its disciples, and that it ministers to the worst prejudice of cultivated men, that other people are of no account.

Striking resemblances are to be found between the doctrine of the *Will to Power* of Nietzsche and the *Elan vital* of Berg-

son.¹ But there is all the difference in that one makes freedom the aim of development, and the other power. For faith in freedom means ultimately the belief in the reality of spiritual forces other than oneself, and the will to power means its denial.² Nietzsche rejoices in that his superman will seem to Christian moralists a devil. That must be so, if pride and force be the only ideal—even if one exclude physical force. The great noon of the world will come, if it ever comes, not when a modern Borgia wreaks his will upon the weak; but when pride itself becomes humble, when the lofty looks are cast low, not from without but from within, when real freedom is recognised for all.

That Nietzsche's antagonism to Christian ideals was more radical than any theological hostility was his boast in a letter to his mother. His dubbing the

¹ This is seen in certain arguments, *e. g.*, the Calvinistic, drawn from the Omnipotence of God when he is conceived as earthly autocrat.

² Cf. on this point Caffi, *op. cit.*

three graces, Faith, Hope, and Charity, as the *three Christian dodges* is evidence of this. His view of the primitive Christian community as described in the New Testament goes farther. Let me quote what he says:

“One does well to put on gloves when reading the New Testament. The proximity of so much uncleanness almost compels one to do so. We should as little choose ‘first Christians’ for companionship as Polish Jews. . . . Neither of them have a good smell. I have searched in vain in the New Testament for even a single sympathetic tract. There is nothing in it free, gracious, open-hearted, upright. Humanity has not yet made its beginning here—the instincts of cleanliness are lacking. . . . There are only bad instincts in the New Testament, there is no courage even for those bad instincts. All in it is cowardice, all is shutting of the eyes

and self-deception. Every book becomes cleanly, when one has just read the New Testament. To give an example, immediately after Paul, I read with delight Petronius, that most charming and wanton scoffer. . . .

“Every expression in the mouth of a ‘first Christian’ is a lie, every action he does is an instinctive falsehood—all his values, all his aims are injurious, but he whom he hates, that which he hates, has value. . . . The Christian, the priestly Christian especially, is a criterion of values. Have I yet to say that in the whole New Testament only a single figure appears, which one is obliged to honour—Pilate, the Roman governor. To take a Jewish affair *seriously*, he will not be persuaded to do so. A Jew more or less—what does that matter? The noble scorn of a Roman before whom a shameless misuse of the word truth was carried on has enriched the New Testament with the sole expression which

has value—which is itself its criticism, its annihilation. What is truth?"¹

Zarathustra is a "strong, spontaneous, adventurous individual." So, also, were St. Paul and St. Francis. High-hearted courage has always been a Christian virtue—the eagle's pride and the serpent's cunning with which Zarathustra conquers may win an audience in days when old bonds are broken. What is Nietzsche at his noblest as compared with that ideal which he contemns: "God is Love: and whoso dwelleth in Love, dwelleth in God. If a man love not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?"

¹ *Antichrist*, 314, 316.

IV

NIETZSCHE'S ORIGINALITY

NOTHING is more characteristic of Nietzsche than his claim to be original. It is the creator of new values who is the real revolutionary, he says. He is essentially apocalyptic, and believes his power to be that of inspiration. He gives us an account of this, marred in its self-admiration by no false modesty. Even the titles of his books betray this apocalyptic spirit, *The Dawn of Day*, *The Twilight of the Idols*. It is well to have before us some of these passages. For Nietzsche can be judged only by himself. Books about him crystallise into death the flaming soul, which speaks in them:

“Has any one at the end of the nineteenth century any distinct notion of what poets of a stronger age understood

by the word inspiration? If not, I will describe it. If one had the smallest vestige of superstition left in one, it would hardly be possible completely to set aside the idea that one is the mere incarnation, mouthpiece, or medium of an almighty power. The idea of revelation in the sense that something which profoundly convulses and upsets one becomes suddenly visible and audible with indescribable certainty and accuracy describes the simple fact. One hears—one does not seek—one takes—one does not ask who gives: a thought suddenly flashes up like lightning, it comes with necessity, without faltering. I have never had any choice in the matter. There is an ecstasy so great that the universe strains, it is sometimes relaxed by a flood of tears, during which one's steps now involuntarily rush and now involuntarily lag. There is the feeling that one is utterly out of hand with the very distinct consciousness of

an endless number of fine thrills and titillations descending to one's very toes; there is a depth of happiness in which the most painful and gloomy parts do not act as antitheses to the rest, but are produced and acquired as necessary shades of colour in such an overflow of light. There is an instinct for rhythmic relations which embraces a whole world of forms (length, the need of a wide-embracing rhythm, is almost the measure of the force of an inspiration, a sort of counterpart to its pressure and tension). Everything happens quite involuntarily, as if in a tempestuous outburst of freedom, of absoluteness of power and divinity. The involuntary nature of the figures and similes is the most remarkable thing; one loses all perception of what is imagery and metaphor; everything seems to present itself as the readiest, truest, and simplest means of expression. It actually seems, to use one of Zarathustra's own phrases, as if

all things came to one and offered themselves as similes. ('Here do all things come caressingly to thy discourse and flatter thee, for they would fain ride upon thy back. On every simile thou ridest here into every truth. Here fly open unto thee all the speech and word shrines of the world, here would all existence become speech, here would all Becoming learn of thee how to speak.') This is my experience of Inspiration. *I do not doubt that I should have to go back thousands of years before I could find another, who could say truly, It is mine also.*"¹

"This work stands alone. Do not let us mention the poets in the same breath. Nothing perhaps has ever been produced out of such a superabundance of strength. My concept 'Dionysian' here becomes the *highest* deed; compared with it, everything that other men have done seems poor and limited. The fact that

¹ *Ecce Homo*, 101.

a Goethe or a Shakespeare would not for an instant have known how to take breath in this atmosphere of poison and the heights, the fact that by the side of Zarathustra, Dante is no more than a believer, and not one who first *creates* the truth—that is to say not a world-ruling spirit, a fate; the fact that the poets of the Veda were priests and not even fit to unfasten Zarathustra's sandal—all this is the least of things and gives no idea of the distance, of the azure solitude in which this work dwells.

. . . If all the spirit and goodness of every great soul were collated together, the whole could not create a single one of Zarathustra's discourses. . . . Until his coming no one knew what was height or depth and still less what was truth. There is not a single passage in this revelation of truth which had already been anticipated and divined by even the greatest of men. Before Zarathustra there was no wisdom, no prov-

ing of the soul, no art of speech; in his book, the most familiar and most vulgar thing utters unheard-of words. The sentence quivers with passion. Eloquence has become music. Forks of lightning are hurled towards futures of which no one has ever dreamed before. The most powerful use of parables that has yet existed is poor beside it, and mere child's play compared with this return of language to the nature of imagery."¹

One more passage, and that from *Zarathustra*, must be cited. This will give a good notion of Nietzsche in his apocalyptic robes of ceremony:

“False shores and false securities ye were taught by the good. In the lies of the good ye were born and hidden. Through the good everything hath become deceitful and crooked from the bottom.

¹ *Ibid.*, 106.

“But he who discovered the land ‘man,’ discovered also the land ‘human future.’ Now ye shall be unto me sailors, brave, patient ones!

“Walk upright in time, O my brethren, learn how to walk upright! The sea stormeth. Many wish to raise themselves with your help.

“The sea stormeth. Everything is in the sea. Up! Upward! Ye old sailor hearts!

“What? A fatherland? *Thither* striveth our rudder, where our *children’s land* is. Out thither, stormier than the sea, our great longing stormeth!

“‘Why so hard?’ said once the charcoal unto the diamond, ‘are we not near relations?’

“Why so soft? O my brethren, thus I ask you. Are ye not—my brethren?

“Why so soft, so unresisting, and yielding? Why is there so much disavowal and abnegation in your hearts? Why is there so little fate in your looks?

“And if ye are unwilling to be fates, and inexorable, how could ye conquer with me some day?

“And if your hardness would not glance, and cut, and chip into pieces—how could ye create with me some day?

“For all creators are hard. And it must seem blessedness unto you to press your hand upon millenniums as upon wax——

“Blessedness to write upon the will of millenniums as upon brass—harder than brass, nobler than brass. The noblest only is perfectly hard.

“This new table, O my brethren, I put over you: ‘Become hard!’¹

“But what say I where no one hath *mine* ears! Here it is still an hour too early for me.

“Mine own forerunner I am among these folk, mine own cockcrow through dark lanes.

“But *their* hour will come! And mine will come also! Every hour they be-

¹ *Zarathustra*, 318–319.

come smaller, poorer, less fertile. Poor pot-herbs! Poor soil!

“And *soon* shall they stand there like dry grass and prairie, and, verily, wearied of themselves—and longing for fire more than for water!

“Oh, blessed hour of lightning! Oh, secret of the forenoon! Running fires shall I one day make out of them and announcers with fiery tongues.

“Announce shall they one day with fiery tongues: ‘It cometh, it is nigh, the great noon!’”¹

“But I and my fate, we speak not unto To-day. Nor do we speak unto Never. For speaking we have patience and time and too much time. For one day it must come and will not be allowed to pass by.

“Who must come one day and will not be allowed to pass by? Our great Hazar, *i. e.*, our great far-off kingdom of man, the Zarathustra-kingdom of a thousand years.”²

¹ *Ibid.*, 252-253.

² *Ibid.*, 353.

The dithyrambic style of Nietzsche disguises the fact that this revelation is not really so new as he claims. The intensity and vividness with which he felt his own experience of this vision often blinded him to the amount of his indebtedness to others. His ever-present desire to be in reaction against his environment led him to suppose that his essays were more entirely *unzeitgemässe* than they were. Much of his effort is merely towards a revival—an anti-Gothic revival; classical, Pagan, Mediterranean. Even despite his attack on the decadent Romanticism of the nineteenth century, Nietzsche is essentially a Romanticist. Much of his cult of the superman is the romantic cult of the genius. Signor Papini regards it as the chief sign of weakness in Nietzsche that he is unable ever to be authentically original.¹ Curious it is and worthy of note how much there is of recollection in his writing. Part of its

¹ "La prova più inaspettata di questa fiachezza consiste, secondo me, nella sua incapacità ad essere veramente ed autenticamente originale." (Papini, *op. cit.*, 232.)

charm lies in its power to call up memories. His works are a veritable whispering gallery of literary echoes. Nietzsche, who condemns all second-hand culture, is eminently literary. Machiavelli certainly and Gobineau probably have a good deal to do with his cult of Cesare Borgia. Doctor Thiele discerns in *So Spake Zarathustra* the strains of influence of many kinds of German literature in the nineteenth century. Great, also, is Nietzsche's debt to those Scriptures which he abhorred. The title of his autobiography *Ecce Homo* affords a striking instance of this. La Rochefoucauld is not obscurely his chosen model in his aphoristic vein—although for the main part his aphorisms have not the rapier-point of the great aristocrat. It would be a good exercise in literary culture to trace through Nietzsche's writings all the various influences which moulded him and are reflected in his style. What Herr von Bülow said of his music and its relation to Wagner might be said of many

others of his productions in their literary provenance.¹

All this does not seriously detract from the greatness of Nietzsche. Long since have we learned that the greatest literary genius may borrow as much as he likes, so long as he makes his takings his own, and transfuses all with the alembic of his own personality. Nietzsche does this in an eminent degree. No writer is more personal. But he is not independent, despite all his dithyrambic praise of solitude. In spite of his hatred of sentimentalism, he is above all things a "man of feeling," and is moved not so much by a positive inherent power, as by irritation against some other person or writer. His relation

¹ Dörner in his work *Pessimismus, Nietzsche und Naturalismus* has a very acute summary of Nietzsche's position as a Romanticist. I quote a couple of passages:

"Er spielt die antike Weltanschauung in mancher Beziehung gegen die Christliche aus. Auch da ist er Romantiker, er schaut seine Gedanken in die Vergangenheit, er nimmt was ihm passt aus der Antiken, vor allem nicht ihr Mass" (p. 112).

"Kurz, Nietzsche verteilt eine Romantik des Lebensdranges, des Machteffektes, die auf der Herrschaft des Naturalismus der Zeit fusst und den Machttrieb vergöttert, der die Zeit bestimmt" (p. 116).

to Wagner is typical. He begins with friendship and adoration. These find literary expression in *The Birth of Tragedy* and the *Essays out of Season*. When the friendship has become enmity, he cannot get the thought of Wagner out of his head, and develops his new principles in opposition to him. Wagner and his wife, who is probably "Ariadne,"¹ count for a great deal in Nietzsche's later writing, even apart from those pages devoted to that topic. The same is true of his attitude to Christianity.²

Even his heroic moral attitude has at times something rhetorical. Nietzsche betrays himself when, in order to prepare his readers for an attack on the New Testament, he is forced to drag in a tag: "I can't help it. Like Luther, I say: 'Here I stand, I can do no other!'" This is

¹ Cf. Bernoulli, *Overbeck und Nietzsche*, and also B  lart's remark in *Nietzsches Freundschafts-Trag  die*.

² "Originalit   disions-nous en parlant de l'animosit   de notre penseur    l'  gard de la morale chr  tienne; il faut s'empresse d'ajouter qu'il n'est gu  re original ici que par ses exc  s." (Seill  res, 210.)

eminently unspontaneous: very unlike Luther.

The literary affinities of Nietzsche form too multifarious a topic to be treated here. Rather it is with his philosophic background that this lecture will try to deal. Even then it will not be complete. In an interesting essay in the *International Journal of Ethics*, written some dozen years ago, M. Fouillée writes as follows:

“Nietzsche has not that supreme originality which he claims for himself. Mix Greek sophistry and Greek scepticism with the naturalism of Hobbes and the monism of Schopenhauer corrected with the paradoxes of Rousseau and of Diderot, and the result will be the philosophy of Zarathustra.”¹

And again:

“He fancies himself secure from the prejudices which emanate from the ‘herd’

¹ “The Ethics of Nietzsche and Guyau,” A. Fouillée, *International Journal of Ethics*, 1903, p. 13.

or are due to environment, and yet no one more than this singer of the praises of force and of war has gathered together into a single heap all the gregarious prejudices from Germany still feudal in the midst of the nineteenth century, all those dominant ideas which spring from the race, the environment, and the moment, and combined them with corresponding ideas from antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the Renaissance.”¹

We shall not be able to enter into all the questions aroused by this passage. But it may be worth while to take in turn Nietzsche's relation to certain writers, from whom he believed himself to be wide apart as the poles.² In many cases that difference was real, yet he owed more to them than he suspected. Having considered these cases, we will pass to another writer, who

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

² The extraordinary originality which enthusiastic Nietzscheites found in his writings is mainly due to their own unfamiliarity with the history of philosophy. (Wolf, *The Philosophy of Nietzsche*, 28.)

is usually credited with having been partly the inspirer of Nietzsche, or if not that, a more logical and thoroughgoing exponent of the same doctrine, Max Stirner, the author of *Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum*. In this case I believe that the opinion is not justified, and that Nietzsche, even if he had read Stirner, derived little or nothing from him. Nor would either have approved the other.

It may be well to say a few words about the course which is best to take in order to arrive at a comprehension of Nietzsche. For the purposes of literary appreciation some of his earliest books, such as the *Birth of Tragedy* and the *Future of our Educational Institutions*; for a complete study all or nearly all must be read. For obtaining illuminating critical views about European culture, he may be opened almost anywhere. But for those who desire quickly to know something of the *Gospel of One Superman*, his third or last period is alone of supreme importance. Nietzsche's

course may be divided into three: the Schopenhauer-Wagner period, *The Birth of Tragedy*, and the *Essays out of Season*, etc. Then comes a period of intellectualism of which *Human, All Too Human* is the most important work; although the *Joyful Wisdom* and the *Dawn of Day* must be assigned rather to that than the succeeding time. In *Human, All Too Human* Nietzsche wrote on the side of intellectualist, scientific methods, and was much under the influence of Paul Réc (although he did not admit this). In this time he was more purely sceptical than at any other; in his reaction against Wagner he sets the relation of art to science in precisely the opposite light to that in which his earlier and his later works regard it. His sympathy for the English Darwinian school and the English psychologists is great, and is unlike his later (or earlier) attitude. The most misleading of all ways of reading Nietzsche is to regard anything said in *Human, All Too Human* as author-

itative for his later and most characteristic stage. For instance, he uses expressions here which imply an attitude to war—which is at variance with all he says later. Wagner, to whom this book was sent, regarded it as a proof of mental weakness, declaring that he and his wife had already noticed traces of this during his visits to Tribschen. Had Nietzsche continued in the line of this book, there would have been little beyond his literary brilliance to distinguish him from many other positivists. Nietzsche, as the apostle of the superman is to be read primarily in *Also Sprach Zarathustra*. This cryptic work needs a commentary, as Nietzsche himself was aware. All the later works, *Beyond Good and Evil*, *The Genealogy of Morals*, *The Wagner Tracts*, and above all the posthumous *Will to Power* and *Ecce Homo* and *The Antichrist* are to be used for this end. When we speak of the Nietzschean doctrine, it is of the Nietzsche of this last period that we speak. Nor

can it be disproved by citations from the second period.¹ Books about Nietzsche are legion. Simmel's *Schopenhauer und Nietzsche* is very illuminating. As a guide to the ordinary reader Doctor Mügge's work is of value. It contains an account of the life, an analysis of his works in order, and an attempt at appraisal which is neither partisan nor hostile.

Emmanuel Kant, the philosopher of Königsberg, is one of Nietzsche's most common targets. Nietzsche is never weary of mocking him. He makes puns on the name to his discredit. He treats the doctrine of the Categorical Imperative as hypocrisy. He is contemptuous of Kant's Christian or semi-Christian attitude, of the value he sets on each individual, and so forth. He quarrels with his distinction between *phenomena* and *noumena*. Nietzsche's phenomenalism is so radical that he denies

¹ This seems to me an error in Doctor Wolf on *The Philosophy of Nietzsche*. He cites passages from *Human, All Too Human*, as though they were decisive evidence in regard to Nietzsche's final doctrine. Mügge, *Friedrich Nietzsche*, describes the three periods.

it to be phenomenalism, for that word implies a reality of which it is the appearance. These things and others in Kant are a target not merely for the general scorn in which Nietzsche holds German writing and German philosophy, but for special and peculiar mockery. Yet, Nietzsche not only owed a great deal to Kant, but in some respects he actually developed his doctrine.¹ Kant is really the critic and the destroyer of rationalism. He shews rather the limits than the powers of the human reason. Further in his doctrine of the practical reason, he shews the regulative value of those ideas, God, Freedom, and Immortality, of which he denied the possibility of demonstration. The modern anti-intellectualist pragmatist movement in all its forms owes much to Kant.

Nietzsche, it is needless to say, did not believe in the three great ideas of the Practical Reason as propounded by Kant.

¹ Vaihinger, *Die Philosophie des Als Ob*, 772, admits that Nietzsche took much from Kant, though not from the Kant of the text-books.

Yet the best and most influential part of his purely philosophic writing is his acute criticism of the rationalistic habit of mind. As he said in a letter to Brandes, he had arrived at a state in which he disliked dialectic and even the sense of grounds for an opinion. This is due not to his making up his mind apart from all reasoning, but to the way in which long brooding affects one. Arguments are considered on either side, but eventually there arises a unity, in which all seems clear. Then it seems silly and degrading to grope about for reasons now forgotten, when, besides, the conviction is so much more solid than the mere conclusion of an argument.

To return to Nietzsche and his attack on logicians. The philosopher's trust in dialectic is, like everything else, merely a form of the will to power. His desire is to rule. So he asserts the superiority of that in which he is an adept. More than that, logic in itself, the whole method of the reasoning faculty, is without any ref-

erence to reality. It is merely the outcome of the instinct to control.

The object of science is to enslave nature. Truth is merely that form of illusion which enables one best to live. Logic, the cutting of the world into little bits, and treating it as machinery, is not even an elementary guide to reality. Even its ultimate principle, the necessity of inference, given certain premises, is dictated only by the will to power; *e. g.*, it is fatigue, not love of knowledge, that drives us to seek unity—and reason is the principle of unity. Let me cite what Nietzsche says:

“Logic is the attempt on our part to understand the actual world according to a scheme of Being devised by ourselves; or, more exactly, it is our attempt at making the actual world more calculable and more susceptible to formulation, for our own purposes. . . .

“In order to be able to think and to draw conclusions, it is necessary to

acknowledge that which exists: logic only deals with formulæ for things which are constant. That is why this acknowledgment would not in the least prove reality: 'that which is' is part of our optics. The 'ego' regarded as Being (not affected by either Becoming or evolution.)

"The *assumed world* of subject, substance, 'reason,' etc., is necessary: an adjusting, simplifying, falsifying, artificially separating power resides in us. 'Truth' is the will to be master over the manifold sensations that reach consciousness; it is the will to *classify* phenomena according to definite categories. In this way we start out with a belief in the 'true nature' of things (we regard phenomena as real.)¹

"Thus it is the *highest degrees of activity* which awaken belief in regard to the *object*, in regard to its 'reality.' The sensations of strength, struggle, and re-

¹ *The Will to Power*, II, p. 33.

sistance convince the subject that there is something which is being resisted.

“The criterion of truth lies in the enhancement of the feeling of power.

“According to my way of thinking, ‘truth’ does not necessarily mean the opposite of error, but, in the most fundamental cases, merely the relation of different errors to each other; thus one error might be older, deeper than another, perhaps altogether ineradicable, one without which organic creatures like ourselves could not exist; whereas other errors might not tyrannise over us to that extent as conditions of existence, but when measured according to the standard of those other ‘tyrants,’ could even be laid aside and ‘refuted.’

“Why should an irrefutable assumption necessarily be ‘true’? This question may exasperate the logicians who limit *things* according to the limitations they find in themselves: but I have long since declared war with this logician’s optimism.

“Everything simple is simply imaginary, but not ‘true.’ That which is real and true is, however, neither a unity nor reducible to a unity.¹

“Life is based on the hypothesis of a belief in stable and regularly recurring things; the mightier it is, the more vast must be the world of knowledge and the world called being. Logicising, rationalising, and systematising are of assistance as means of existence.

“Man projects his instinct of truth, his ‘aim,’ to a certain extent beyond himself, in the form of a metaphysical world of Being, a ‘thing in itself,’ a world already to hand. His requirements as a creator make him *invent* the world in which he works in advance; he anticipates it: this anticipation (this faith in truth) is his mainstay.

“All phenomena, movement, Becoming, regarded as the establishment of relations of degree and of force, as a contest. . . .

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

“As soon as we *fancy* that some one is responsible for the fact that we are thus and thus, etc. (God, Nature), and that we ascribe our existence, our happiness, our misery, our *destiny*, to that some one, we corrupt the *innocence of Becoming* for ourselves. We then have some one who wishes to attain to something by means of us and with us.

“The ‘welfare of the individual’ is just as fanciful as the ‘welfare of the species’: the first is *not* sacrificed to the last; seen from afar, the species is just as fluid as the individual. ‘The *preservation* of the species’ is only a result of the *growth* of the species—that is to say, *of the overcoming of the species* on the road to a stronger kind.”¹

This psychological attempt to explain the growth of intellect as a development of the will to power is not indeed conducted on the same lines as Kant’s critique. It

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

is more akin to those of Bergson and some of the Pragmatists. Like theirs, it is largely due to the notion of biological evolution, and the sense that intellect is itself a product of those physical forces which we see in natural development.

For all that, Nietzsche owed a great deal more to the work of Kant as a critic of intellectualism than he would have cared to admit. As Doctor Wolf puts it: "The main point of his theory of knowledge, I take it, was to bring out the human perspective involved in all human knowledge—somewhat as Kant and others had done before him, only more so."¹

¹ The following passage is also pertinent:

(*Werke*, XIII, 85, § 214): "Die wissenschaftliche Genauigkeit ist bei den oberflächlichsten Erscheinungen am ersten zu erreichen, also wo gezählt, gerechnet, getastet, gesehen werden kann, wo Quantitäten constatiert werden können. Also die armseligsten Bereiche des Daseins sind zuerst fruchtbar angebaut worden. Die Forderung, Alles müsse mechanistisch erklärt werden, ist der Instinct, als ob die werthvollsten und fundamentalsten Erkenntnisse gerade am ersten gelungen wären: was eine Naivetät ist. Thatsächlich ist uns Alles, was gezählt und begriffen werden kann, wenig werth; wo man nicht hinkommt mit dem 'Begreifen' das gilt uns als 'höher.' Logik und Mechanik sind nur auf das oberflächlichste anwendbar: eigentlich nur eine Schematisir- und Abkürzungs-Kunst, eine Bewältigung der Vielheit durch eine Kunst des Ausdrucks—kein 'Verstehen' sondern ein Bezeichnen

Lastly, the "thing in itself," which Nietzsche so stoutly denied, was to a large extent restored by him. In one aspect, indeed, he is purely naturalistic. But like Schopenhauer, he believed in a force behind all phenomena, that "infinite and eternal energy" (in the words of another philosopher whom Nietzsche disliked), which he calls the *will to power*. Kuno Fischer long since gave grounds for supposing that Kant's "thing in itself" means and was intended by him to mean no less than Will. This view, if not precisely established, has much to say for itself. Nietzsche denied all metaphysical reality, yet it is not difficult to see that his will to power, if it is to have any meaning attached to it at all (and he always repudiated sheer materialism), is of the nature of a spiritual force—*The will that can,*

Existent behind all laws, that made them and lo they are.

zum Zweck der Verständigung. Die Welt auf die Oberfläche reducirt denken heisst: sie zunächst 'begreiflich' machen.

"Logic und Mechanik berühren nie die Ursächlichkeit."

To take one instance in detail. Kant had pointed out that the uniformity of nature, natural laws, etc., were not eternal realities, properties of things in themselves; they merely depend on our way of seeing nature, they are the *à priori condition of our experience*. After saying that cosmological proofs of God are purely regulative, he goes on:

“All phenomena depend in the same way *à priori* on the understanding, and receive their formal possibility from it, as when looked upon as mere intuitions, they depend on sensibility and become possible through it, so far as their form is concerned. However exaggerated therefore and absurd it may sound, that the understanding is the source of the laws of nature, and of its formal unity, such a statement is nevertheless correct and in accordance with experience. . . .

“The pure understanding is therefore the law of the synthetical unity of all phenomena, and this makes experience,

as far as its form is concerned, for the first time possible.” Kant, *Critique of the Pure Reason*, Max Müller’s translation, pp. 111, 112.

Nietzsche’s criticism of science is analogous, though different. Kant asks, how knowledge is possible, assuming that we have knowledge, at least of phenomena. Nietzsche asks, what does knowledge mean? His answer is that knowledge has nothing to do with any so-called truth, but is merely the complex of intellectual formulæ, by which that resourceful animal Man is able to increase his power. Scientific knowledge is not only not truth, but every single instrument of so-called knowledge is merely a convenient lie—*i. e.*, it begins by treating as static what is essentially dynamic and splitting up the continuum of life in flux into imaginary substances. We are ever driven in the terrific whirl of becoming. The very beginnings of scientific method, which assumes a hard-and-fast multiplicity of beings, are a fiction. Truth

is in Nietzsche's view that body of convenient lies that helps us to live more powerfully.¹ The object of science is to enslave the outward world, just as morals is that other body of lies necessary for the will to power of the majority, the oppressed classes, to move towards reconquest.

Nietzsche gives us, then, a psychological account of scientific knowledge which is to set us free from fatalism. Kant gave a deductive account of the origin of knowledge, also designed to set us free. Both taught the regulative rather than the absolute value of the laws of nature and of the whole body of so-called knowledge.²

Let us pass to another case in which the disagreement was more violent, and the dependence even more obvious—that

¹ Nietzsche, *Werke*, XIII, 102, § 239: "Das Leben bejahen—das selber heisst die Lüge bejahen. Also man kann nur mit einer absolut unmoralischen Denkweise leben."

² Fatalism in another sense is inherent in Nietzsche's system. How can there be freedom if the one force moving all reality is blind will to power? No real choice is possible in Nietzsche's system, and he himself denies all moral responsibility, but it is freedom which he desires.

of Schopenhauer. Nietzsche's relation to Schopenhauer is of capital importance in any study of him. The question of his debt to Kant is more academic. Nietzsche had, as we know, for a long time been an ardent disciple of Schopenhauer, and afterwards turned against him. As against any form of facile optimism he remained of the same opinion; but from the "tragic" standpoint, which is his final one, he asserts, as we saw in the second lecture, that although the universe is a chaos, although life has no purpose—moral, intellectual, or artistic—although a blind will to power is the sole reality and involves suffering infinite, yet Life is still to be accepted in its entirety, that any form of self-denial is a blasphemy against existence, and that the notion of redemption from suffering, and therefore from existence, is radically false.¹ Nietzsche does

¹ Nietzsche, *Werke*, XIII, 90, § 228: "Die eigentliche grosse Angst ist: *die Welt hat keinen Sinn mehr*. Inwiefern mit 'Gott' auch die bisherige Moral weggefallen ist: sie hielten sich gegenseitig."

not teach that suffering as such is an end. Like Christianity, he asserts that pain and pleasure are alike irrelevant in pursuit of the main end, which is life and more abundant life, and that whichever we encounter, alike pain or pleasure, can be made the basis, if accepted, of a richer development. This doctrine is in direct opposition to that of Schopenhauer. The latter taught that the one reality is will, that the restlessness of will produces life, and with this as an inevitable consequence, suffering; that the only means of redemption is by the will to love, *i. e.*, pity—all love is pity—overcoming the will to live. Self-denial, therefore, in its literal sense, is the sole virtue. Ultimately, the whole conscious universe, which is the expression of the will to live, will sink back into an eternal Nothingness, after realising the mistake of existence. This doctrine appears an unrelieved pessimism—although it may be to some extent counteracted by the fact that Schopenhauer did not approve suicide, and

that he speaks with approval of the "mystical" death of Quietists like Madame Guyon, and seems to leave a loophole for supposing that Nirvana means something other than actual annihilation. Still, Nietzsche is justified in treating the redemption by negation of Schopenhauer, as a no-saying to life. His opposition to this is radical, and it is justified.

Yet Nietzsche was in error when he supposed that he had come out of the circle of Schopenhauer's influence. Both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche teach a philosophy of the will. Along with Hartmann, whom Nietzsche so deeply despised, they really rest on the unconscious and subconscious to the depreciation of the articulate elements in man. All three are alike anti-intellectualist, although in very different ways. Nietzsche is always psychological, the others are metaphysicians. Even allowing for the difference between the will to live and the will to power, it is not true to say that the systems are iden-

tical. As Simmel points out, for Schopenhauer Will is the reality behind the world, and will produces life. For Nietzsche life is the ultimate reality of which will to power is the expression. Schopenhauer would say: "I live, because I will"; Nietzsche: "I will, because I live." Practically, however, it remains true that both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, and Hartmann along with them, teach a monism of Will, just as Hegel teaches a monism of thought. Both Hegel and Schopenhauer teach that the individual is an illusion, the manifestation under forms of time and space of an Absolute. Only Schopenhauer's Absolute is Will, Hegel's is the Idea, and is called Absolute. Nietzsche would deny that he believed in any Absolute. Now and then it would appear that his life force is so highly concentrated in individuals, his theory of the world as a chaos is so thorough, that his individuals have more reality than those of either Schopenhauer or Hegel. Yet on the whole his philosophy is a monism with

the individual as the mere bubble on the stream of the Will to Power.

Nietzsche is not a pessimist in Schopenhauer's sense; yet neither is he an optimist. His *Amor Fati* is a counsel of despair. In Schopenhauer's view the world is evil by the very fact of its existence. Will is insatiable and restless. In producing the multifarious world in order to satisfy itself, it is attempting the impossible. No peace for it is possible, until it sinks into Nirvana. On the whole, then, life is bad and redemption is possible only by its extinction. Nietzsche says that life has no meaning nor moral. Therefore we are to worship its ever-recurring monstrosity.

Let us pass to another influence, which can be considered but briefly. Darwin comes in for much of Nietzsche's contempt (except in the *Human, All Too Human* period). The Darwinian hypothesis of a struggle for existence he regards as absurd, arising out of the phenomenon of an overpopulated island like England,

where Darwin and Malthus were reared. Yet few writers owed more to Darwin. The influence of Darwin is the watershed that divides Schopenhauer's system from that of Nietzsche, which is essentially one of becoming. Nietzsche's conception of the world as physiological development only—his never-ceasing belief in evolution—even his belief in the struggle for power, as the key-word to all development, are really only Darwin with a difference.¹ Nietzsche's conception of the Will to Power does give a more plausible account of natural evolution than that of the struggle for existence. Yet clearly he got the former to a large extent out of the latter. Moreover, it is doubtful whether Nietzsche would have hit on the symbol *Superman*, had not his imagination been fired by the *Origin of Species*.² We can

¹ "Toutes les conséquences habituellement tirées du darwinisme par les partisans de la force, surtout en Allemagne, nous les avons vues se développer chez Nietzsche. Il est aristocrate et ennemi de la démocratie comme tous les darwinistes qui veulent appliquer purement et simplement la loi darwinienne à la société humaine." (Fouillée, 253.)

² Nietzsche, *Werke*, XIV, 261: "Meine Forderung: Wesen hervorzubringen, welche über der ganzen Geltung 'Mensch' erhaben dastehn; und diesem Ziele sich und 'die Nächsten' zu opfern."

see how much at one time this school attracted him by looking at the writings of his second period. M. Claire Richter has written an interesting book on *Nietzsche et les théories biologiques contemporaines*, in which he seeks to show that Nietzsche was unconsciously a disciple of Lamarck rather than Darwin in certain important aspects of the doctrine of the transmutation of species. This may be so, without it affecting the other fact, especially since M. Richter admits that Nietzsche was unconscious of his debt to Lamarck. The truth is that, in regard to Darwin, Nietzsche went through his usual process. He read him, was strongly influenced, then began to turn round and criticise. Finally he poured scorn on the whole school, and would have denied all affinity thereto. Darwin's English quality was another drawback. Nietzsche might despise German culture-Philistines, and go so far as to say that even the presence of a German retarded his digestion. Yet he despised the English

even more heartily, and identified them with a narrow utilitarian commercialism and an equally pedestrian view in ethics.

In this, as in many other ways, Nietzsche merely represented his own day in Germany. He was more German than he supposed. Doctor Georg Brandes, who has been called *l'inventeur de Nietzsche*, considers his whole system the translation into terms of ethics of the Bismarckian era. Bismarck, indeed, in his later years Nietzsche disliked and thought him corrupted by the struggle for power; while he declared that wherever Germany extended her sway she ruined culture.¹ Yet it is the Prussian officer-corps which had his admiration. We know this on the authority alike of his friend Deussen and also his sister. It is militarism which is the best counter-poison to democracy. The next century,

¹ Nietzsche, *Werke*, XIII, 350: "‘Deutschland, Deutschland über alles’ ist vielleicht die blödsinnigste Parole, die je gegeben worden ist. Warum überhaupt Deutschland, frage ich, wenn es nicht Etwas will, vertritt, darstellt, das mehr Werth hat, als irgend eine andere bisherige Macht vertritt. An sich nur ein grosser Staat mehr, eine Albernheit mehr in der Welt."

he prophesied, would be the era of the great wars, wars for the conquest of the world, and he hints not obscurely in one of the passages of the posthumous works that England must be relieved of her colonies, or at least that Europe must come to an "understanding with her," by which he seems to mean subjugation. Nietzsche's dislike of any kind of nationalism has blinded some people to the fact that his conception of the hierarchy of society was more like that of the Prussian monarchy than of any other part of Europe.¹ It was not entirely that, for

¹ *Werke*, XIII, 352: "Englands Kleingeisterei ist die grösste Gefahr jetzt auf der Erde."

He appears to have wished Russia to have the hegemony of Europe. The whole passage discussed is so important that I cite it in full.

Werke, XIII, 358, § 881: "Um aber mit guten Aussichten in den Kampf um die Regierung der Erde einzutreten—es liegt auf dem Stand, gegen wen sich dieser Kampf richten wird—hat Europa wahrscheinlich nöthig, sich ernsthaft mit England zu verständigen; es bedarf der Colonien Englands zu jenem Kampfe ebenso, wie das jetzige Deutschland, zur Einübung in seine neue Vermittler- und Makler-Rolle, der Colonien Hollands bedarf. Niemand nämlich glaubt mehr daran, dass England selber stark genug sei, seine alte Rolle nur noch fünfzig Jahre fortzuspielen; es geht an der Unmöglichkeit, die *homines novi* von der Regierung auszuschliessen, zu Grunde, und man muss keinen solchen

he did not put the soldiers first. Nietzsche, like Bismarck, is one of the leaders of the reaction against the ideals of the French Revolution. That reaction has had many aspects. In some ways Nietzsche's is the most radical, for it is based on a notion independent of wealth or political rank and regards the masses as mere means to the man of true power. Nietzsche's new order of rulers are not to claim, as in ancient aristocracies, that they are privileged in virtue of their services to the community. Rather the community exists to make them possible. Their *raison d'être*, however, is far beyond themselves and involves immediate sacrifice. They exist to raise the type *man*, and with it to inaugurate a higher culture.

This latter function it is which indicates

Wechsel der Parteien haben, um solche langwierige Dinge vorzubereiten; man muss heute vorerst Soldat sein um als Kaufmann nicht seinen Kredit zu verlieren. Genug: hierin, wie in anderen Dingen, wird das nächste Jahrhundert in den Fusstapfen Napoleons zu finden sein, des ersten und vorwegnehmendsten Menschen neuerer Zeit. Für die Aufgaben der nächsten Jahrhunderte sind die Arten Öffentlichkeit und Parlamentarismus die unzweckmässigsten Organisationen."

the essential difference between Nietzsche and a writer by whom it has been alleged he was deeply influenced, Max Stirner. Max Stirner is the *nom de guerre* of a certain Karl Schmidt who lived in the first half of the nineteenth century, dying in 1856. He wrote a book on the *History of the Reaction, i. e.*, the reaction against the French Revolution. It is, however, his single work *Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum*, by which he is best known. This book was not very well known at the time, 1848. Perhaps it would never have been dug out, had it not been for the vogue of Nietzsche. Now it has been published in an American translation with a laudatory preface by Doctor Walker, who proclaims its difference from, and, in his view, superiority to, Nietzsche. I believe that Doctor Walker is right in the fact, although wrong in his estimate. It must be said that the debt of Nietzsche to Max Stirner is believed by many to be great. Much is made of it by M. Fouillée

in his interesting book on *Nietzsche et l'Immoralisme*. One writer, Doctor Paul Carus, in *Nietzsche and other Exponents of Individualism*, goes farther. Not only in his words on Nietzsche's predecessor (pp. 74-92) does he assert the very strong direct connection of the two, but he goes on to say that Nietzsche's omission to mention the fact that he had pillaged Max Stirner for his characteristic ideas is not to be wondered at. It is no more than Nietzsche's application in his own person of the doctrine that the superman is beyond good and evil, relieved of the ordinary obligations of decent behaviour. Nothing seems to me less fair than this judgment. Nietzsche's non-mention of Stirner is certainly not decisive against his having read him. Even if he had not read him, he might have learned his drift from somebody else. He must have known about him, for Hartmann discusses him. That he should have deliberately refrained from mentioning Stirner in order to win a

spurious reputation for originality is not in keeping with Nietzsche's character. Besides, if that were so, traces of Max Stirner would be found in the posthumous works.

The reason why I think that Nietzsche could not have been influenced by Max Stirner, except in certain non-essential matters, such as dislike of the democratic ideals of the French Revolution, is that the two systems are in reality antagonistic, and only in appearance at all similar. Stirner's doctrine is briefly this: The one reality is the ego, and he should aim at treating the world as mere material for his amusement. Max Stirner tries to shew that Christianity did a service to mankind in so far as it set them free from the gods of this world and proclaimed its nothingness in comparison with real satisfaction. Unfortunately, it did this only in order to introduce a deeper slavery to abstractions concerning the other world. All supernaturalism he condemns just as Nietzsche does. But he goes on to say

that every kind of moral ideal is only a form of supernaturalism, a ghost or bogie-man with which we are terrified. The real nature of religion is contained in this fact—it enslaves man to a principle. It does not matter what the principle is. So long as we allow ourselves to be directed by it, we are not independent. The one thing we know is ourselves—and we are fools if we allow ourselves to be enslaved to any form of authority, church or state or class or tradition or morals. All these things are dodges invented by other people, in order that with their help they may tyrannise over us. Not merely this. A man is equally a slave when he is the follower of an ideal, even though that ideal be self-chosen. Justice is absurd, for that is a social principle; and our sole business is to use the universe for ourselves. Truth, as an end, is no less silly, for it prevents us doing what we want at the moment. All ideals which look to the future are of the nature of religion

and are merely vain imaginations, bogies. The ghostly world of our dreams is the factory out of which men have invented the supernatural. Afterwards this became the ideal world of moral purposes. Then, with the positivist conception annihilating the supernatural and all idealist ethics, there has come the idea of Humanity. All these in turn are worshipped, and the last, Humanity, the principle of the French Revolution, is not the less dangerous, because it comes in the form of enlightenment. At bottom those who hold it are bogie-worshippers, no better than Christians. Even Freedom as an ideal is ridiculous, because it sets forth a principle, which will interfere with the ego.

The doctrine may be called radical egoism. It is an unrelieved individualism which would set the ego to work his will in the world, treating everything else as mere force, and might do good in protecting a man from the conventions of his own past. Nothing but a calculation

of probability could prevent his yielding to his immediate impulses at any moment. Nero appears to be admired by the author, although one passage gives a hint that he does not set forward a pure hedonism. If this be so, we can only save his heart at the expense of his head. On his own theory, absolutely nothing ought to hinder the ego at any moment, and self-realisation is interfered with when every immediate pleasure is foregone in the name of a future good.

Max Stirner's protest against the sentimental idealism of his day—the day of Mazzini—is stringent enough in all conscience, and for the most part unattractive. As a criticism it is acute. Like Nietzsche, Max Stirner detests democracy, and even more obviously than Nietzsche does he express the movement of reaction against the French Revolution and the watchwords Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. Like Nietzsche, Max Stirner disliked utilitarians, and, like Nietzsche, he scorned all

those new codes of ethics which are in the eyes of their propounders to contain all the essence of Christianity, divorced from its dogmas. Like Nietzsche, he sees the futility of expecting to retain the Christian values in human life, if the Christian faith has gone by the board. Like Nietzsche also, he saw that, apart from a Christian, or at least an idealist, doctrine of the individual soul, there are no real grounds for preaching a doctrine of fellowship or humanity or the golden rule, or whatever you call it. Here are a few passages:

“As long as you believe in the truth, you do not believe in yourself, and you are a *servant*, a religious man. You alone are the truth, or rather, you are more than the truth, which is nothing at all before you.”¹

“One has a prospect of extirpating religion down to the ground only when one antiquates society and everything that flows from this principle.”²

¹ Stirner, 472.

² *Ibid.*, 413.

“The religious consists in discontent with the present man, *i. e.*, in the setting up of a perfection to be striven for, in man ‘wrestling for his completion’ (Ye therefore *should* be perfect as your father in heaven is perfect). It consists in the fixation of an ideal, an absolute. Perfection is the ‘supreme good,’ the *finis bonorum*; everyone’s ideal is the perfect man, the true, the free man, etc.

“The efforts of modern times aim to set the ideal of the ‘free man.’ If one could find it, there would be a new religion, because a new ideal; there would be a new longing, a new torment, a new devotion, a new deity, a new contrition.”¹

The question is, is this doctrine of unbridled egoism the same as that of Nietzsche? I cannot think it. It may plausibly be argued that if it is not what Nietzsche meant, it is what he ought to

¹ *Ibid.*, *The Ego and His Own*, 321.

have meant. Or it may be said that ultimately this is what Nietzsche's principle would work out to, if accepted by the mass of men. It may be so. My point is that it is not what Nietzsche meant, nor anything like what he meant: that it is in direct opposition to some of Nietzsche's most important principles, such as natural asceticism, the sacrifice of ages in order to speed the superman, the raising of the type of man. Stirner protests against the whole idea of the type of man. Nietzsche, it is true, dislikes Humanity, and will have nothing to do with equality; that is because he wants to prepare the way for something better, the reign of the superman—who would to Max Stirner have been only a new bogie, worse than the old. Here and there Nietzsche has a remark which might have been suggested by Max Stirner; even that is by no means certain, although we are not concerned to deny it. The essay of Max Stirner on *The Untrue Principle in Our Education* in the volume

selections by Mackay might have influenced Nietzsche a little. In the main, Nietzsche's manner of presentment is so different, and his doctrine so much more complex, that it is hard to believe in any connection—unless there be some direct evidence. That there is not. Nietzsche's superman is an ideal. It is the quality of a new aristocracy; no one living now incarnates this higher man. Good Europeans are to undergo severe discipline in order that their descendants may be supermen. The superman is subject to certain principles, which Stirner would dub ghosts—courage and a high heart, heroic endeavour, great sufferings, great health, the refusal ever to say no to experience. Nietzsche desired a body of self-controlled rulers with distinguished manners—every one of these qualities embodies a principle, and requires discipline and some kind of faith. Max Stirner's system may have some affinity with that of Nietzsche. It embodies every one of his worst faults with vulgarity added, and

would produce a world of pretentious egoists. The superman, as the creator of a high culture, is a very different ideal from the *ego* with all the world for his box of toys. Whatever Nietzsche may have thought of Max Stirner, there can hardly be much doubt as to what Max Stirner would have thought of Nietzsche.

“Bah!” he would have said, “free air, pure air. Get out of my sight with your *Gespenster*, your will to power, your life with a capital L, and your superman—superghost you should have said. You call yourself Zarathustra the ungodly, the Antichrist, the creator of new values, the destroyer, the immoralist. Go away! You are no better than the cobweb spinner of Königsberg and his great-aunt the Categorical Imperative. Your eternal recurrence, and all your talk of eternity, the aim of all delight, your belief in the genii of the ring, your finding eternity in the moment recalls to me that hoary old humbug of Jena, who found the Absolute Idea

objectified in the Prussian state. As to your superman, he is a ghost—like all other ghosts, and your disciples will be slaves like the rest of their crowd. Idealists, Comtists, Liberty-loving atheists—all of you are no better than the Christians you despise.

“Yes, I tell you you are a Christian, like all the others, no better except that you have added self-deception to their vices. You think you are new, yet you are as much a preacher of duty as Lycurgus. Your Dionysos cult is religion back one more, whether you call it Dionysos or Christ, it is all the same, if you are to fall down in reverence. Capital letters are all idolatry. You even make an idol out of Life. What is Life, pray, that I am to fall down and worship it? I reject the monstrous slavery of your *amor fati*. Besides, I know nothing about it. I know only that I am here.

“Poor fellow! You have tried hard to be shocking, and have succeeded only in

being silly. You actually talk of redemption, of the salvation of man. Go back to your Frau Pastorin and to Church."

V

THE CHARM OF NIETZSCHE

WHAT is the secret of Nietzsche's vogue? Even if we were to adopt the view of Signor Papini, that the secret of Nietzsche, veiled from us by a lofty eloquence, is weakness, we should still be far from explaining the spell which he exerts. That spell is a fact. Nietzsche has some conquering charm in him. By this he attracts not only Nietzscheans pure and simple, whose reading of his doctrine might not always be acceptable to their master, but many others. Superior persons, or those liking the pose of aristocracy without its obligations, young men and even more young women glad to be free of tradition find in him a new-born hope;¹ some philosophers who disagree with him profoundly, and

¹ Nietzsche made himself the exponent of a tendency, and as such he has his followers among large masses of people whom he despised as belonging to the herd.

Christians who are opposed to his central doctrine may be found to admire and almost to love the hermit of Sils-Maria, the prophet of Zarathustra, the singer of the Eternal Recurrence. Musicians and educationists prize him for much that he says about positive as against negative virtue, and for the wide horizons of culture he sets before his "higher men." "Every idiot fancies himself an *Übermensch*" was a remark made once to me by an erudite Bavarian. The pocket edition of *Also sprach Zarathustra* marks a circulation of close on 140,000. In the British Museum there are to be found about one hundred books and pamphlets on him in German alone; many in other languages. M. Bernoulli devotes two immense volumes to the friendship between Nietzsche and the Swiss historical theologian Overbeck. Even his personal affairs are the subject of almost a wide literature. What is the meaning of this?

Not entirely, not mainly, his message.

Some people there have been who are for treating Nietzsche as negligible and dismissing his criticisms as the ravings of a lunatic. That is not a wise proceeding, as M. Seillières points out at the close of a work devoted to severe criticism, *Apollon ou Dionysos*. Mere insanity would not have given him such a vogue. Nowadays, at least, his wide-spread prevalence makes it impossible to leave him aside. Let us take his influence as a fact, and in this lecture try to gain some notion of his charm. In the next we can consider his importance. How much of enduring fame he will win no one can prophesy.

First of all comes the fact of the extraordinary personal character of all his writings. We see in Nietzsche, no less than we do in Newman, the literary expression of a soul on fire. Nietzsche will not write until he has fused his brooding thought into a unity of feeling. When he does write, that unity of feeling is so deeply concentrated that his very force tends to

take captive the reader, almost irrespective of what he says. Schellwien¹ in his little book on *Stirner and Nietzsche* pronounces that he is so entirely a dogmatist in his writing that one must always take him or leave him, according as his ideas appeal intuitively. Nietzsche felt this himself. In a letter to Georg Brandes he said that he had come to distrust dialectic and even all grounds at all, *i. e.*, he must go by pure intuition.² This does not mean that he took up notions at random;³ rather that he went through the long psychical process of weighing and reconsidering, and then, when the whole seemed clear, he

¹ "Da sonach Nietzsche's Denken durch und durch dogmatisch ist, so ist es kein Gegenstand für Diskussion. Wer ebenso glaubt mag es annehmen; wer es nicht glaubt, braucht sich nicht weiter darüber zu beunruhigen." (Robert Schellwien, *Max Stirner und F. Nietzsche*, 27.)

² "In der Skala meiner Erlebnisse und Zustände, ist das Übergewicht auf Seiten der seltneren, fernerer, dünneren Tonlagen gegen die normaleren, mittleren. . . . Endlich—und das wohl am meisten macht meine Bücher dunkel—es gibt in mir ein Misstrauen gegen Dialektik, selbst gegen Gründe." Nietzsche to Brandes. (*Briefe*, III, 274.)

³ Doctor Wolf points this out; although he rather underrates the inconsistencies in Nietzsche—not the difference between the three periods, but inconsistency at any moment.

kicked away the ladder, ending by thinking it a bore, a waste of time, to discuss the grounds. If a person could not see what he saw, Nietzsche would not convert him by argument.

It is this power to write with blood of which he boasts. Nietzsche, in his own view, lived more deeply than other people, and therefore, having mastered the art of expression, he was able to write with such compelling force. The certainty, the prophetic conviction with which he writes have in them something as of a vision, a thing seen.¹ More and more this note of dogmatism has become effective in our day. It is notable alike in philosophy, in literature, in politics. The note of absoluteness may do no more than express

¹ Nietzsche in his later period laments the fanaticism of his earlier writings. Yet in truth he grew more violent as he grew older.

“Als ich jüngst den Versuch machte, meine älteren Schriften, die ich vergessen hatte, kennen zu lernen, erschrack ich über ein gemeinsames Merkmal derselben: sie sprechen die Sprache des Fanatismus. . . . Der Fanatismus verdirbt den Charakter, den Geschmack, und zuletzt auch die Gesundheit.” (*Werke*, XII, 179.)

a strong personal idiosyncrasy. In this age, however, unlike some others, this is an advantage; the tentative scientific understatement is apt to repel. We can see this in our political and artistic controversies; in most of our popular essays and in nearly all modern criticism. It may be a consequence of the weakness of an age which wants to be secured against its own timidity. But it is a fact.

Secondly—but this is largely the consequence of that personal quality—Nietzsche strikes the imagination. This is what is needed now to secure any man an empire. Whether in politics or philosophy or business, it is not intellect but imaginative authority that wins a spell. Even if those were right who identified the teaching of Nietzsche with that of Max Stirner, they would never be able to secure for the latter one tithe of the popularity of Nietzsche.

Max Stirner lacks these qualities of style and imagination. It may be said that all

this is briefly summed in the statement that Nietzsche is a poet. That is true. "Art," we are told, "is the expression of sincere emotion," and judged by that canon Nietzsche is an artist of no mean order. His genius is essentially lyrical.¹ That is to say, it is his personal, individual feeling which breaks into the "lyrical cry," and this feeling is always or nearly always measured by some criticism of life. Thus, his poetic quality embodies the two strands. It is not mere singing, in some enchanted garden, away from the drab dulness of the world; it is not mere philosophy uninformed by experience; it is the fusion of the two by the alembic of a vivid per-

¹ "When we read him, we are moved not by classic, but by romantic art, he transfers us to the rococo world, not to that of the Renaissance; he incites in us dramatic tension and lyric stress, while he lacks epic calm and exuberance. But he is a master of his art, and we might call him in a certain sense the Richard Wagner of German prose.

"Long after his unjust warfare against Christianity, his contradictory theories, which do violence to facts, his clumsy reconstructions and exaggerations have been forgotten he will be remembered as one of the greatest German stylists—as a poet of powerful diction, as a master of language and of musical declamation in words." (Külpe, *The Philosophy of the Present in Germany*, translated by M. and O. Patrick, p. 129.)

sonality, which gives Nietzsche his charm, and will probably continue to give it. Take, for instance, the Night-Song in *Zarathustra*. This was one of Nietzsche's own favourites:

“ ‘Night it is: now talk louder all springing wells. And my soul is a springing well.

“ ‘Night it is: only now all songs of the loving awake. And my soul is the song of a loving one.

“ ‘Something never stilled, something never to be stilled is within me. It longeth to give forth sound. A longing for love is within me, that itself speaketh the language of love.

“ ‘Light I am: would that I were night! But it is my loneliness, to be girded round by light.

“ ‘Oh, that I were dark and like the night! How would I suck at the breasts of light!

“ ‘And I would bless even you, ye

small, sparkling stars and glowworms on high—and be blessed by your gifts of light!

“ ‘But in mine own light I live, back into myself I drink the flames that break forth from me.

“ ‘I know not the happiness of the receiver. And often I dreamt that stealing was needs much sweeter than receiving.

“ ‘It is my poverty that my hand never resteth from giving; it is mine envy that I see waiting eyes and the illuminated nights of longing.

“ ‘Oh, unbledness of all givers! Oh, obscuration of my sun! Oh, longing for longing! Oh, famished voracity in the midst of satisfaction!

“ ‘They take things from me; but do I touch their soul? There is a gulf between giving and taking, and the smallest gulf is the most difficult to bridge over.

“ ‘A hunger waxeth out of my beauty:

I would cause pain unto those whom I bring light; I would fain bereave those I gave my gifts to. Thus am I hungry for wickedness.

“ ‘Taking back my hand when another hand stretcheth out for it; hesitating like the waterfall that hesitateth when raging down—thus am I hungry for wickedness.

“ ‘Such revenge is invented by mine abundance; such insidiousness springeth from my loneliness.

“ ‘My happiness of giving died from giving; my virtue became weary of itself from its abundance!

“ ‘He who always giveth is in danger to lose his sense of shame; he who always distributeth getteth hard swellings on his hand and heart from distributing.

“ ‘Mine eye no longer floweth over from the shame of the begging ones; my hand hath become too hard to feel the trembling of full hands.

“ ‘Whither went the tear of mine eye, and the down of my heart? Oh, solitude of all givers! Oh, silence of all lighters!

“ ‘Many suns circle round in empty space: unto all that is dark they speak with their light—unto me they are silent.

“ ‘Oh, that is the enmity of light against what shineth! Without pity it wandereth on its course.

“ ‘Unfair towards what shineth in the heart of its heart, cold towards suns, thus walketh every sun.

“ ‘Like the storm the suns fly on their courses; that is their walking. They follow their inexorable will; that is their coldness.

“ ‘Oh, it is only ye, ye dark ones, ye of the night who create warmth out of what shineth! Oh, it is only ye who drink milk and refreshment from the udders of light!

“ ‘Alas, there is ice round me; my hand burneth itself when touching what

is icy! Alas, there is thirst within me that is thirsty for your thirst!

“ ‘Night it is: alas, that I must be a light! And a thirst for what is of the night! And solitude!

“ ‘Night it is: now, like a well, my longing breaketh forth from me. I am longing for speech.

“ ‘Night it is: now talk louder all springing wells. And my soul is a springing well.

“ ‘Night it is: only now all songs of the loving awake. And my soul is the song of a loving one.’

“ Thus sang Zarathustra.”¹

Nietzsche's sense of his own inspiration finds vent in a highly charged passage of *Ecce Homo*,² quoted in the last lecture. The megalomania of that piece is repulsive. Yet, some of the analysis is acute. Zarathustra—and that is Nietzsche at his highest—has that quality of *inevitableness*

¹ *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, II, The Night-Song, pp. 149–151.

² *Ecce Homo*, pp. 101, 106.

in the writing which belongs to the highest art. The sense of far distances, of a translucent atmosphere as though the Alps had made themselves into music, is with us very frequently; also a certain iridescence of changing colours. One of the minor merits of Nietzsche is the multiplicity of fresh landscapes and kaleidoscopic variety of his pictures. As M. Fouillée remarks:

“Sa poésie est un lyrisme puissant: sa philosophie a je ne sais quoi de pittoresque qui réduit l'imagination; c'est une série de tableaux, de paysages, de visions et de rêves, un voyage romantique en un pays enchanté, où les scènes terribles succèdent aux scènes joyeuses, où le burlesque s'intercale au milieu du sublime. Nietzsche est sympathique par les grands côtés. La seule chose antipathique en cette belle âme c'est la superbe de la pensée. Toute doctrine d'aristocratie exclusive est d'ailleurs une doctrine d'orgueil, et tout or-

gueil n'est-il pas un commencement de folie? Chez Nietzsche le sentiment aristocratique a quelque chose de maladif.”¹

Probably not a little of his attraction for many is owing to this. This is the day of flash-light and electric movement. Nietzsche is like a motor, whirling the occupant through many countries, giving at once the sense of rapid movement and of changeful beauty. His very inconsistencies and the aphoristic habit are a help in this respect.² Many of his books—though not the best—can be opened and read for a minute or two and convey in this way both light and artistic pleasure.

¹ Fouillée, *Avant-Propos*, VI. The following passage is a good instance of this.

“Wir sind die ersten Aristokraten in der Geschichte der Geister—der historische Sinn beginnt erst jetzt.” (Nietzsche, XI, 217.)

² “Les aphorismes conviennent à un public qui n’a ni le temps ni les moyens de rien approfondir et qui s’en fie volontiers aux feuilles sibyllines, surtout si elles sont poétiques au point de lui paraître inspirées. L’absence même de raisonnement et de preuve régulière prête au dogmatisme négateur un air d’autorité qui impose à la foule des demi-instruits, littérateurs, poètes, musiciens, amateurs de tous genres. Des paradoxes en apparence originaux donnent à qui les accepte l’illusion flatteuse de l’originalité.” (Fouillée, *Avant-Propos*, IV.)

This must be the case with a genius so essentially pyrotechnic, with rockets and Roman candles, and then the more elaborate set pieces, to attract the deep "Oh" of the crowd. For, although he despised the crowd, it is to the crowd and to some of the characteristics of an age of vulgar machinery that Nietzsche owes part of his popularity.

Not that he does not deserve it as a writer. He worked at style. Early in his life he declared that he was mastered by the Categorical Imperative: Thou must write.¹ Nor must we call him a spontaneous artist. That note of the inevitable, of inspiration, is the end, not the beginning—it is the flash of insight that comes at the end of long, almost hopeless toil, the brilliant vision that is the reward of torments both of body and spirit. Plainly he declares that none but fools can suppose that writ-

¹ "Der Kategorische Imperativ, 'Du sollst und musst schreiben,' hat mich aufgeweckt. . . .

"Es sei schwer gut zu schreiben, von Natur habe kein Mensch ein guten Stil, man müsse arbeiten und hartes Holz bohren, ihn zu erwerben." (*Briefe*, I, 52.)

ing is easy. He is right; what a pity they do not abstain from publishing! Countless gibes he casts at the Germans for their heavy feet in literature. Their clumsy and awkward notion of style is a source to him of frequent merriment. No one who had so high a regard for French culture would be likely to underrate the value of polish. Nietzsche, moreover, is well aware that great style is an imaginative quality, not mere statement. Mr. Bernard Shaw has done much to popularise Nietzsche by "Man and Superman." Yet the two writers are poles apart. Mr. Shaw may seem a poet to the German Chancellor. That is akin to his other "errors." Somewhere or other Mr. Shaw declared that "effectiveness of statement is the one quality of good writing." Were this true, we ought all to go to school to that new genre in literature—advertisement. Nietzsche saw just the opposite. Writing is akin to music. It is an appeal to the subconscious more than to the logical faculty. Other-

wise mathematical treatises would be the noblest literature, and the writer of an index or a synopsis superior in many cases to his original. Language is used sometimes, and Mr. Shaw lends colour to this view, if he does not reach it, which would imply that there would be little lost if, instead of the thirteenth chapter of First Corinthians, we had some such abstract as the following:

Love, described by St. Paul, characteristics of,
more excellent than other gifts;
superior to (a) eloquence,
 (b) martyrdom,
 (c) faith,
 (d) giving charity,
their worthlessness without love, as illustrated by (a) brass (b) cymbals;
its enduring quality;
self-emptying;
faith, hope, in what way inferior;
illustrated by author's own growth from child to adult.

This dilemma, or something like it, is what lies before the numerous people who regard themselves as superior to the style

prejudice and condemn a work in proportion as it is well written. Nietzsche, who made so much of the rhythmic element, the dance, knew very well that language is a sacrament of the soul, and that style is good or bad in proportion as it is able to communicate this. He declares it in his love of musical terms to be the communication by means of the rhythm and colour of words of a certain *tempo*—*i. e.*, the creation of a condition in the reader—emotional, imaginative, and intellectual. In another place he says: “My style is a dance.”

In the degree in which this is done we have really great writing. Most writing fails in this, because it is too conventional, not always because the writers do not feel greatly. In early days all writing tends to become a cento of conventional phrases, *e. g.*, children’s letters. Only later on does self-expression in any degree become possible. That other ideal of Mr. Shaw means self-expression of a kind, but only of one kind—it assumes that all of us are per-

petually in debate, and that some form or other of platform speaking is the end. Even here, when platform speaking reaches a high point, it passes with an orator into something like poetic communication. Nietzsche's interest as a writer comes partly from this power of placing discussions, apparently academic, in a setting of beauty and imagination. This is manifest in one of Nietzsche's earliest works, a course of lectures delivered at Basle on *The Future of Our Educational Institutions*. The picture of the meeting of the two students with the old professor and his friend, and the overhearing of their conversation provides at once a scene into which the reader can enter with sympathy. Akin to this is another quality, which comes of Nietzsche's passionate one-sidedness. Not only has he come to see everything in a unity, but he forces the reader to do so, and persuades him before he is aware. Some dialecticians will quietly assume premises which cut off nearly all

the objections of their interlocutor. Not by dialectic, but through the force of their personality they prevent him remembering these objections by driving all his energies to defend what is really some side-issue. Thus they win an easy victory. In the field, thus artificially limited, they are right. Some of Nietzsche's charm is due to this method. In the *Genealogy of Morals* or *Antichrist* he commonly discerns some motive really operative among certain people, *e. g.*, resentment at weakness. Then by his own chosen one-sidedness he isolates this factor and by the force of his personality prevents the casual reader from seeing any other. To a mind at all trained, his early history of the Jewish people and of early Christianity is a travesty of the facts, no less than the attempt to make our Lord the preacher of a Tolstoyan Gospel of Quietism. Nietzsche owed to Tolstoy and to Schopenhauer more than he supposed. His account of the personality of Christ is merely a work of imagina-

tion; it ignores all the sterner side and takes him as a preacher of non-resistance pure and simple.

To take another instance. *The Will to Power* truly expresses an important element in all life; nor is it by a process of far-fetched interpretation altogether impossible to reduce everything to scale. The attempt, on the whole, is no whit different from that of the hedonist, whom Nietzsche despised, to explain all human action by the motive of pleasure-seeking. The process of interpretation in each case has to be so elaborate as to deprive it of all value. In *The Will to Power* the skill of Nietzsche is shown not so much in the expression of his principle, as in the passion of personal faith which possessed him, and in his very contempt of demonstrative reasoning. The reader who sees a little and says, "That is true; I had not seen it before," is carried forward on a sea of criticism, epigram, eloquence, and passionate prophecy. Long before his crit-

ical faculty is awakened he may be swept into the current.

All this springs from the fact we spoke of earlier. Nietzsche is a dogmatist and a preacher. In one place he said that any one born with an ancestry of preachers will tend to be dogmatic, to a "thus said the Lord" method of discourse. In another he alludes to his being descended from a line of Lutheran pastors. Certainly his writings afford evidence of his own theory. The closing passage of his early piece on Wagner reads like the peroration of a sermon.

While he is dogmatic and abusive, he does not claim to be final. Superpapal almost in his notion of infallibility, he regards even the uttering of truth as an adventure, and disclaims all idea of system. The desire for proof, the anxiety of scientific or statistical men for mathematical certainty he declares to be a sign of counting-house blood. Science is the creation of fear, while art comes from courage.

People whose fathers and grandfathers were clerks must always be coming to conclusions. This is the foundation, this and timidity, of the passion for certitude and for the mechanical card-catalogue method of knowledge. In truth nothing is certain; all our theories are thoughts thrown out at a great subject; we must go on always creators, ever ready for fresh adventures, "never resting in a facile orthodoxy of Comte or Hegel or of our own." You remember the famous epilogue in which Walter Pater, writing from the opposite standpoint, that of pure hedonism, declared that "one must ever go on courting new impressions, testing new opinions." So Nietzsche disclaimed all idea of disciples, merely repeating his catchwords; what he wants is a new spirit, fresh and creative minds.

That, perhaps, is his greatest charm. He set men free. The last age was overcome by the tyranny of determinism. What is known as scientific fatalism had

hold of it. A method which in natural science was fruitful was thought sufficient for a philosophy of life. Freedom was denied, and all history and even individual life was made to consist of links in a chain of inevitable development. Evolution was treated as a process entirely mechanical.

Nietsche's own words are worth citing:

“*The belief in willing.* To believe that a thought may be the cause of a mechanical movement is to believe in miracles. The *consistency of science* demands that, once we have made the world *thinkable* for ourselves by means of pictures, we should also make the emotions, the desires, the will, etc., *thinkable*—that is to say, we should *deny* them, and treat them as *errors of the intellect*.”¹

It was hoped to explain all events mathematically and to deduce the whole history of the world, including man, from

¹ *The Will to Power*, II, 143.

the inevitable clash of physical forces. This, I suppose, was the faith of Herbert Spencer, and was expounded in the famous words of Tyndall about the genius of a Shakespeare being potential in the fires of the sun. It found classical expression in the words of Du Bois-Reymond, about getting an abstract account of the course of things in a few differential equations.

Nowadays, M. Bergson and many others, including some men of science, have propounded a theory of evolution radically different. We are told that it is essentially creative; that freedom is the aim. Freedom in some degree pervades the world. Its growth is neither inevitable nor mechanical. As to the future, we can be nowhere assured of aught but a high probability.

Nietzsche is one of the influences which have helped in this direction, and ministered to the self-criticism of science.¹ Prac-

¹ *Werke*, XIII, 85, § 213: "Die Entwicklung der mechanistisch-atomistischen Denkweise ist sich heute ihres nothwendigen Ziels immer noch nicht bewusst—das ist mein Eindruck nachdem ich lange genug ihren Anhängern zwischen die Finger gesehen habe.

tically, though not theoretically, his philosophy is a doctrine of freedom. Doctor Wolf holds that Nietzsche allows a small degree of freedom to all. But this is doubtful. If everything be driven by a blind will to power, how can there be any real freedom? It is the same with materialism. Nietzsche not only denies any metaphysical entity, but he speaks of the soul as the companion and echo of the body. This seems like pure materialism. Yet Nietzsche denies alike materialism and determinism. He does profess an uncompromising naturalism, and it is difficult to see how he can escape from either of these two.

Yet it is freedom he cares for. His assertion of the reality of life leads right away from determinism, and his perpetual imperative is: Act as though thou art free. Since Nietzsche in his *Genealogy of Morals* throws scorn on the notion of

Sie wird mit der Schaffung eines Systems von Zeichen endigen: sie wird auf Erklären verzichten, sie wird den Begriff, 'Ursache und Wirkung,' aufgeben."

moral responsibility, it is hard to see how any freedom which he teaches amounts to much. It is always conceived as mere animal energy, the butting against his fellows by the splendid blond beast. Yet it remains the fact that, whether consistently or the reverse, Nietzsche has had to many the charm of an apostle of freedom as against a mechanical conception of development. At bottom, as M. Bergson has pointed out, a world in which there is no freedom, but everything proceeds necessarily out of the chain of events, is a dead world—a clock running down. Now, the *Eternal Recurrence* may seem to favour such a view even on the part of Nietzsche. But at least its effect is opposite—it is a sense of creative activity in art, in life, and in thought. Whatever be the defects of a doctrine of mere power, there is no question that to convinced adherents of the naturalistic view of the world, Nietzsche comes as preaching a gospel of hope and deliverance, whereas

in its more common form that doctrine leads to a chilling fatalism. Just as Nietzsche forward a positive instead of a negative sense of moral duty, so he ministers to a positive as against a negative and depressed atheism. His charm, then, is this: without any taint of orthodoxy, free, as he claims, not only of all Christian but of all idealist or moralist tradition, realist to the core, he delivers his disciple from the tyranny not only of the Heaven above, but also of the earth beneath. He is to live as though nothing were inevitable, as master, not slave, of the universe, finding in it, even if he is worsted, a noble foe, ready for the new, the unknown, the exceptional, climbing daily fresh Alpine heights of danger—enslaved neither to priest nor to philosopher, nor even to scientific dogmatist. Jacob earned his royal title by wrestling with a supernatural being; Nietzsche, who denies the supernatural, would win for his pupils a like principality by teaching them to wrestle

with natural reality. Rightly or wrongly, many have won this way a sense of freedom, of the worth of life, and of trying.

All this is bound up with his attack on logic. Nietzsche was by no means the first of the modern protesters against hyperintellectualism. The vogue of William James, of Henri Bergson, and of many others is proof that he is far from the last. The common sense of the man in the street has never indeed believed in the claim of mere logic to decide all things. He has always protested in the name of reality against rationalism, has believed with Lotze that reality is richer than thought, and with Pascal that the heart has its reasons which the intellect cannot penetrate. Or, to put it in ordinary language, the instinct of the normal man or woman tells him how much greater a force is to be found in the subconscious and inarticulate elements of life than in those which can be docketed and defined. Nietzsche's contribution to this was real.

He attempted to discover the origin of logic, and to get behind the mystery of language. Probably the most useful piece in all his psychological work is this effort to shew how language originates in the attempt to control the flux of becoming. (This is found largely in the later works, especially *The Will to Power*, and also in the thirteenth and fourteenth volumes, which give collected fragments.) After this men begin to hypostatise divisions invented with an object entirely practical. Then they go on to assume that to be fixed which is eternally changing, and unconsciously to invent a whole world of substance-Being. Nietzsche marks that revolution which man's attitude to thinking would assume the moment people began seriously to apply the notion of evolution to the inner world of thought and its outcome in language.

Nor indeed will in future even orthodox theology decline to admit some of the results of this change. The crystalline

idea of God as an impassible Absolute is largely responsible for the popular belief in a dead God. Christianity, by its doctrine of the Trinity, is a denial of this, and pictures God much more in the way suggested by the phrase of Aristotle: as *ἐνέργεια ἀκινησίας*.¹ The changeless life of God is Love; but in the Christian view this is compatible with racing activity and postulates variety. Christianity at least has nothing to fear from the supersession of the static conception of God to one which is dynamic.²

This tendency may be just now exaggerated, and too much stress laid on the element of becoming. Yet it cannot be denied that in this matter Nietzsche, so far from being *unzeitgemässe*, was eminently in accord with the evolutionary tendencies of this age. Some of what he says about the trend of science seems to herald much of what we hear of in connection with the

¹ Cf. C. P. S. Schiller's essay on this topic in *Humanism and Other Essays*.

² Cf. Baron von Hügel's criticism of Bergson.

electronic theory of matter, with the splitting up of the molecules into the infinitely smaller ions, with the theory that all matter is ultimately electricity. Also his general standpoint seems to favour the claim nowadays put forward, that science does not explain, but merely describes. The following passage affords an illustration of this:

“Of all the interpretations of the world attempted heretofore the *mechanical* one seems to-day to stand most prominently in the front. Apparently it has a clean conscience on its side, for no science believes inwardly in progress and success unless it be with the help of mechanical procedures. Every one knows these procedures: ‘reason’ and ‘purpose’ are allowed to remain out of consideration as far as possible; it is shown that, provided a sufficient amount of time be allowed to elapse, everything can evolve out of everything else, and no one at-

tempts to suppress his malicious satisfaction when the 'apparent design in the fate' of a plan or of the yolk of an egg may be traced to stress and thrust—in short, people are heartily glad to pay respect to this principle of profoundest stupidity, if I may be allowed to pass a playful remark concerning these serious matters. Meanwhile, among the most select intellects to be found in this movement, some presentiment of evil, some anxiety is noticeable, as if the theory had a rent in it, which sooner or later might be its last: I mean the sort of rent which denotes the end of all balloons inflated with such theories.

“Stress and thrust themselves cannot be ‘explained’; one cannot get rid of the *actio in distans*. The belief even in the ability to explain is now lost, and people peevishly admit that one can only describe, not explain, that the dynamic interpretation of the world, with its denial of ‘empty space,’ and its

little agglomerations of atoms, will soon get the better of physicists: although in this way *Dynamic* is certainly granted an inner quality.”¹

Other factors in Nietzsche's success are to be considered. With the decay of rhetoric and the period, men have come to like the electric style. Nietzsche knew this, and is for ever switching on bright lights. There is no repose in it, no majesty, little balance. A French critic² is hardly unjust when he declares:

“En somme, un style mêlé, baroque, inégal, riche et même somptueux en images, passionné hors de mesure dans l'expression, toujours courant après l'excessif, l'inédit, l'inéprouvé, toujours *par delà*, un style merveilleusement 'ondoyant et divers' comme l'homme même dont il nous restitue la singulière et vivante image.”

¹ *The Will to Power*, II, 109.

² Pallarès, 151.

This style recalls the Greeks as little as it does Cicero. It is an amalgam of thrills, of sudden changes, of strange fire—all as in a very pure air. There is little or no humour, unless we think this is humorous:

“Once Spirit was God; then it became man, now it is mob.”

“Concubinage has been corrupted by marriage.”

“It is a curious thing that God learned Greek when He wished to turn author, and that he did not learn it better.”

“The great moments of our life are at the points when we gain courage to rebaptise our badness as the best in us.”

He has a great gift of epigram. But his style, though brilliant, has no repose, and is fatiguing to read for long. Strings of aphorisms are rarely attractive. La Rochefoucauld had an ill influence on Nietzsche. He hoped to be a sort of super-Roche-

foucauld. But he lacked the essential quality. He was not a man of the world. That is what distinguishes him alike from La Rochefoucauld and from Stendhal. His paradoxes and even his blasphemies are the difficult effort of a child trying to be naughty. He is not selfish enough to be profoundly cynical. There is always something of the eternal undergraduate about Nietzsche. The undergraduate is not insincere. But he honestly believes himself more shocking than he is. He is astounded alike at his cleverness, his melancholy, and his profundity. A little later he learns that all clever young men go through this phase. But as compared with his French models Nietzsche is always too much of a preacher, too profoundly moral even in his immoralism.

Yet he has great qualities. He lights up the bypaths of history and criticism. To glance through a volume of Nietzsche is to obtain a number of *aperçus* on everything under the sun, for nothing in

heaven or earth but bears somehow upon the main theme—the future of culture. “Europe is necessary to me as a culture-museum,” he said to his sister, when she wanted him to go and live in Paraguay. Nietzsche himself was a culture-museum. All peoples, nations, and languages he lays under contribution. In a few pages we come upon bits of criticism about music, about philosophy, from Buddha to Avenarius, about poetry from the Vedas to Leopardi, about the theory of art, the goal of world politics, or the bearing of digestion upon authorship. His books are bright with many memories. Reading Nietzsche conveys a pleasing sense of familiarity with all that can be called culture. That is as far as many people want to go.

Probably it is the apocalyptic prophecy of a new age that wins him disciples, as distinct from admirers. He is, as we saw, essentially a prophet, a seer. People had got tired of the nineteenth century before

it closed. At the outset of the twentieth they wanted not so much to be as to feel new. Nietzsche gave them this feeling. He is the John of the Baptism of the new kingdom.

“Repent,” he might cry, “of your absurd morality. Rend all your garments, and live naked to the real wind. Rid yourself of shams; away with your conventional lies, your worship of comfort, your domestic pettiness, and above all your wallowing in pity. Be something. Look down, down on the herd, which you disown. Kill all this sentimental culture, this passion of the past, and join in the great gamble for the future, when every valley shall be a gulf, and every hill a Himalaya; when the crooked shall be twisted round, and the rough places become rocks. For Man, Man alone, shall be exalted in that day—for the Superman cometh, he cometh to judge the world, and with violence shall he rule the world

and reprove with terror for the proud of the earth."

This note of appeal to the will, this sense that mankind is in the making, ushered in the twentieth century. The spirit of scepticism, of decadence had hold of many, or else a mere conservatism. Nietzsche was like the wild northeaster, and he was, in his own words, "the voice of the day after to-morrow."¹

On one side of its culture, the nineteenth century was pre-eminently the age of historical sentiment. This sentiment, the *passion of the past*, is a noble thing. It is not really a hopeful thing to try to throw away the achievements of the race. Yet historical interest may be overdone. Either it becomes mere sentimentalism, or culture becomes a jumble of memories. This is indicated by Nietzsche in a passage of *Beyond Good and Evil*:

¹ "Ich würde den härtesten Despotismus (als Schule für die Geschmeidigkeit des Geistes) noch eher gut heissen, als die feuchte, laue Luft eines 'pressfreien' Zeitalters, in dem aller Geist bequem und dumm wird, und die Glieder streckt." (Nietzsche, *Werke*, XIV, 397.)

“This historical sense which we Europeans claim as our speciality has come to us in the train of the enchanting and mad *semibarbarity* into which Europe has been plunged by the democratic mingling of classes and races—it is only the nineteenth century that has recognised this faculty as its sixth sense. Owing to this mingling, the past of every form and mode of life, and of cultures which were formerly closely contiguous and superimposed on one another, flows forth into us modern souls; our instincts now run back in all directions, we ourselves are a kind of chaos; in the end, as we have said, the spirit perceives its advantage therein. By means of our *semibarbarity* in body and in desire we have secret access everywhere, such as a noble age never had; we have access, above all, to the labyrinth of imperfect civilisations and to every form of *semibarbarity* that has at any time existed on earth; and in so far as the most considerable part of human

civilisation hitherto has just been 'semi-barbarity,' the historical sense implies almost the sense and instinct for everything, the taste and tongue for everything; whereby it immediately proves itself to be an *ignoble* sense. . . . Let us finally confess it, that what is most difficult for us men of the 'historical sense' to grasp, feel, taste, and love, what finds us fundamentally prejudiced and almost hostile, is precisely the perfection and ultimate maturity in every culture and art, the essentially noble in works and men, their moment of smooth sea and halcyon self-sufficiency, the goldenness and coldness which all things show which have perfected themselves."¹

This ministers to the turning away from first-hand experience, and applies to all who look on life merely as spectators, like the Lady of Shalott, seeing only shadows in the mirror. The sense of this danger

¹ *Beyond Good and Evil*, 167, 169.

was ever present with Nietzsche. It is expressed in the finest of the *Essays Out of Season*, and may be found also in the chapter of *Zarathustra* on "The Country of Culture." Further, an overgrowth of historical sentiment may lead to a throttling conservatism, and a refusal to cut new lines when they are needed, the attempt to solve problems essentially new by an appeal to precedent. Nietzsche refused, and by refusing strengthened the tendency to resist this. The present generation is nervously anxious not to resemble its parents. Thus it has found refreshment in Nietzsche's call to new adventure, and his effort to sum up the religion and culture of several millenniums. He gives the impression that we are now done with the era that began with Socrates, flowered into Christianity, and culminated in the French Revolution; that a new age of human culture is to begin, and that it is ours to make.

To this end courage is needed, and a

great soul; the sense that will is omnipotent, that pain is irrelevant and indeed a tonic, and that we are tied to nothing. This appeal to the heroic, taking a thousand forms, and proclaimed with prophetic urgency came with force to an age, which believed itself only at the beginning of the conquest of the material world and sighed for the open air. It is an appeal essentially romantic, nor, if properly explained, is it other than wholesome.

Yet though it be romantic, it is or claims to be realist. That gives its force to Nietzsche's call to recognise morality for what it is, to look below the screen of language which conceals reality, to blow off with the wind of criticism the haze of sentiment, in which men disguise their egotism, to take account of force. This call came like a trumpet-call to an age dominated by *Realpolitik*, or else by an economic struggle, which is the same thing under the protection of the police. The fact that Nietzsche repudiated alike the

economist's ideal and the statesman's only gave him a greater leverage. *The Will to Power* in its natural meaning has the simplicity and also the demerits of all purely cynical estimates. But it came as a relief to the languor induced by the moral scepticism of the *fin de siècle*. It assured many of the worth of life and courage without any taint of other-worldly idealism. Nietzsche appealed to a very powerful motive, the sense of distinction. He addresses himself to the Higher Men.

“Here is little of man; therefore women try to make themselves manly. For only he who is enough of a man will *save the woman in woman*.”¹

As we saw earlier, this notion of distinction, so far from being denied, is in reality enhanced by the Christian doctrine of individual worth. Any writer is sure of a hearing who claims for his adherents the few, the rare spirits—just as a hotel

¹ *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, 248.

may win the multitude by calling itself "the select hotel." Browning and Meredith owed something of their vogue to this form of snobbishness, and it frequently makes the fortune of some outrageous artist. Many people bought Browning not because to them he was delightful, but because to others he was difficult. Nietzsche owed much of his vogue to this desire to be thought superior, although neither in his nor in the other cases is it any measure of real worth. Most of his more clamorous disciples would disgust him, no less than the Browning Society disgusted the poet. For all that, intellectual and æsthetic coxcombry has found much on which to preen itself in *Zarathustra*. Neither riches nor birth in the usual sense are needed for Nietzsche's Higher Man. Any one, therefore, who feels so disposed, can claim that he has the characteristics of the future lords of the world.

The following passages serve to illustrate this:

“Such accusers of life—they are overcome by life with a blinking of the eye. ‘Thou lovest me?’ saith the impudent one. ‘Wait a little; I have no time yet for thee.’

“Man is the cruellest animal towards himself. And in all who call themselves ‘sinners’ and ‘bearers of the cross’ and ‘penitents,’ ye shall not fail to hear the lust contained in that complaining and accusing!

“And myself?—will I thereby be the accuser of man? Alas, mine animals, that alone I have learnt hitherto, that the wickedest in man is necessary for the best in him; that all that is wicked, is his best *power* and the hardest stone unto the highest creator; and that man must become better *and* more wicked.

“Not unto *that* stake of torture was I fixed, that I know: man is wicked. But I cried, as no one hath ever cried: ‘Alas, that his wickedest is so very small! Alas, that his best is so very small!’

“The great loathing of man—it choked

me, it had crept into my throat, and what the fortune-teller foretold: 'All is equal, nothing is worth while, knowledge choketh.'

"A long dawn limped in front of me, a sadness weary unto death, drunken from death, and speaking with a yawning mouth.

"Eternally he recurreth, man, of whom thou weariest, the small man. Thus yawned my sadness and dragged its foot and could not fall asleep."¹

"Of the convicts guilty of riches, who collect their profit out of all rubbish heaps, with cool eyes and voluptuous thoughts—of that rabble that stinketh unto heaven,—

"Of that gilded-over, falsified mob, whose fathers were thieves or birds of carrion, or rag-gatherers with wives complaisant, voluptuous, and forgetful (for none of them hath a far way to go to become a whore);

¹ *Ibid.* p. 326.

“‘Mob at the top, mob below ! What are to-day “poor” and “rich” ? This distinction have I unlearned. Then I fled away, further, ever further, until I came unto these cows.’

“Thus spake the peaceful one, and snuffed himself, and perspired over his words, so that the cows wondered again. But Zarathustra, all the time the man was speaking so bitterly, gazed with a smile into his face, and silently shook his head.

“‘Thou dost violence unto thyself, thou mount-preacher, in using such bitter words. For such bitterness neither thy mouth nor thine eye was made.

“‘Nor, methinketh, even thy stomach. Unto *it* all such anger and hatred and overflowing are repugnant. Thy stomach desireth gentler things. Thou art not a butcher.

“‘Thou rather seemest unto me to be an eater of plants and roots. Perhaps thou grindest corn. But certainly thou

art averse from the pleasures of the flesh and thou lovest honey.' ”¹

Immoralism is always attractive. Freedom from dependence on any kind of authority has charm for many. The Nietzsche worshipper is peculiarly happy. Not only is he at liberty to bait Christians²—a common pastime for the *intellectual*—but he can pour scorn on the solemn academic moralists who have often supposed themselves to be new, because they are infidels. Nietzsche laughs at them and says that they are Christians without the excuse of faith, and condemns all under the rubric of the spirit of gravity. What he says about the spirit of gravity is true. Pious folk would do well to note this.

That charm as of naughtiness, the toy-smashing child, stands for much. But it

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 401.

² “Il est permis de penser que son antichristianisme en morale fut l'un des auxiliaires les plus précieux de la renommée tardive du philosophe qui intitule à l'antichrétien sa dernière production littéraire. La morale chrétienne comme les choses très anciennes et très mêlées à la vie a tant d'ennemis conscients ou inconscients. Les tendances ne furent pas étrangères sans doute à l'intervention de M. Brandes.” (Seillières, *Apollon ou Dionysos*, 210.)

is not all. Many persons had been directing their lives to ends deliberately anti-Christian. Such men were rejoiced when a writer of power and passion expressed their feelings. Others were pleased with his attacks on priests. They have a pleasurable malice in this superior form of amusement known in Paris as *épater le bourgeois*. Others, without sharing their convictions are stimulated. Indeed, the thrill of Nietzsche is possible to many who have no mind for his philosophy.

What that thrill precisely is it is hard to say. It is not mere poetry; nor prophecy; nor his terrific sincerity; nor his vision; nor his acuteness of criticism, his amazing variety; nor his iridescent epigram. Probably it is something personal. His bewildering changes, the kaleidoscopic quality adds to that sense of exhilaration, as of drinking champagne, with which he is read. True, his nerves are naked. But nowadays people like naked nerves.

Dionysos is his own word for it—the

spirit of the dancer. I could not believe, he said, in a God who could not dance. In this once more he is nearer to Christianity than he knew. There is an interesting mediæval poem in which the whole plan of salvation is entitled "The general dance." It is as the tight-rope dancer living dangerously on a line strung between precipices amid eternal snows that Nietzsche is so much of a "wonder, a beauty, and a terror." In a new age, very childlike, he calls to all with the spirit of youth, to try all experiments, to shrink back neither for fear nor for love, neither for God nor for man, neither for good nor for evil. This call, together with his strange, mystical sense of the eternal in the transient and, therefore, the value of the moment; this paradox of the ungodly who yet worships, of the immoralist who preaches self-control, of the Antichrist who could mount the Cross, the iconoclast who could yet set up a religion, this it is which gives to Friedrich Nietzsche a

charm that will outlast all the febrile puerilities of his attack on Christianity and all the superficial snobbery of his contempt for the common man. One of the best illustrations will be found in the "Song of the Seven Seals":

"If I myself am a grain of that redeeming salt that maketh all things mix well in the vessel of mixture;

"(For there is a salt that bringeth together what is good and what is evil; and even the wickedest is worthy of serving as seasoning and as a means for the last foaming-over.)

"Oh! how could I fail to be eager for eternity and for the marriage ring of rings, the ring of recurrence?

"Never yet have I found the woman by whom I should have liked to have children, unless it be this woman I love. For I love thee, O Eternity!

"For I love thee, O Eternity !

"If I am fond of the sea, and of all

that is of the sea's kin, and if I am fondest if it contradicteth me angrily;

“If that seeking lust is within me that driveth the sails after the undiscovered; if there is a sailor's lust in my lust;

“If my rejoicing hath ever cried: ‘The shore hath disappeared! Now the last chain hath fallen down from me!

““The limitless roareth round me! Far, far away shine unto me space and time! Up! upward, old heart!’

“Oh! how could I fail to be eager for eternity and for the marriage ring of rings, the ring of recurrence?

“Never yet have I found the woman by whom I should have liked to have children, unless it be this woman I love. For I love thee, O Eternity!

“*For I love thee, O Eternity!*”¹

¹*Ibid.*, p. 344.

VI

THE DANGER AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NIETZSCHE

CERTAIN dangers attach to the doctrine of Nietzsche. Whether or no the writer intended them is irrelevant. They arise naturally out of his teaching, provided men are found to take in earnest his claim to be a moral revolutionary. Every teacher must be held responsible for the natural consequences of his teaching, however little he intended all of them. Some of these consequences Nietzsche did intend. Others he did not. In any case Nietzsche is guilty of them unless he took pains to avoid them. Moreover it is not certain that the more extreme interpretation of his doctrine is wrong. In his work on *The Quintessence of Nietzsche*, Mr. J. M. Kennedy propounds the following genial suggestion for the treatment of the poor:

“It will in time inevitably be recognised that the distinction between masters and slaves must be made more apparent, must be more generally admitted than it now is. Instead of the lowest classes in society receiving wages and keeping up their pseudo-independence, *they must be trained to submit themselves as property.*”¹

The two completed plays of the late John Davidson's *Mammon Trilogy* are even surer evidence. Mr. Davidson thought that Nietzsche did not go far enough. Still, of the source of his doctrine of triumphant power reintroducing the rack there can be no question. Much of Nietzsche can be interpreted in a less barbarous way. But his own professed disciples afford evidence that for the most part this interpretation is non-natural. A German, Doctor Brahm, has written this year a pamphlet to prove that the Germans, and more espe-

¹ Kennedy, *The Quintessence of Nietzsche*, 347.

cially Hindenburg, have full right to the privileges of the superman.¹

Some of the dangers lurking in his doctrine Nietzsche seems to have felt. Hence his oft-repeated assertion that his writings (in the final period) are directed solely to the master class of the future. That proviso cannot help him. Since this class is to be recruited from all higher men irrespective of existing social arrangements, any one may deem himself a higher man, "beyond good and evil."

The first danger is an unbridled individualism. Nietzsche's assertion that morality is due to the herd instinct is coupled with the view that the higher man, and still more the superman of the future, is by the law of his being released

¹ "Wie der Genius alle Kultur rechtfertigt, so ist es denn schliesslich auch die letzte Form der Heiligung der Kriegesclasse ohne die der militärische Genius nicht geschaffen wurde. Wenn gerade in den Zeiten des Krieges so häufig auffällt dass ein Mann wie Hindenburg dahin gegangen wäre, ohne seine letzten Qualitäten zum Ausdruck gebracht zu haben, wäre der Krieg nicht gekommen, so meint Nietzsche genau das Gleiche wenn er den Krieg schon daraus rechtfertigt, dass er dem militärischen Genius die Möglichkeit der Entfaltung gibt." (Brahm, *Friedrich Nietzsches Meinungen.*)

from all these restrictions. This doctrine forms and is bound to form an incentive to oppression. Every little poetaster may fancy himself one of the select. An able man may justify almost any breach of social obligation by an appeal to Nietzsche. Speaking once of a certain course of conduct pursued by an able man as base, I was met by the rejoinder: "I think Nietzsche would have approved of it." The temptations to men of talent to win success by crooked methods are strong. In all ages many give way to them. Hitherto such lapses have been blamed. Now they can be justified by the authority of a great name. Nietzsche admitted that according to all existing standards his superman is a criminal.

True, Nietzsche made clear that he did not teach what in the narrower sense is called license. Yet the Christian ideal of chastity he treats with scorn. His disciples may claim to be excused, if they go somewhat farther than their master.

Once teach that all moral restraints are without meaning save for the herd, and it is no wonder if men place upon this a sinister application. Gabriele d'Annunzio is a professed follower of Nietzsche. The ideal which is stated or implied in his works needs no description. Nietzsche may not himself be guilty of affirming such perversity. Yet he can hardly be acquitted of having furthered it.

Let us pass on to consequences, which are more direct. Egoism he admits to be a quality of greatness. Even this is susceptible of a decent meaning, if we understand by it that an individual has his own end and is something more than a cog in the social machine. Altruism without qualification is ultimately destructive of individuality. Yet this minimising interpretation is far from obvious. Nietzsche's own admiration of Napoleon,¹

¹ The author of the pamphlet mentioned before makes a not unfair use of this fact to justify his identification of Hindenburg with the superman:

"Alexander den Grossen, Cäsar, Napoleon, später auch Bismarck, zitiert er wohl öfter als Shakespeare und Goethe." (Brahm, *Friedrich Nietzsches Meinungen über Staate und Kriege.*)

and still more of Machiavelli's hero, Cesare Borgia, does not favour such a gloss. His teaching appears to justify the utmost ruthlessness and treachery, if only it be displayed by the strong. Nietzsche despised the Philistine ideal of riches. Yet the question as to who is the superman or the forerunner of the superman is a question of fact. Even the Pope does not claim to be infallible in matters of fact. The point is not, who is the superman? but what may the person do who has reason to think himself such? Once Nietzsche's moral of the exploitation of the weak by the strong is accepted as a principle, any individual or group of individuals may say: "I, or at least my children, will be supermen. We therefore are beyond good and evil. Greatness, according to our Master, always goes along with social wickedness. Any means are right, if they lead to the supreme end. Therefore we are benefiting society, or at least ages to come, if we treat the mass of men with

contempt and throw to the winds all thoughts of pity or honesty." The non-moral company promoter, who achieves eminence in riches, by eminence in lying, the organisers of the slave trade, the oppressors of native races, the promoters of the Putumayo atrocities, all these might be condemned by Nietzsche himself. Yet they would find excuse in his principles:

"The way in which one has to treat raw savages and the impossibility of dispensing with barbarous methods becomes obvious in practice when one is transplanted, with all one's European pampering, to a spot such as the Congo, or anywhere else where it is necessary to maintain one's mastery over barbarians.

"*Warlike and peaceful people.*—Art thou a man who has the instincts of a warrior in thy blood? If this be so, another question must be put. Do thy instincts impel thee to attack or to

defend? The rest of mankind, all those whose instincts are not warlike, desire peace, concord, 'freedom,' 'equal rights': these things are but names and steps for one and the same thing. Such men only wish to go where it is not necessary for them to defend themselves—such men become discontented with themselves when they are obliged to offer resistance; they would fain create circumstances in which war is no longer necessary. If the worst came to the worst, they would resign themselves, obey, and submit; all these things are better than waging war—thus does the Christian's instinct, for instance, whisper to him. In the born warrior's character there is something of armour, likewise in the choice of his circumstances and in the development of every one of his qualities: weapons are best evolved by the latter type, shields are best devised by the former.

“What expedients and what virtues

do the unarmed and the undefended require in order to survive, and even to conquer?"¹

Instead of the humanisation of society, the getting rid of the habit of treating men as tools, "hands," we shall have all these evils enhanced a thousandfold—except in so far as they reduce the quantum of production. That this is so is shewn by the passage quoted above about the lower classes becoming mere property—perhaps the basest of all political ideals. It *ipso facto* denies them the quality of men. Worse dangers attach to Nietzsche's doctrine. It may seem commonplace to quote his words to warriors. But his words about loving peace "as a means to new wars" and "a good war justifying any cause"² are not so easily susceptible of a spiritual

¹ *The Will to Power*, II, 342.

² "Ye shall love peace as a means to new wars, and the short peace better than the long.

"I do not advise you to work, but to fight. I do not advise you to conclude peace, but to conquer. Let your work be a fight and your peace a victory.

"Ye say a good cause will hallow even war? I say unto you a good war halloweth every cause." *Zarathustra*, p. 60.

interpretation as the defenders of Nietzsche suppose. Even if they do refer to warfare of ideas, it is fair to say that when ideas get embodied in societies this warfare will be something more barbaric than mere debate.¹ Moreover, we must take also into account what he says elsewhere:

“Our psychologists, whose glance dwells involuntarily upon the symptoms of decadence, lead us to mistrust intellect ever more and more. People persist in seeing only the weakening, pampering, and sickening effects of intellect, but there are now going to appear:

New barbarians	{ Cynics Experimen- talists, Conquerors:	{ The union of intellectual superiority and of an overflow of strength.
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¹ The following passage seems to favour the view that Nietzsche might be referring to the warfare of ideas:

“Neue Form der Gemeinschaft: sich kriegerisch behauptend. Sonst wird der Geist matt. Keine ‘Gärten’ und blosses Aus-

“I point to something new: certainly for such a democratic community there is a danger of barbarians; but these are sought only down below. There is also *another kind of barbarians* who come from the heights: a kind of conquering and ruling natures, which are in search of material that they can mould. Prometheus was a barbarian of this stamp.

“*Principal standpoint*: one should not suppose the mission of a higher species to be the *leading* of inferior men (as Comte does, for instance); but the inferior should be regarded as the *foundation* upon which a higher species may live their higher life—upon which alone they *can stand*.”¹

“We must understand the fundamental artistic phenomenon which is called ‘Life’—the *formative* spirit, which contracts

weichen vor den Massen. Krieg (aber ohne Pulver)! zwischen verschiedenen Gedanken! und deren Heeren.

“Neuer Adel, durch Zuchtung. Die Gründungs-Feste von Familien.

“Der Tag neu eingetheilt: die körperlichen Übungen für aller Lebensalter. Der Wettkampf als Princip.” (*Werke*, XII, 368.)

¹ *The Will to Power*, 329.

under the most unfavourable circumstances: and in the slowest manner possible. The *proof* of all its combinations must first be given afresh: *it maintains itself*.

“Sexuality, lust of dominion, the pleasure derived from appearance and deception, great and joyful gratitude to Life and its typical conditions—these things are essential to all Paganism, and it has a good conscience on its side. *That which is hostile to Nature* (already in Greek antiquity) combats Paganism in the form of morality and dialectics.

“An antimetaphysical view of the world—yes, but an artistic one.

“*Apollo's* misapprehension: the eternity of beautiful forms, the aristocratic prescription, ‘*Thus shall it ever be!*’

“*Dionysos*: Sensuality and cruelty. The perishable nature of existence might be interpreted as the joy of procreative and destructive force, as *unremitting creation*.”¹

¹ *Ibid.*, 415.

“Such men as Napoleon must always return and always settle our belief in the self-glory of the individual afresh: he himself, however, was corrupted by the means he had to stoop to, and had *lost noblesse* of character. If he had had to prevail among another kind of men, he could have availed himself of other means; and thus it would not seem necessary that a Cæsar *must become bad*.

“Man is a combination of the *beast* and the *superbeast*; higher man a combination of the monster and the superman;¹ these opposites belong to each other. With every degree of a man’s growth towards greatness and loftiness he also grows downward into the depths and into the terrible: we should not desire the one without the other; or, better still, the more fundamentally we desire the one, the more completely we shall achieve the other.

¹ The play on the German words, “Unthier” and “Überthier,” “Unmensch” and “Übermensch,” is unfortunately not translatable.—Tr.

“Terribleness belongs to greatness: let us not deceive ourselves.

“I have taught the knowledge of such terrible things that all ‘Epicurean contentment’ is impossible concerning them. Dionysian pleasure is the only *adequate* kind here: *I was the first to discover the tragic*. Thanks to their superficiality in ethics, the Greeks misunderstood it. Resignation is not the lesson of tragedy, but only the misunderstanding of it! The yearning for nonentity is the *denial* of tragic wisdom, its opposite!”¹

If we add to this that he seems to attribute to this new, or rather old, god Dionysos the qualities of barbarism and sensuality, we may anticipate a fine crop of horrors if any persons or group of persons gets hold of the notion that he is *Übermensch*, or *Übervolk*. *Si monumentum quæris, circumspice*. That person or group might, in Nietzsche’s own judgment, be far from

¹ *Ibid.*, 405.

qualifying for the title. None the less could he excuse on Nietzsche's principles any ruse and every ruthless act.

Nietzsche said, when attacking Christianity, that its evil quality was not of necessity tied to that other worldly faith which he denied. That might be harmless enough, if only Christianity had not reversed the natural order of values and denied rank. Nietzsche's own principles should be applied here. Nominal Christians may be found who try to adapt their faith to the notion of a conquering race, which is in all but name the same as that of Nietzsche. Houston Stewart Chamberlain in the *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century* affords a cardinal instance of this. That work denies that humanity means anything at all, declaring all truth to lie in race-tyranny. He prophesies a new triumph for a rejuvenated Christianity, embodying the idea of a race-superiority. The import of Chamberlain's Nietzscheanised Christianity has recently become plain. Chamberlain is

not himself an admirer of Nietzsche. That does not affect the argument.

To take one more instance. Nietzsche was no lover of any existing state; still less of any form of nationalism. He declared the modern state to be that in which the slow suicide of all is called life. He regarded it as the refuge of the much too many, a dangerous means for helping the weak at the expense of the strong, thereby retarding that cosmopolitan Paradise in which the good European should be master, supported in a life of virtue, free from moralic acid, resting on a pyramid of slaves. What he says of the state in *Zarathustra* may be cited.

“What I call the state is where all are poison-drinkers, the good and the evil alike. What I call the state is where all lose themselves, the good and the evil alike. What I call the state is where the slow suicide of all is called ‘life.’”¹

¹ *Zarathustra*, 64.

Yet, on the other hand, his root principle is the will to power. Elsewhere he defines the state.

“The state, or *unmorality* organised, is from within—the police, the penal code, status, commerce, and the family; and from without, the will to war, to power, to conquest, and revenge.

“A multitude will do things an individual will not, because of the division of responsibility, of command, and execution; because the virtues of obedience, duty, patriotism, and local sentiment are all introduced; because feelings of pride, severity, strength, hate, and revenge—in short, all typical traits are upheld, and these are characteristics utterly alien to the herd-man.”¹

“The maintenance of the military state is the last means of adhering to the great tradition of the past, or, where it has been lost, to revive it. By means of it the superior or strong type of man

¹ *The Will to Power*, 184.

is preserved, and all institutions and ideas which perpetuate enmity and order of rank in states, such as national feeling, protective tariffs, etc., may on that account seem justified.”¹

Further, in politics, according to Nietzsche, perfection is to be found only on purely Machiavellian principles. He definitely prophesied the coming of that savagery so well named by M. Cambon “*La barbarie pédante*.”²

Is it not, then, obvious what is likely to happen if any state or nation adopts his views? It can assert that the State is Power, nothing else but Power. It can believe with Nietzsche that power is the one end of life. It may go on to proclaim itself free from all restraints in dealing with enemies and from every kind of limitation in dealing with its subjects or

¹ *Ibid.*, 189. “Die allgemeine Militärflichtigkeit ist schon heute das sonderbare Gegengift gegen die Weichlichkeit der demokratischen Ideen.” (Nietzsche. *Nachtrag*, 8, 497.)

² “Ein Zeitalter der Barbarei beginnt, die Wissenschaften werden ihm dienen.” (*Werke*, XII, 334.)

with religious and economic groups. Such was the inspiring motive of Napoleon, Nietzsche's ideal, the most gigantic egotist whom the world has ever known.

What we need to bear in mind is this: The question of fact as to where the germ of supermanity resides is one thing, and will be decided by each individual or group in accordance with its own wishes. If that question be decided in the affirmative, Nietzsche's ethic gives him a right to despise any kind of restraint, to claim everything as his due; to perpetrate barbarities and treacheries; to exploit the rest of the world as tools. On this ground it is hardly unfair to say that Nietzsche's doctrine is one of grave practical danger, however deeply Nietzsche might have despised those who would put it to the proof. Nietzsche's doctrine is a spirit rather than a code. Despite all qualifications, it is the spirit of pride in mere power, which believes that for powerful individuals or classes, and for these alone, "nothing is

true, all things are permitted"; which would deny all inherent reality to other persons or groups, treating them as things, as indeed on the naturalistic hypothesis they are.

Barbarism, however, is not the greatest danger of Nietzsche. His attack on mere peaceful domesticity is a reaction against a sophisticated culture. It may be claimed, even if it cannot be proved, that he is merely advocating a tragic view of life, with its due place for austerity. Alike in education and the state, a certain process of hardening is needful to manhood. His fear lest Europe should become a sort of China is not ignoble. How dull and Philistine appear to us the ideals of the mid-century utilitarians with their "bagman's Paradise"! Nietzsche represents the reaction against that. We need not altogether blame him if he expressed himself with misleading violence. Even his attack on pity is intended mainly as a rebuke to that sentimentalism in regard to pain which has tended to ruin discipline in

home, school, and state and to produce certain propaganda, such as vegetarianism on humanitarian grounds, or the more dangerous forms of Pacifism. Nietzsche, as we have said, agrees with Christianity in holding that fulness of life is the true aim, and that is never reached without suffering and, indeed, is sometimes stimulated by pain.

Nietzsche's danger is deeper than any apparent barbarism. It lies in the cult of pride, which he tends to stimulate. The young gentleman at college who prides himself on true culture will easily believe himself to be of the "artist-rulers." Among all men of gifts there is a tendency, only with difficulty kept down, to despise the mass of men. This tendency can be restrained only by much intercourse with those whose gifts are real but different. As life goes on, men tend more and more to associate with those of a like calling, artists, the professions, politics, writing, warfare, and so forth. This check is then

removed. The real danger of a philosophy of pride becomes apparent, and it can be seen to-day in the tone of contempt adopted by many modern critics towards any fashion in art and literature and philosophy which they do not happen to like. Nietzsche has stimulated all this by encouraging the individual with gifts to set himself against all authority. Probably he did not intend it, yet the undoubted effect of his influence is to stimulate excessive individualism in regard to all the higher things of the mind. Indeed, to many Nietzsche stands for such individualism, and for nothing else. Yet it was French culture with its genius for order which he admired most.

The main evil is, as was said in an earlier lecture, that Nietzsche, Prussian¹ most certainly in this respect, insists on concentrating attention on Power. However much of interpretation we may put upon

¹ "Diese Härte gegen sich, diese Unterordnung unter die Aufgabe, ist sie nicht preussisch-deutscher Geist? Hat man nicht Nietzsches geistiges Milieurecht das geistige Potsdam genannt?" (Brahm, 26.)

his writings, we cannot do away with the radical distinction between a gospel of Power and a gospel of Freedom. The fact that some think Nietzsche's gospel is to be understood "in a spiritual sense," so far from mitigating, only deepens the evil. A gospel of Power must lead on the part either of the individual or the class to a theory of egoism, of pride, and of tyranny. It is in its essence exclusive. A gospel of Freedom, must equally of course lead to a doctrine of tolerance, of humility; for freedom implies the recognition of others—power pure and simple is satisfied to use them as tools. The ideal of the one is embodied in the Roman conception of the *Imperium* in the head of the state, and of the absolute power over life and limb of the individual master over his "familia." The ideal of the other is for ever incarnate in the Christian doctrine of the State, as made up of more than one authority, of which each must respect the other because each is Divine, and in the Christian

conception of the individual, as having a limited freedom and bound by the golden rule, because "one is your Father and all ye are brethren." The one doctrine separates the man or class or state in whom Power is vested from all others, and superimposes it on the rest. The other recognises headship and inequality and rule, but all as a part of the membership "one of another," which is the essence alike of true citizenship and real churchmanship. Nothing can relieve Nietzsche from the stain of having stimulated the tendencies, already sufficiently strong, towards that essential evil of Paganism which we see at its worst in Nero and at its best in Diocletian. The Italian tyrants of the Renaissance, refined and cruel, are the true comment on this doctrine. It is not an otiose point that it is in such men that Nietzsche found the nearest approach to his ideal.¹ It is no defence to say that he

¹ He does in one place seem to imply that his master-class may live as careless Epicurean gods:

"Es ist durchaus nicht das Ziel die letzteren als die Herren

did not approve the material tortures, and that the "splendid blond beast" he only honoured in the past. For it is clear that, if he honoured the qualities displayed by these, he was deeper in his worship of them than one who only admired their power. The *Mammon* of John Davidson gives us the measure.

Nietzsche is a good tonic, but a bad food. Let us, finally, try to estimate the significance of Nietzsche. What will be his place in the history of European culture we cannot at this date predict. Some things, however, are certain. His importance lies in the fact that he heralded the break-up of the nineteenth century. He prophesied and partly produced the shattering of those ideals which seemed almost self-evident in that great movement which culminated in the Exhibition of 1851; Tennyson was the creature of his age, and spoke of the time:

der ersteren aufzufassen, sondern es sollte zwei Arten nebeneinander bestehen—möglichst getrennt, die eine wie die epikurischen Götter sich um die andre nicht kümmernd."

*When the war-drum throbbed no longer, and
the battle-flag was furled
In the Parliament of Man, the Federation of
the world.*

Tennyson, himself (and many others) became disillusioned. In "Locksley Hall," sixty years after, he left the record of this. All those ideals have exhibited their emptiness. Men have seen, as Carlyle and Ruskin said they would, that mere competition for money is no security for the higher goods of human culture. The problem of the poor, so far from being solved by the grant of the vote, is seen to be more terrific than ever. We contrast with the modern proletariat the happier lot of the feudal serf of the Middle Ages, who had his land, and by Magna Charta was secured in his "wainage." This disillusion has taken in many the form of socialism. In others it has become a sad conservatism, quite unlike the joyous toryism of old, which harked back to feudal ideals:—we see this sceptical disillusion in writers like Sir Henry Maine. Nietzsche

expressed this disillusion, but he went beyond it. His gift to the world is a gospel of hope.¹ He allows many people to hope, who, having given up the supernatural, would otherwise have sunk into gloom. War, also, it has been thought, would be shown to be a chimera, because it is so expensive. A rationalist world would settle down to eternal mutton-chops. Nietzsche saw through this falsity. So far from all grounds of quarrel coming to an end with the growth of great aggregations, they have increased. Now there has dawned upon men's minds the prospect of world-dominion. Here Nietzsche was prophetic.²

“The time for petty politics is past; the next century will bring the struggle for the

¹ “Und nun nachdem wir lange dergestalt unterwege waren, wir *Argonauten des Ideals*, muthiger vielleicht als klug ist, und oft genug schiffbrüchig und zu Schaden gekommen, aber wie gesagt, gesünder als man es uns erlauben möchte, gefährlich-gesund—immer wieder gesund—will es uns scheinen, als ob wir, zum Lohn dafür, ein noch unentdecktes Land vor uns haben, dessen Grenzen noch Niemand abgesehen hat, ein *Jenseits aller bisherigen* Länder und Winkel des Ideals, eine Welt so überreich an Schönem, Fremdem, Fragwürdigem, Furchtbarem und Göttlichem, dass unsere Neugierde, sowohl als unser Besitzdurst ausser sich gerathen sind—ach, dass wir nun durch Nichts mehr zu ersättigen sind.” (*Leben*, II, 450.)

² *Beyond Good and Evil*, 146.

dominion of the world—the compulsion to great politics.”

Nor is it easy to suppose, that words like this have been without effect in stimulating this desire for world-hegemony.

Nietzsche will occupy a place in the history of political ideals. Mr. Carlyle in the first chapter of his *History of Political Theory in the West*, describes the change that came over political thought between Aristotle and Cicero. Partly as a result of the conquests of Alexander and the Hellenisation of Asia and Egypt, partly from the beginnings of the Roman Empire, men had begun to believe in a cosmopolitan world-citizenship, based on that fundamental likeness between man and man of which Stoic and Christian ideals were the expression. This notion was at the back of the minds of the great Roman lawyers, who always asserted that slavery was a thing of convention and opposed to the law of nature. That belief held Europe until the French Revolution. It had much to

do with the feudal system, for in theory the serf differs *toto cœlo* from the slave. The church, which was opposed to slavery, had no objection to serfdom. There was nothing un-Christian in the feudal theory of the peasant. With the revived study of Roman law in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, the old evil reappeared, for lawyers began to work out logically the statements of the Code and the Digest. Since the serf was unfree, he was to be denied personality and treated as purely a chattel. That condition was partly the cause of the Peasants' Revolt in England, and later on of the Peasant War in Germany. There, as a result of Luther's influence, the lot of the peasant became worse for three centuries. Yet he was not denied altogether the rights of humanity. "Eh, Nangis, ce sont des hommes," was the reply even of an autocrat like Louis XIV when one of his dukes asked him why he did not execute all deserters. Despite many inconsistencies, that sentiment remained unchanged. It helped to

produce the French Revolution; it ended the slave-trade, and ultimately slavery.

Precisely at the moment of its triumph, this movement suffered a setback. Modern capitalism shewed the evils of an exploited proletariat. Men began to ask in what way, save the name of freedom, the modern wage-slave was better off than his predecessor, the chattel. Some would end this by a revolution. Others were willing to accept its essential fact, the exploitation of the many for the higher life of the few. Possibilities of Empire over black and yellow races raised once more the problem of racial differences. Darwin, too, and belief in heredity helped in the same direction. It was seen that nations could not be held together without authority, and that breed was a fact. Democracy in so far as it implies an absolute individualism, irrespective of blood, is not justified on the principles of evolution and heredity. The political fact of the consolidation of modern Germany by a military monarchy was a further stimulus.

Nietzsche is important in that he expresses and sums up a new critical attitude and calls men back to doctrines of the natural inequality of man. Doubtless, he owed much to his admired Gobi-neau and his work on *The Inequality of Races*. The tendency nowadays is to regard not the individual, but the group, as the social unit. This in itself is not contrary to Christianity, which never taught an absolute individualism and lays stress on the family. Nor is it even contrary to the present direction of social reform, which more and more tends to pay regard to the numerous groups which make up the nation, and to treat men as members of such bodies. It is easy to connect it with eugenics and the effort to limit the multiplication of those whom Nietzsche ridicules as "the botched and bungled." This may be done without that violence of pride and selfishness which Nietzsche applauds. Whether this tendency be right or wrong, it exists. Nietzsche is among

the most important influences which have developed it.

Another point is of even more note, although it is less obvious. Mere freedom without any restrictions is not possible in any society. The anarchy of the purely individualist ideal of the last century is becoming apparent in moral, intellectual, and artistic matters, and in social and political spheres it affords no pleasing prospect. Nietzsche's task, we must ever remember, was not ignoble. The raising of the type man, the winning of the highest culture, is an inspiring aim. Nietzsche saw that this would never be under the ideals then prevalent of comfort, money-getting, Christianity sunk into mere eudæmonism, elementary education, and the rule of the newspapers. He places in contrast the aristocratic ideals of courage and distinction. He asks the question, Who is to rule? As he points out, "Society seeks a commander."

Once more, in fact, he raises the ques-

tion, "What is the nature of Authority?" This question is one of increasing importance. People will be forced to answer it with more care than they have done recently. In all practical affairs, the common answer is: "Authority is what I like." Nietzsche's answer is that in the rare person: "Authority is what I command." He moves right away from the prevailing notion that every one's opinion is equally valuable. Creighton used to complain of "the appalling levity" with which people pronounced judgments on topics they have never studied. This evil is real. It is well that we should recognise it, while avoiding the opposite danger of the tyranny of the expert who cannot see the wood for the trees. In any case, the question which Nietzsche puts, or rather the problem which determined the direction of his thoughts, is one of capital importance. In the intellectual and religious no less than in political and artistic realms it will have its influence.

Whatever be the true answer, it must take into account the imaginative and subconscious elements in human nature, no less than the logical and articulate. The least reasonable of all replies is that negation of authority which we call absolute individualism. Hardly less so is that concentration of authority which in the State we call despotism, in the Church Infallibilism. Mankind has nowhere yet achieved success in this matter. Nowhere has it arrived at that form of political or even ecclesiastical development which shall secure a perfect balance, which shall allow to each individual his true place as a creator, *i. e.*, as an authority-making person, while, on the other hand, it insures to him the discipline from outside in the form of group-authority which shall guard against his own caprice. Nietzsche hoped that he had effected this by his new asceticism, by his Jesuitry of the new order for his race of ruling philosophers. Unluckily, he ended there. For the vast

majority of men he leaves no place at all, except to obey, to display the herd-virtues, while he assigns to them the part of mere tools to the higher man.

No system can endure that does that. It rests on a lie. Owing to existing differences, it may last for a time, like slavery. Here only would I emphasise this fact. Nietzsche's criticism of democracy, as he understood it, *i. e.*, as a theory of comfortable Philistines idealising sympathy and devoid of the austere virtues, was indeed one-sided and violent; but it had this merit—it posed the problem of the present age: How is society to be held together without rule? What are the true grounds of such rule? In other words, what is the basis of political and still more of intellectual and artistic obligation? Despite many volumes and much talk, this problem still exists. Nietzsche was right in saying, that it could not be solved merely by an appeal to logic or by giving free hand to the scientific expert.

We need not discuss again Nietzsche's criticism of rationalist ideals. His importance in this respect is obvious. In an age in which M. Bergson's is a name to conjure with, the connection of Nietzsche with a genuine movement away from the *Aufklärung* need not further be emphasised.

Lastly, it remains to ask, what lessons we can draw from Nietzsche in the domain of Christian apologetics.

First of all, we must recognise the recrudescence of pagan morality. No longer is there any excuse for saying that morality can be taken for granted, or that it does not matter what a man believes. Very early Nietzsche saw that it was hopeless to maintain the Christian standards apart from the Christian Faith. The novels of George Eliot were remarkable for one such attempt. Acton thought that their distinctive merit was this that, while the writer's standpoint was that of pure atheism, she yet maintained the

Christian ideal of human life. Nietzsche observed the same fact, but regarded it as a demerit.

Nietzsche has for ever shattered the old claim of the infidel that he waged no war against Christian ideals of living, but was concerned only to deny the puerilities of a supernatural creed. Whereas Gambetta said, "*Le cléricalisme c'est l'ennemi*," Nietzsche says: "*Le moralisme c'est l'ennemi*." Nietzsche knew very well how vain was the hope of the Tübingen school to destroy Christianity by criticism. So long as people went on admiring Christ, they would find means of remaining Christians. A few might give up the creed. The majority, however, seeing that creeds were integral to the moral ideal, would insist on keeping both. Nietzsche has proved right. People who want to believe are no longer disturbed by the presuppositions of intellectualism. Nietzsche himself helped to break them down. He did more service to the faith than he knew. Confident that

the Christian Spirit is the truth, many are content to wait even in the quagmire until criticism and thought have sifted the grain from the chaff.

Secondly, Nietzsche forces us to face one great fact—hatred. We have now before us the enmity of many men who give up the Christian Faith, not because they cannot believe it, but because they hate Christ. This hostility, though more bitter, is less hopeless than the cold contempt of the superior person. Nietzsche is a nobler foe, and his blows are direct, not like those of certain nominal Christians who under the dominion of ideas essentially naturalistic would have us surrender all that makes Christianity attractive. Christian morality is on its trial. More and more will it be openly attacked by those who worship “the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life.” Should these elements attain predominance as an ideal, a new outbreak of persecution is certain, and it will be as much more fiendish

than the old as the present war is more barbarous than those of the eighteenth century. Anything like tolerance is absent from these people. When his friend Romundt thought of becoming a priest, Nietzsche took it as a personal insult, the end of all friendship. Nietzsche himself deprecated persecution. Were his disciples, who have none of his charm, to get hold of the tiller, nothing can be more certain than that they would persecute. Nietzsche's philosophy is a repetition of the old complaint that Christians are *hostes humani generis*. Any general belief in it would produce the old cry, *Christiani ad leones*. His dislike of Christianity is indeed to many people his chief recommendation.

In another respect, Nietzsche is fruitful. Many amiable persons, some of them erudite, seem to discuss the problem of Christianity as though it were merely an intellectual amusement.¹ To others, again,

¹ *Leben*, II, 133: "Bis heute ist mir nichts fremder und unverwandter als die ganze europäische und amerikanische Spezies von 'libres penseurs' . . . sie glauben allesammt noch ans Ideal—'Ich bin der erste Immoralist.'" "

the whole matter seems capable of solution on grounds of historical criticism, in which are inherent presuppositions which they accept without inquiry. Before people begin to discuss the historical problem, they must have answered the old question, What is the chief end of Man? Much even of ultra-modernist or liberal writing seems to take for granted the Christian ideal, and merely to ask how to commend it. The real question is: "What think ye of Christ?" Is the Christian' ideal decadent or is it noble? Is it true, as St. Paul said in one of Creighton's favourite texts to ordinands, "that the weakness of God is stronger than men," or is Nietzsche's apotheosis of force the only truth? Many books are written now which ignore the fact that there can be any doubt about ethical ideals. The writer is occupied with the question as to which bit of the Creed he can throw as a sop to Cerberus, hoping thus to win the educated man. Nietzsche is a standing witness that, even if you

throw over the whole Creed, you are no nearer to your end; you will have made ridiculous what was always hateful. That is all. *L'homme moyen sensuel* is not and never will be Christian in his aims; now that he is educated and free he will say so. The very last thing that will attract is a Christianity with the supernatural left out, and all the old moral ideals intact. Such a man needs a change of heart before he wants Christ. When he does, except for one or two details, he will not be troubled by the Creed. "Except ye repent, and become as little children, ye cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven."

Nietzsche's call to reality is a lesson to all Christians. He saw that many men disguise their egotism under the mask of a high moral ideal; that even sympathy may be a cloak of self-indulgence and the love of power, and that pity in some matters is but the expression of cowardice. He summoned men to go out into the wilderness away from all hothouses, and predicted

treasures for all who treat life as a great adventure. Christians profess to do that. *Via Crucis via lucis* is their motto. In face of Nietzsche's attacks and those of others, a Christianity which is what Mr. Wells called "muffled" will have no appeal. Are there not many who act as though St. Paul had said that the love of money was a root of all good, instead of evil? Few Christians attain so high a standard as did Nietzsche.

Christians, again, in contradistinction to Nietzsche assert the will to freedom. They believe that we are all "members one of another." Yet do all of them live, or even try to live, as though they believed this? Christians may agree with Nietzsche in the doctrine of differences between men conditioned by natural gifts and inheritance. They are bound to differ from him when he bids them to treat large classes of men as mere things, the conditions of the higher life for themselves. But do they not sometimes live as though

that were the truth? No baser cynicism, as William Morris once said, can exist than that of the man of culture content to enjoy all the treasures of humanity without contributing anything. Yet without precisely intending it, many devout Christians are little better. They look upon the great mass of men as of a different order, and at every attempt to better their condition they set up a panic outcry that their dividends are in danger. That cry will nowadays unite many who differ in every other belief. Nietzsche is significant, not because he does not, but because he does, express the spirit of his time. All he did was to make it more articulate and to accept without glozing the fact, all too patent, of the servitude of the many for the comfort of the few. The temptation—expressed in the extreme in the *culte du moi*—to treat the whole crowd as mere instruments of my pleasure is a temptation as old as human nature. It is better indeed, for the most part,

that, even if men do these things, they should acknowledge a higher standard. Nietzsche has at least the merit of honesty. The more his writings are read, the more difficult will it be for Christians to go on trying to serve both God and Mammon. They cannot go on for ever halting between two opinions, directing their lives by one standard and professing lip service to another. They will have to come out and no longer be of those Limbo-spirits, "neither for God nor for his enemies."

Nietzsche is one of the many influences that will deepen the cleavage between the Church and the world in the future. All compromises will be less and less to the taste of the succeeding age. Much of Nietzsche is, indeed, of direct service to the Christian, and is far less antagonistic than he supposed. Even, however, with these reservations, there is a gulf fixed.

Nietzsche is a portent, as he said. His attitude of neo-pagan revolt against Chris-

tian and humane values is a symptom. Nietzsche claimed to be reviving the heroic prephilosophic spirit of Greece and Rome. The use to which he put classical culture is not new. We see it in some of the Renaissance princes or in our own Tiptoft.

Classical antiquity had many aspects. One such can be seen in that movement which steered by Plato's star. This movement developed ethical doctrines which resembled the Christian, and a sense of religious need which was fulfilled only in the Catholic Church. Friends and foes alike now recognise the greatness of this *præparatio evangelica*, not only in strictly philosophical thought, but also in ethics. Nietzsche was well aware of it, but he hated it, and Socrates to him spelled decadence. In later ages classical studies have often formed a propædæutic to Christian theology. Works like Fénelon's *Télémaque*, and indeed all the most characteristic literature of the seventeenth century shew the blending of the two streams of classical tradition

and Christian feeling. One eminent critic holds that the special note of the French genius is this blending of the two antiquities, and for that reason he sets Bossuet at its summit. Until recently this has been the spirit of classical culture in England.

Nietzsche also drew his inspiration from the classics, but it was an inspiration totally contrary. He went back to the pagan prephilosophic side of Hellenism, to Rome conquering and proud, not humane, as in Cicero. To him the Greek spirit was essentially this-worldly, outward, and barbaric. In Christianity he found the most dangerous enemy, for it had sucked the sap from the ancient tree and supplanted this grand, aristocratic immoralism.

There can be little doubt that Nietzsche was right in his facts. True Paganism is seen in the spirit of the Melian dialogue or of the Roman slave system, not in the refined ethics of Cicero or the meditative melancholy of Marcus Aurelius. This real Paganism is the sworn foe of Christianity

and of all ideals which believe in human brotherhood. Nietzsche drank deeply of this spirit and helped to make it operative. Many traces of this baleful side in classical culture may be seen to-day. We must face it. Christians have to meet an attack which owes its origin not to scientific inquiry or philosophic scepticism, but to the glamour of Athens and to the grandeur of Rome.

If in this respect Nietzsche is a foe, in another he is a friend. Nietzsche knew the tragedy of things. He never thought that evil was only an appearance, nor was suffering to him merely the creases in the eternal smile of the Absolute. No facile optimism, whether of Hegel or of Rousseau, no blind faith in the idol of automatic progress, no romantic idealisation of nineteenth-century enlightenment marred the clearness of his vision. He knew that life is tragic, and that man needs redemption. He knew, too, that the cost of any redemption that is worth having must be terrific.

The price for the world's ransom must be paid in blood. The world would not be worth redeeming could it be paid in any lower coinage. In this sense Nietzsche is at one with all that is best in Christianity, although he was opposed to much that masqueraded under that august title. Modern civilisation is the apotheosis of vulgarity—or was. In its gaudy and clamorous prosperity, with every shop-window shouting, men have mistaken all their values and mixed the colours of the world. In religion an idol has been made of easy amiability, and for the enthralling spectacle of God as Father men have substituted a pretty picture of the eternal grandmother. The “splendour of God” had become a tawdry oleograph, and a milk-and-water sentimentalism had usurped the once austere name of Christian piety. The reaction against Puritanism had led to a religion of weak good nature and the refusal of all austerity. It was against this that Nietzsche tilted when he attacked Strauss

and denounced the shallowness of free-thinking optimists. He was right. This, at least, we in our generation may learn. We learn it at the cost either of our own service or the loss of many friends—of whom we only dare hope that we may be not all unworthy. The world is once more revealed to us as a place “of true, marvelous, inextricable courage and power, a question-chamber of torture by rack and fire, with no sleep among the demon questioners, none among the angel watchers, none among the men who stand or fall beside these hosts of God.” This does not make faith easy. It makes it strong. Deafened by the thunder of the guns and dazed by the spectacle of a world in ruins, many a man and woman have lost all faith in a God who is Love. Those who keep their faith keep it with a difference. No more will they cavil at the Master’s likeness of His Father to an austere landowner. No more will they find it hard to believe that Love, because it is perfect, will send

not peace but a sword. Love is known for what it is, no sentimental wish for another's pleasure, which will be changed by a show of tears, but a resolute will for his true good—ready to purchase that good at any cost in pain, not only to himself but also to the loved one. "There is nothing so merciless as the mercy of God." Not all men will have religion now or at any time. But one great quality will come back to all religion that is real—the awe of God. Men have dreamed that they could love God yet cease altogether to fear Him. They have found that to love God without a holy fear is not possible. In the long run Love goes, too, and self reigns alone. Nietzsche felt this in a dim way. He got out of the difficulty by denying God altogether. But he kept the sense of the tragic and tremendous greatness of life. This, he said, we are to recognise, to embrace, and even to adore—if we would rise to the height of freedom. Courage and a face always smiling, with pain not merely braved

but transmuted, joy amid a universe which is a chamber of horrors, and life best felt as life with death lurking at every footfall, these were the maxims which he preached. All honour to him that he preached them with no hope of any reward, no gleam from any light behind the hill. We shall do well if we take from this bitter tonic its goodness, the sense of the greatness of things, the need of courage and a free soul, the worth of discipline, the futility of mere comfort-worship, and the vanity of all security that has any other anchor than our own soul. We Christians are the happier that we can see a reason for all this where Nietzsche saw none, and can say with the ancient sage: "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom; and to depart from evil, that is understanding."

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